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Chapter 2, titled "Hotelling Tax Competition" shows how competition among 
governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of 
taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentia- 
tion is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, 
when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. 
Non-existence of equilibrium, which is possible, is a metaphor for intense tax com- 
petition. The chapter also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination 
presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, 
but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated. 
Chapter 3 shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the 
GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Ree trade 
can never be achieved when punishment for deviation from a trade agreement 
is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions, ' the most severe form of 
punishment allowed (Article XXVIII). Retaliation is not allowed to entail higher 
tariffs than those set by the initial deviant. If, in addition, tariff bindings (Article 
11) limit an initial deviation from an agreement in a similar way, then efficient 
self-enforcing tariff reductions must proceed in a series of steps or 'rounds'. 
Chapter 4 provides an answer to the question "Why are trade agreements 
regional? " It argues that free trade agreements (FTAs) are regional because, in 
their absence, optimal tariffs are higher against (close) regional partners than 
(distant) countries outside the region. Optimal tariffs shift rents from foreign 
firms to domestic citizens. Lower transport costs imply higher rents and therefore 
higher tariffs. So regional FTAs have a higher payoff than non-regional FTAs. 
Therefore, only regional FTAs may yield positive gains when sponsoring an FTA 
is costly. To analyze equilibrium, standard theory of non-cooperative networks 
is extended to allow for asymmetric players. Naive best response dynamics show 
that 'trade blocks can be stepping blocks' for free trade. 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
"The best kind of economic theory has almost always reflected pol- 
icy concerns, while informing policy in turn. " 
(Bhagwat%, Greenaway and Panagariya 1998) 
In the areas of both international tax and trade policy, the experience of the last 
half a century or so has revealed that competition between governments in policy 
making has brought about losses in efficiency, in some areas quite significant. This 
dissertation takes as its starting point some worrying stylized facts about the na- 
ture of competition between national governments which existing theory does not 
adequately explain. It then develops aspects of existing theory in order to present 
ways of understanding how strategic interaction between national governments 
brings about losses of efficiency in ways that appear to fit the facts. 
In the area of international tax policy, an acceleration in the liberalization of 
capital markets since 1980 appears to have brought problems of tax competition 
to the fore, so much so that contemporary policy debates are now focused on 
how to limit the degree of competition, for example through tax harmonization 
measures. Nevertheless, questions are still being raised as to why tax competition 
has been harmful, against a backdrop of conventional wisdom which suggests that 
competition between governments should promote efficiency. 
I 
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In the area of international trade policy, by contrast, the problem of policy 
coordination failure was felt most acutely half a century earlier, from the 1930s 
until immediately after the Second World War. Since that time, trade agreements 
formerly under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) have gone some way to resolving the 
coordination failure. In contrast to the field of tax competition, there is widespread 
agreement that unfettered trade policy intervention is harmful when it carries effi- 
ciency losses with no terms of trade (or public good) benefits to set against them. 
Given widespread agreement that trade policy interventions should be removed, 
attention in this area is focusing instead on why the post war trade liberaliza- 
tion process has been so gradual under the GATT. By understanding historical 
difficulties, it is hoped that light will be shed on why further multilateral trade 
liberalization is proving so difficult to achieve. 
1.1 The Two Basic Questions 
1.1.1 How can Tax Competition be Harmful? 
In the field of tax competition, attention appears to be returning to a fundamental 
question: 'In what sense can tax competition be harmful? ' It is to this question 
that the first part of the dissertation is addressed. According to conventional 
thinking based on Tiebout (1956), competition between governments is thought of 
as useful in that it constrains governments' self-serving activities. This thinking 
applies conventional wisdom about the beneficial effects of competition between 
firms to the case where governments use the policy variables under their control to 
maximize the rents to office. Yet many would argue that tax competition between 
governments has done more to hinder than to enhance efficiency. 
Oates (1972) argues that the result of tax competition may be a tendency to- 
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wards inefficiently low levels of amenity provision. ' In an attempt to keep taxes 
low in order to attract business investment, government officials may hold spending 
below levels required for efficient amenity provision, particularly for those ameni- 
ties that do not offer direct benefits to local business. This idea that amenities 
and taxes are driven down to inefficient levels through competition between gov- 
ernments has come to be known as the 'Race to the Bottom Hypothesis'. 
Yet even though capital markets have become more integrated over the last 30 
years or so, recent empirical evidence has called into question the pervasiveness of 
the presumed worldwide race to the bottom of tax levels. For example, Baldwin 
and Krugman (2000) point out that tax rates have remained high in 'the core' of 
Europe in spite of far reaching market integration measures adopted by members 
of the European Union (EU). Capital does not appear to have flooded towards 
members in 'the periphery' despite their lower tax rates. In response, the debate 
over tax competition has begun to call for an explanation. 
Chapter I of this dissertation puts forward the idea that Hotelling's (1929) 
model can be adapted to understand why competition between governments in 
the taxation of production does not promote efficiency. In his classic article, 
Hotelling (1929) called into question the extent to which competition promotes 
efficiency when firms compete not just over prices but over product character- 
istics as well, and when consumers' preferences for product characteristics vary. 
Chapter 1 questions, along parallel lines, the extent to which competition promotes 
efficiency when governments compete not just over taxes but over levels of amenity 
provision, and when firms' preferences for levels of amenity provision vary. This 
chapter shows how competition among governments that tax the production of 
'The term 'amenity' (attributable in this context to unpublished research by Myrna Wooders) 
is used because the usual attributes of a *public good, ' namely non-excludability and non-rivalry, 
are not features of the goods that governments provide in the present analysis. Firms' 'prefer- 
ences' rather than firms' technologies are referred to in order to emphasize that each firm has a 
clearly defined pmfe7-red or ideal level of amenity promsion from which the actual level can vary. 
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mobile firms (the tax base in the model) can undermine efficiency. 
The characterization of efficiency loss is interesting in itself. Some governments 
can be driven to 'overprovide' amenities while others 'underprovide' amenities in 
equilibrium. This helps to explain taxation in the European core and periphery 
for example, and possibly across the developed versus the developing world. The 
chapter also examines other directions in which Hotelling's framework can be used 
to understand tax competition. These are explained in more detail below. 
Why Has M-ade Liberalization Been (So) Gradual? 
The second general question addressed by this dissertation is 'Why has the process 
of postwar trade liberalization not proceeded more rapidly towards free trade? ' 
Tariffs on manufactures have fallen from a trade-weighted average of about 50 
percent after the war to about 5 percent today. It has required eight protracted 
negotiating rounds under the GATT covering the whole of the post-war period 
to reach current levels of openness. At the time of writing, there are significant 
difficulties with launching a ninth round at Doha despite a consensus that fur- 
ther trade liberalization would be widely beneficial, especially in agriculture and 
services. According to the conventional view of a trade agreement as a repeated 
prisoners' dilemma, country representatives should have sat down around a table 
after the war and agreed upon a move more or less straight to free trade. 
Meanwhile, particularly in the recent past as the multilateral liberalization pro- 
cess has appeared to stall, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have proliferated. 
Consequently, there is a question mark over whether this proliferation of PTAs is 
consistent with the process of multilateral trade liberalization. Some participants 
in the debate hold the optimistic view that countries choose between regional and 
multilateral liberalization in an overall move towards free trade. Others are more 
pessimistic, arguing to the contrary that countries joining PTAs may be more pro- 
tectionist towards non-members than they were before, leading to fragmentation 
Outline of the arguments 
of the world trading system. 
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Chapter 2 of the dissertation addresses specifically the question of why trade 
liberalization proceeded in a series of negotiating rounds under the GATT. The 
GATT's institutional structure, now adopted by the WTO, is modelled as a dy- 
namic game and the resulting (most efficient) equilibrium path is analyzed and 
shown to exhibit gradual trade liberalization. 
Chapter 3 argues that world free trade may only be achievable via a period of 
regionalism. It also indicates more and less pessimistic scenarios, depending on 
the costs of negotiating an agreement. If the costs are relatively low then a move 
straight to free trade may be possible. If costs are higher then the liberalization 
process may stall at regionalism (or the process may not get off the ground at all 
if costs are very high). 
1.2 Outline of the arguments 
This section builds on the brief summary of questions posed and answers proposed 
in the previous section. While the previous section introduced the main ideas, this 
section discusses the development of those ideas in greater detail. The next two 
subsections relate quite closely to the development of the arguments in the chapters 
themselves. The two subsequent sections of the introduction contain overviews of 
the more general debates in each of the areas, putting the contributions of this 
dissertation into a broader context. Readers who are familiar with the literature 
in each of these areas may find these sections unnecessary. 
The dissertation is divided in two parts. The first part motivates the need for a 
new perspective on tax competition and then explains the way that this is actually 
developed. The second part examines the dynamics of trade liberalization, both 
through multilateral trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO and through the 
formation of regional trade agreements. 
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1.2.1 Part 1: A New Perspective on Tax Competition 
The idea that politicians are self-serving, and need some form of restraint coming 
possibly through competition, goes all the way back to Hobbes (1651). Indeed 
the word Levtathan, the title of Hobbes' treatise, has now been adopted as the 
generic term for a government that uses the policy instruments at its disposal 
to maximize its own power. Tiebout (1956) first conjectured that competition 
between governments could be beneficial when he argued that efficiency is reached 
through competition between jurisdictional governments if citizens are able to 
choose, or 'vote with their feet', between jurisdictions. This idea has subsequently 
been established in the literature, especially by the work of Wooders (1980,1985) 
and Conley and Wooders (1997,2001); see Wooders (1999) for a comprehensive 
review. 
A more recent preoccupation in this field is that competition between govern- 
ments for mobile capital will result in a 'race to the bottom' of taxes and amenity 
provision. It is argued that, by taxing at a lower rate in order to prevent capital 
from fleeing elsewhere, each government has an incentive to engage in wasteful 
competition with the consequence that amenities are underprovided. Whether 
competition promotes or detracts from efficiency rests essentially on whether or 
not governments have access to efficient taxation. The weight placed on inefficient 
outcomes reflects recognition that taxation is not generally efficient. Wilson (1986) 
and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) were the first to formalize the intuition of this 
argument, expounded by Oates (1972). 
Yet empirical evidence suggests that the existing literature does not Provide 
a comprehensive understanding of tax competition. One development is that the 
empirical literature remains unable to find conclusive support for the view that 
competition between governments promotes efficiency; see, for example, Oates 
(1985,1989) and Anderson and van den Berg (1998). But the second is that 
recent empirical work also questions the pervasiveness of a race to the bottom in 
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tax rates and amenity provision; see Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2001) for a 
comprehensive investigation encompassing OECD countries. More than this, there 
appears to be evidence that richer countries are not being forced to lower tax rates 
to prevent capital from migrating to poorer countries. Baldwin and Krugman 
(2000) present empirical evidence which suggests that countries in the European 
core have not needed to lower tax rates in order to prevent capital from migrating 
to poorer countries in the periphery. There are also suggestions that on a wider 
scale OECD countries have not had to lower tax rates in order to compete with 
developing countries. Taken together, it has been suggested that these findings 
call for further developments in the theory of tax competition to explain them. 
As mentioned above, Chapter 1 develops a model of Hotelling tax competition 
to show how different governments can be driven simultaneously to 'overprovide' 
and to 'underprovide' amenities in equilibrium, undermining efficiency. The model 
may explain the patterns observed in the European core versus the periphery, 
and between the developed and developing worlds. Thus, the model provides a 
synthesized way of understanding the empirical observations outlined above. 
A key element of the analysis in Chapter 1 is that firms have diverse techno- 
logical requirements for levels of amenity provision. Suppose, for example, that 
the amenity in question is a legal system. It is generally agreed that some type of 
legal system will benefit a firm in its production activities and in bringing goods 
to market. But the ideal level of coverage differs across firms and certainly across 
industries. One firm's necessary legal protection is another's excessive red tape. 2 
In the previous literature, where all firms tend to have the same technological 
requirements for amenities, the forces of competition tend to push all governments 
in the same direction. With technological diversity among firms, it is not clear 
whether competitive forces will act similarly to push all governments in the same 
direction, or whether they will be pushed apart. Hotelling's Principle of Mini- 
mum Product Differentiation predicts that goverm-nents will provide amenities at 
2This idea is developed further, using other examples, in the chapter itself. 
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the same (inefficient) level. However, research by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and 
Thisse (1979) has called into question Hotelling's Differentiation result. Extending 
the intuition arising from their results on competition between firms to competi- 
tion between governments suggests that competition might instead mo-umize the 
differentiation between governments' levels of amenity provision. Demonstrating 
this constitutes one of the main contributions of Chapter L' 
An alternative possibility that arises in the framework of Chapter I is that an 
equilibrium does not exist. This 'equilibrium existence problem' is an extension of 
a result by dAspremont et al (1979) to the context of tax competition. When firms 
are highly responsive to a government's efforts to attract them to its jurisdiction 
by changing its level of amenity provision then this situation arises. Firms are 
more responsive to change when a move away from their ideal level of amenity 
provision incurs a relatively high cost. Non-existence of equilibrium in this present 
setting is a formal metaphor for intense tax competition. No equilibrium level of 
taxation exists at which governments stop undercutting each other in tax levels. 
Governments continually respond to each others' tax plans with successive but 
unending small tax reductions. 
The non-existence of equilibrium characterizes quite nicely informal accounts of 
policy discussions amongst European policy officials, for example. They complain 
of continually having to look over their shoulders at the policy announcements 
of other governments in the EU and make counter-announcements themselves. 
The problem of unending tax cuts suggested by the model also seems to motivate 
present calls in the European policy debate for tax harmonization. 
The results just discussed depend on the assumption that governments set a 
uniform tax schedule. That is, all firms locating in a jurisdiction must pay the 
same tax. The second part of Chapter 1 examines whether it is possible to resolve 
the problems of equilibrium existence or efficiency by allowing governments to 
3See the next section for a review of the literature. See Chapter 1 for a detailed comparison 
of the model presented to Hotelling's original. 
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engage in perfect tax discrimination. As with perfect price discrimination, where 
firms can tailor prices to individual consumers, under perfect tax discrimination 
governments can tailor taxes to individual producers. Another interpretation of 
this alternative policy regime is that governments are able to offer tax breaks from 
a uniform schedule to firms in order to attract them to the jurisdiction. ' 
Bhaskar and To (2002) show that the issue of equilibrium existence in the 
Hotelling model is completely resolved under perfect price discrimination. In Chap- 
ter I it is discovered that even when governments are able to discriminate perfectly 
between firms in setting taxes, the equilibrium existence problem is only partially 
resolved. There is a larger range of values for which the cost of amenity mismatch 
supports an equilibrium. But even under perfect tax discrimination, if the cost of 
amenity mismatch is relatively high then tax competition is so intense that the 
system does not settle down to an equilibrium. The difference in the outcome 
arises because in the present analysis the level of governments' costs are endoge- 
nous, depending on the level amenity provision, whilst in the analysis of Bhaskar 
and To costs are exogenous as in a conventional Bertrand type framework. 
1.2.2 Part 11: The GATT, Regionalism, and the Postwar 
Trade Liberalization Process 
The significant reductions in tariff rates achieved over the postwar period have 
been accompanied by sustained growth in international trade. World trade growth 
in real (volume) terms averaged 6.2 percent per year over the period 1960-1994. 
Whilst no single explanation is widely accepted for this growth in trade, tariff 
reductions achieved on a multilateral basis through the GATT are recognized as 
an important contributory factor. As well as generating direct welfare gains from 
trade, the establishment of a stable set of rules that govern the world trading sys- 
4See Chapter I for a discussion of related literature on perfect price discrimination and on 
tax breaks. 
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tem is reckoned to have promoted international cooperation more widely, in areas 
such as FDI for example. These developments are believed to have contributed in 
turn to improvements in economic performance and welfare in the postwar period 
(Whalley and Hamilton 1996). 
A Theory of GATT Rounds 
These gains to trade notwithstanding, concerns have been raised over the slow pace 
of the liberalization process. These concerns have been amplified with an apparent 
slowing down of the process itself. Since the early 1980s, a literature has developed 
to explain why trade liberalization has been gradual. Early contributions were 
made from a traditional neoclassical standpoint. They tried to explain why a 
country would unilaterally (i. e. independently of behavior of other countries) wish 
to gradually reduce its import tariffs, based on various types of market failure 
within the domestic economy (see Leamer 1980 and Mussa 1986 for examples). ' 
One important aspect overlooked by all models of unilateral gradualism is the 
terms-of-trade motive for tariff setting. It has long been recognized (certainly 
since Mill 1844) that when countries have purchasing power on world markets, 
they can use it to improve their terms of trade using interventions such as tariffs. 
In such a world, countries will not adopt free trade unilaterally. Taking account 
of each country's own incentive to set tariffs, it is well understood that any trade 
agreement must be self- enforcing. This point was first made in the context of trade 
agreements by Dixit (1987). Each participating country must get a higher payoff 
from being in the agreement than remaining outside. And given that a country 
deviates from the agreement, the tariff level adopted in punishment against that 
country must be credible. That is, it must be in the interests of all the other 
parties to enact a tariff at that level. 
The new literature on gradual trade liberalization plays on the credibility of 
'See Section 1.4 for a review of the literature, where these papers and others will be discussed 
in greater detail. 
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participants' claims to adopt free trade immediately. ' The general idea is that 
initially, full liberalization cannot be self-enforcing, as the benefits of deviating 
from free trade are too great to be offset by any credible punishment. But if there 
is partial liberalization, structural economic change within the domestic economy 
reduces the benefits of deviation from further trade liberalization (and/or raises 
the costs of punishment to the deviator). This enables free trade to be approached 
in a series of steps. 
For example, Staiger (1995) endows workers in the import competing sector 
with special use-it-or-loose-it skills. Initially, the government cannot credibly com- 
mit to free trade because if it reneges then it averts a contraction of the import 
competing sector, securing an additional payoff to the skills of workers there. These 
gains, together with gains in the export sector from the other country's move to 
free trade, make the payoff from deviation higher than from the agreement. But 
because the payoff to liberalization are declining at the margin, some liberalization 
can be committed to credibly, enabling free trade to be reached in stages. 
Another way to emphasize the contrast between models of unilateral and mul- 
tilateral gradualism is that in the former case a planner would liberalize gradually 
whilst in the latter case it would move straight to free trade; gradualism occurs 
due to strategic interaction between the players. 
Chapter 2 asks why trade liberalization under the GATT proceeded gradually, 
in a series of rounds, and attributes the cause at least partly to the GATT's own 
institutional structure. This institutional structure is shown to create a strategic 
incentive for countries to proceed gradually with trade liberalization. The approach 
of Chapter 2 contrasts markedly with the previous literature, which concentrates 
on features of the domestic economy to explain gradualism. In particular, the 
chapter focuses on the implications for the liberalization process of the GATT rule 
on the unthdrawal of equivalent concessions (WEC) as set out in Article XXVIII 
of the GATT charter, and on taTiff bindings as set out in Article 2. Given that the 
6Myopic best response tariffs are taken as the starting point. 
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GATT Articles have now been adopted formally by the WTO, the issues identified 
are likely to carry over to the new institution. 7 
Suppose that a deviant country fails to implement some agreed market access 
measure, whilst all other parties to the agreement proceed to do so. When the 
failure is discovered, under GATT rules trade partners are allowed to do no more 
than to withdraw market access concessions equivalent to those that the deviant 
failed to implement. Exactly this penalty structure is modelled in the context of 
a dynamic game and it implications for trade liberalization under the GATT are 
analyzed. In terms of the applied game theory literature, WEC imposes paTtial 
irreversibility on punishments in this game. This is new, in that only complete 
irreversibility has been analyzed in the past (Lockwood and Thomas 2002). 
The first main result presented in Chapter 2 is that the VVEC rule does facilitate 
trade liberalization but, when retaliation is limited by the VVEC rule, free trade 
certainly cannot be reached no matter how little countries discount the future. This 
result contrasts markedly with conventional insights from the theory of repeated 
games, which indicate that free trade can be achieved, given sufficiently little 
discounting. The intuition behind our result is simple. A standard repeated game 
allows trade partners to implement the worst (credible) punishment against a 
deviant. In general, the VVEC rule makes such severe punishments illegal. By 
outlawing a class of severe punishments, the WEC rule compromises efficiency. 
Note that for this first result, partial irreversibility is imposed only on one side of 
the agreement. That is to say, - WEC limits only the actions of punishers. 
The second main result concerns the gradualism of trade liberalization. Specif- 
ically, if punishments are constrained by the WEC rule and the initial deviation 
by any country is also constrained, then the most efficient self enforcing path of 
7The chapter focuses on the broad sweep of postwar trade liberalization up to the end of the 
Uruguay round, at which point the WTO was formed. Over that period, the GATT's articles 
were adhered to closely by signatories. Since the WTO's inception in 1996 adherence to the rules 
appears to have been more limited, particularly by the EU and US. 
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trade liberalization is gradual; trade liberalization must take place in a series of 
rounds. 
How is an initial deviation also constrained? Article 2 of GATT (1994) specifies 
that a schedule of comn-litments be maintained. Results of tariff negotiations are 
recorded as scheduled commitments in the form of tariff bindings; a permanent 
and irrevocable commitment that tariffs will not Tise above bound levels for the 
product in question. If tariffs are raised above bound levels, then it is assumed that 
the deviant incurs a loss of polffical good unll. Moreover, it is supposed that the 
loss of political good will is so costly that it is never incurred in equilibrium. This 
implies that the optimal deviation is simply not to cut tariffs from the previous 
period's level (but not to raise them either). In this situation, because punishment 
is limited, current tariff cuts can only be made self enforcing by the promise of 
future tariff reductions. Moreover, if deviation can at worst entail not raising 
tariffs, then it is always possible to promise liberalization over a number of future 
periods that would more than compensate. This is gradualism in other words. 
Taken together, these findings provide a way of understanding why multilateral 
trade liberalization proceeded in a series of rounds under the GATT, and why the 
process has not reached free trade. 
Why Are Trade Blocks Regional; A Theory Based on Noncooperative 
Networks 
As the process of multilateral trade liberalization has slowed down, there has been 
an increase in the formation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). In the 
period 1948-1994, GATT contracting parties notified 118 PTAs relating to trade 
in goods, of which 38 were notified in the five years ending in 1994. Since the 
completion of the Uruguay Round, 80 additional PTAs covering trade in goods 
and services have been notified. See Whalley and Hamilton (1996) and Sampson 
(1996) for more information about the recent increase in the number of preferential 
trade agreements. Despite the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there 
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is still concern that increased regional integration may result in a fragmentation 
of the world economy into competing trade blocs. 
The literature on preferential trade agreements can broadly be broken down 
into two phases, as suggested by Bhagwati (1991,1993). The first phase focuses 
on static questions concerning the welfare effects of PTAs. This field of research 
was initiated by Viner (1950), who pointed out that a PTA may be 'trade divert- 
ing'. That is, the preferential treatment of members' goods may divert trade away 
from non-members that have a comparative advantage in one or more goods over 
both members. In a small country world, if the trade diversion effect dominates 
then PTA formation is efficiency reducing. Pre-Vinearian analysis of trade block 
formation was built on the presumption that all trade liberalization is efficiency 
enhancing. Current concerns about the proliferation of PTAs are founded on the 
possibility that trade diversion dominates. 
The second phase of development in the literature focuses on whether PTAs 
can provide impetus to, or whether they will detract from, the worldwide freeing 
of trade. Bhagwati (1993) has described this as the 'dynamic' time-path question. 
In less formal terms, he asks, will trade blocks be 'building blocks' or 'stumbling 
blocks' in the path to free trade. 
One issue that the theoretical literature has not focused much attention on 
is why trade agreements are almost always regional. ' However, as we shall see, 
Chapter 3 suggests that the regional nature of trade agreements may be important 
in understanding the dynamic time path question of regionalism. 
Prominent examples of regional trade blocks are the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and European Union (EU). In both cases, members share 
80nly Bond (1999) considers the spacial dimension of regionalism. He compares the sustain- 
ability of multilateral versus regional trade agreements in a repeated game setting, where both 
types of agreement are sustained through trigger strategies. In Bond's model, optimal tariffs 
are higher between closer neighbors, and this makes regional agreements easier to sustain using 
trigger strategies. 
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common borders. Wider evidence that trade blocks are predominantly regional 
is provided by WTO (2000), a report titled "Mapping of Regional Trade Agree- 
ments" , in which each of the 150 agreements notified to the WTO are represented 
in map form. Yet the theoretical literature has tended to focus on the economic 
implications of regional trade agreements, taking their regional nature for granted. 
Some empirical investigations have sought to understand the regional nature 
of trade agreements. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) use a gravity model to show 
that countries behave preferentially towards close neighbors; trade volumes in the 
Western Hemisphere and elsewhere are greater than could be explained by 'natural 
determinants' such as distance, size and common languages. Similarly, Panagariya 
(1998) shows, also by taking a gravity model to the data, that transport costs alone 
are not sufficient to explain why trade agreements are regional. 
Chapter 3 presents a theory of why there may be a strategic incentive to form 
regional trade blocks. In the process, the dynamic time path question is addressed 
by showing conditions under which trade blocks will be building blocks in the 
freeing of trade multilaterally and conditions when the process will stall at region- 
alism. The chapter argues that politicians balance the increased likelihood that 
they will be voted for if they coordinate a PTA against the coordination cost itself. 
The increased likelihood of being voted for results from conventional welfare gains 
to trade due to formation of the PTA. In the model, trade based gains to (close) 
countries of the same region are higher than gains to an agreement involving (dis- 
tant) countries from different regions. The costs of bringing politicians together 
from different nations in order to coordinate an agreement are assumed to be 
proportional to the number of countries involved, and not dependent upon which 
countries the politicians come from. Therefore, a regional PTA may be worth 
coordinating whilst one involving countries from outside the region may not. 
What is the basis for higher production-trade payoffs to a regional agreement? 
According to standard optimal tariff theory, the higher the rents made by a foreign 
firm in the domestic market, the more scope there is for shifting rents to domestic 
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citizens through the use of higher tariffs. And because trading costs increase with 
distance, firms make higher rents in nearby markets than those that are further 
away. So in the absence of an agreement, optimal tariffs are higher on imports 
from countries in the same region than on imports from countries of other regions. 
It follows that a free trade agreement (FTA) between two close neighbors brings 
about larger production and trade gains than between distant countries because 
the former entails a larger mutual tariff reduction. 
Whilst standard optimal tariff theory provides a basis for individual tariff set- 
ting, a general framework is needed in which the overall structure of trade agree- 
ments in the (world) economy can be analyzed. Politicians' incentives to form 
international trade agreements throughout the world is formalized by adapting 
Bala and Goyal's (2000) model of noncooperative network formation. Bala and 
Goyal bring the communication networks previously modelled by others, notably 
Myerson (1977) and Jackson and Wolinski (1996), into a noncooperative setting. 
The main result of the chapter concerns the characterization of the equilibrium 
FTA structure that emerges over time under different levels of sponsorship cost. 
Not surprisingly, if sponsorship costs are above a certain level then no FTAs will 
form at any point on the equilibrium path, and if they are below a certain level then 
world free trade will emerge straight away. It is when sponsorship costs are at an 
intermediate level that regionalism arises and can persist over time. Perhaps most 
interesting of all, a range of sponsorship costs is identified at which regionalism 
emerges first before free trade can be reached. In that case alone, trade blocks are 
indeed building blocks to the achievement of world free trade. 
1.3 Overview of The Debate on Tax Competition 
This section reviews the traditional literature on tax competition according to the 
Tiebout hypothesis and the more recent literature on capital tax competition. The 
section on Tiebout tax competition also reviews work on tax competition between 
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Leviathan governments as this can be thought of as the outcome of a departure 
from the perfect competition of a Tiebout model. Relevant empirical literature 
is also surveyed. See Wilson (1999) for an excellent comprehensive review of the 
wider tax competition literature. See also Berliant and Page (2001) for the state 
of the art on optimal income taxation and public good provision. 
1.3.1 'Tiebout' and Leviathan Tax Competition 
As Wilson (1999) points out, Tiebout's theory of local amenity provision also pro- 
vides a theory of efficient tax competition. First the basic framework is presented, 
then the relationship to the idea of Leviathan governments is considered in which 
competition between jurisdictions is relaxed. 
The Basic Framework 
A jurisdiction can be thought of as a group of individuals who collectively pro- 
vide amenities. To do so, the government offers local amenities that are financed 
through local taxes. ' In large economies with relatively small effective jurisdic- 
tions, there are outcomes that are efficient. That is to say, outcomes cannot be 
improved upon by a reorganization of individuals between jurisdictions. For exam- 
ple, Wooders (1985) demonstrates that when local amenities are financed by lump 
sum taxation and consumers can 'opt out 7 to provide the amenities for themselves, 
then the outcome is near-optimal, where the closeness of the outcome to efficiency 
depends on the costs of opting out. 
There is tax competition in this model in the sense that a jurisdiction's taxes 
must be kept low enough to induce individuals to reside in the jurisdiction, given 
the amenities that are being provided. Taxes are collected in the form of efficient 
lump-sum 'head' taxes and they are set so that each resident's tax bill equals the 
cost of providing him with public amenities. This marginal-cost-pricing rule results 
! 'See NVooclers (1999) for a more general interpretation of the model. 
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in efficient migration decisions. There is now a very large literature extending these 
results; see Wilson (1999) and Wooders (1999) for an overview. 
Tiebout tax competition models have been extended to incorporate mobile 
firms; see for example Richter and Wellisch (1996). There are assumed to be a 
large number of firms, each of which is charged a lump-sum tax that covers the 
cost of the amenities that it uses. The idea that firms have a large number of 
jurisdictions from which to choose remains important for efficiency in this setting. 
Leviathan as the Converse of Efficiency under Tiebout 
There is a natural presumption that if the firms in a Tiebout world were not 
constrained by perfect competition they would act in a self-serving monopolistic 
fashion. This parallels the generally expected behavior of firms as competition is 
relaxed. Thus, a world of Leviathan governments emerges from the Tiebout setting 
as a constraint is placed on the number of jurisdictions. Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) argue that the size of government is excessive in the absence of competition. 
More recently, formal models have been constructed to show that policy-makers 
with Leviathan tendencies tend to behave inefficiently under limited competition; 
see for example Edwards and Keen (1996) and Mintz and Tulkens (1996). 
The model presented in Chapter I is essentially a model of Leviathan govern- 
ments. One way to see the formal set-up is to think of a Tiebout tax competition 
model with mobile firms, where firms vary in their amenity requirements, but 
with a limited number of jurisdictions. There are a large number of firms and 
in both cases taxes are effectively 'lump sum'. It is the limit to the number of 
jurisdictions coupled with a variation in firms' preferences for amenity provision 
that brings about a loss of efficiency under Hotelling tax competition, in contrast 
to the efficient outcome in the Tiebout setting. 
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The Empirical Literature: Looking for Leviathan 
Success appears limited in the search for a relationship between aggregate gov- 
ernment size and efficiency. Indeed, empirical tests for Leviathan by Oates (1985, 
1989) and others have had difficulties in even confirming that there is a relationship 
between aggregate government size and the decentralization of fiscal decisions be- 
tween independent governments, let alone identifying welfare implications of such 
a relation. More recently, Anderson and van den Berg (1998) find no evidence of 
a relation between fiscal decentralization and government size. 
1.3.2 Capital Tax Competition 
Wasteful tax competition involves some departure from the idealized setting of 
Tiebout models. As mentioned before, the key difference with capital tax compe- 
tition is that efficient taxation is not possible. This brings about a fiscal externality. 
As one government changes taxes to improve the welfare of its own citizens, this 
lowers the welfare of citizens in other jurisdictions. The basic principle of capital 
tax competition is illustrated here using a simplified framework based on Wilson 
(1986) and Zodrow and Mieskowski (1986). 
The Basic Framework 
As before there are many jurisdictions. The citizens within jurisdictions are as- 
sumed to be consumers, producers and capitalists. Placing all these roles 'under 
one roof' abstracts from distributional issues. Within each jurisdiction, firms en- 
gage in competitive production, taking prices and amenities as given to produce 
a single output. Two factors are used in production; labor and capital. Citizens 
cannot move between jurisdictions, and supply their labor inelastically. Citizens 
also have a fixed capital endowment which they are free to rent to producers in 
any jurisdiction; capital is perfectly mobile. Once investment and production take 
place, the output is sold to residents for final consumption and to the government 
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as an intermediate good in production of the amenity. Consumption is financed 
with wages and capital income. 
A nice way to illustrate the effect of capital tax competition is first to sho. v 
that when labor is taxed the outcome is efficient. This is because, with labor 
inelastically supplied, the tax is effectively lump-sum. One justification for the 
assumption that efficient taxation is not feasible is that it is administratively easier 
to set the same tax on land and capital. More controversially, it is often argued that 
attempts to introduce a lump-sum tax by Mrs Thatcher, UK Prime Minister in the 
1980s, met with such resistance on equity grounds that she was forced from office. 
When using the model to demonstrate inefficiencies through tax competition, it is 
assumed that tax revenue must be raised through taxation of mobile capital. 
The government is assumed to be a benevolent dictator so that no loss of 
efficiency can be attributed to wastefulness of policy making. Even then, when 
mobile capital is taxed on an ad valorem or specific basis, an externality results 
which brings about inefficiently low taxation and amenity provision in equilibrium. 
The mechanism works as follows. To finance a unit rise in spending, the govern- 
ment must raise taxes. As a result, the cost of capital rises, causing the demand for 
capital to fall. In a model where jurisdictions are assumed to be small, the interest 
rate remains fixed and there is no change to capital incomes. However, wages must 
fall to prevent firms from making negative profits. Therefore, citizens effectively 
pay the tax through a reduction in their wages. This tax increase must be high 
enough not only to pay for the increase in the marginal cost of the government 
spending itself but also to offset the negative effect on tax revenue of the capital 
outflow. Thus, citizen's income will fall as a result by more than the marginal 
cost of the amenity. The marginal benefit of government spending exceeds the 
marginal cost to compensate for the tax induced capital outflow. According to the 
Samuelson rule, efficiency requires that the marginal benefit of amenity provision 
is equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, with utility from the amenity provisioil 
declining at the margin, taxation and amenity provision must be too low. 
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The basic insights from the effects of tax competition have provoked a huge amount 
of interest in extensions of the basic environment and policy analysis to resolve 
the problem. An important extension involves analysis of situations where produc- 
ers in different jurisdictions have different technologies or residents have different 
preferences. This gives rise to variations in tax rates. Variation in tax rates gives 
rise to an additional inefficiency; a fully efficient allocation cannot be achieved if 
tax rates differ across jurisdictions, and identical tax rates are usually not consis- 
tent with differences in amenity levels across jurisdictions arising from variations 
in technologies or preferences. This type of inefficiency creates a role for a cen- 
tral authority to put in place "corrective subsidies" which, as well as redressing 
interjurisdictional imbalances, can force all jurisdictions to raise taxation to the 
efficient level; see Wildasin (1989), DePater and Myers (1994). 
Large jurisdictions have also been analyzed, as well as situations in which ju- 
risdictions vary in size. For example, Wildasin (1988,1989) allows changes in the 
demand for capital to have an effect on the interest rate. The overall effect of 
tax competition is the same but damped by offsetting interest rate changes. Bu- 
covetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) analyze asymmetric tax competition between 
a large jurisdiction and a small jurisdiction, distinguished by the number of resi- 
dents, each with the same labor and capital endowments. They show that small 
jurisdictions tend to be better off under tax competition than large jurisdictions, 
and can even do better than in the absence of tax competition. Since the large 
jurisdiction demands a relatively large amount of capital, an increase in its tax 
rate depresses the after tax return on capital by a relatively large amount. Thus, 
the overall (tax inclusive) cost of capital is less sensitive to tax changes in the large 
jurisdiction than in the small jurisdiction. This suggests that laxge jurisdictions 
will compete less vigorously for capital through tax rate reductions and therefore 
end tip with taxes at a higher rate. 
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Other situations analyzed include fiscal competition (Wildasin 1989) where 
governments compete not in taxes but in expenditures, producing an even more 
severe crace to the bottom' type outcome, and situations where variations in tax 
policy actually creates a motive for trade (Wilson 1987). 
More recently, research has identified effects to counteract the fiscal externality 
and bring about a 'race to the top; ' excessive amenity provision with taxes set too 
high. This possibility is demonstrated by Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon (2001) 
among others. Such an outcome arises in equilibrium when amenity provision 
enhances productivity so that a rise in taxation is associated with a rise in the de- 
mand for capital and therefore creates a positive externality between jurisdictions. 
Limits to the Empirical Evidence of a 'Race to the Bottom' 
The 'Race to the Bottom' hypothesis has proved almost impossible to test empir- 
ically. Not only does it require the strategic interactions between jurisdictions to 
be tested. It also requires some estimate of the efficient level of taxation to be 
established before a comparison can be made to actual levels. 
On a heuristic basis, much of the concern over tax competition has arisen 
simply because the universally quoted Statutory Tax Rate has been seen to fall 
across a number of countries in the last three decades or so. But Devereux, Griffith 
and Klemm (2001) bring together a number of different measures for the OECD 
countries over the period 1970-1998 to establish whether this trend is borne out 
when looking at other measures of capital taxation such as the Implicit Tax Rate 
on Corporate Profits (ITR-COR). The nature of their findings is summarized in 
the following quote: "The differences in the development of STAT and ITR-COR 
over time is striking. The former clearly fell over time while the latter did not, 
and if anything rose. " Mintz and Smart (2001) present and examine evidence that 
corporate income tax rates have remained the same or increased slightly since 
1986 across provinces in Canada. Baldwin and Krugman (2000) present empirical 
evidence (as well as a theoretical model) which counters the idea that historically 
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high taxation countries have had to lower their capital tax rates across the board 
as European capital markets have become more integrated. I-Eggott (1999) draws 
attention to a number of other papers which cast doubt over the pervasiveness of 
the 'race to the bottom' hypothesis. 
1.4 Overview of The Debate on Postwar Trade 
Liberalization 
The Debate on Gradual Trade Liberalization 
Since the 1980s a literature has developed to explain why world trade liberalization 
over the post-war period has been phased, requiring no less than eight rounds of 
trade talks under the GATT, spanning almost half a century. The purpose of this 
section is to give an overview of this literature, drawing attention to the different 
ways of understanding aspects of the process. The first explanations focused on 
market failures within the domestic economy to understand why a country might 
unilaterally have an incentive to liberalize gradually. The literature then moved 
on to take into account strategic incentives to understand why countries could not 
credibly commit to full liberalization immediately, but may be able to do so over 
time. These all focus on economic costs and benefits to liberalization that exist 
within the domestic economy. 
Unilateral Gradualism 
Early contributions were made from the traditional neoclassical standpoint. They 
tried to explain why a country would unilaterally (i. e. independently of the behav- 
ior of other countries) wish to gradually reduce its import tariffs, based on various 
types of market failure within the domestic economy. The first kind of explanation 
for unilateral gradualism is driven by the assumption that there are costs of adjust- 
ment in moving resources out of imPort-competing industries to other activities 
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(Leamer 1980, Mussa 1986). Mussa explicitly assumes convex costs of adjustment 
in a multi-period setting, so it follows directly that adjustment should be gradual, 
and the costs of adjustment are implicitly convex in Leamer. 
Focusing on Mussa's explanation of unilateral gradualism, a link is drawn be- 
tween the rate at which a sector contracts - due to trade liberalization - and the 
unemployment rate. Convexity, in this context, means that the rate of unemploy- 
ment rises more than proportionally to the rate of sectoral contraction. It follows 
that there is an optimal gradual rate of trade liberalization. If liberalization pro- 
ceeds 'too quickly', then the cost to society through unemployment is greater than 
the standard efficiency gains through liberalization. Mussa's approach might be 
criticized because unemployment in his model is not well founded in micro theory. 
But it is probably fair to say that there is still no general agreement on the micro- 
foundations of unemployment. So Mussa's starting point of simply assuming a link 
between sectoral contraction and unemployment, then examining the implications, 
has been accepted as a worthwhile and interesting contribution in this area. 
Leamer's adjustment cost, measured in labor units, is proportional to the num- 
ber of workers who move out of the import-competing sector. But as output is a 
concave function of employment, adjustment costs measured in units of output are 
convex i. e. 1% of the number of workers moving leads to more than a 1% decrease 
ill output. 
Unilateral gradualism can also be explained by the political economy of tariff 
adjustment in declining industries. Cassing and Hillman (1986) have a model 
where, following an exogenous negative shock in the world price, the import- 
competing sector can lobby the government for tariff protection. The level of 
the tariff is assumed to depend positively on the current level of employment in 
the sector. However, they focus on industry collapse (with the tariff falling to 
zero) rather than on gradual adjustment. Brainard and Verdier(1994) endogenize 
the relationship between employment and tariffs via an explicit model of lobbying 
and find that adjustment will be gradual (i. e. both the import tariff and employ 
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ment in the declining industry fall gradually over time). However, the Brainard 
and Verdier model has strictly convex costs of adjustment, so a social planner 
would also choose gradualism. Free trade is generally consistent with theories of 
unilateral gradualism. 
Multilateral Gradualism and the Bicycle Theory 
One crucial aspect overlooked by all models of unilateral gradualism is the terms- 
of-trade motivation for tariff setting. It has long been recognized that when coun- 
tries have purchasing power on world markets, they can use it to improve their 
terms of trade using trade interventions like tariffs. Only relatively recently have 
developments in game-theory presented trade theorists with a range of conceptual 
tools for thinking about the strategic interactions that result. 
Taking account of each country's own incentive to set tariffs, it is well un- 
derstood that any trade agreement must be self-enforc%ng (see Dixit 1987). The 
standard mechanism is an agreed punishment against countries that renege. This 
punishment must be credible. For example, if everyone knows that an optimal tar- 
iff allows at least some trade, then it would not be credible for any one country to 
threaten to sever all trade relations. The same incentive to deviate from no-trade 
exists as to deviate from free trade. 
The new literature on gradual trade liberalization plays on the credibility of 
threatened punishments in a trade agreement, and the way that these can change as 
a result of the liberalization process. Different motivations have been put forward 
by Staiger(1995), Devereux(1997), E'urusawa and Lai(1999)). The general idea is 
that initially, full liberalization cannot be self-enforcing, as the benefits of deviating 
from free trade are too great to be offset by any credible punishment. But if 
there is partial liberalization, structural economic change reduces the benefits of 
deviation from further trade liberalization (and/or raises the costs of punishment 
to the deviator). The individual papers differ in their description of the structural 
change induced by partial liberalization. As already mentioned, Staiger(1995) 
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endows workers in the import competing sector with specific skills, making them 
more productive there than elsewhere in the economy. When they move out of 
this sector, they lose their skills with some probability. In Devereux(1997), there 
is dynamic learning- by-doing in the export sector. In Furusawa and Lai(1999), 
there are adjustment costs incurred when labor moves between sectors. Because 
of the existence of adjustment costs, adjustment is not eventually to free trade in 
Furusawa and Lai, but to a positive tariff where the marginal world benefit from 
tariff reduction is equal to the resulting marginal cost of adjustment (Furusawa and 
Lai, Section 3). In Staiger (1995) and Devereux (1997) uninterrupted liberalization 
eventually results in free trade. 
One idea that has been associated with gradualism is that if negotiating rounds 
fail then there will be a collapse back to higher levels of protectionism. This idea 
was first discussed informally by Bergsten (1975, page 209-24), and dubbed the 
'bicycle' theory by Bhagwati (1988), who borrowed the term from policy circles. 
The issue was first addressed formally by Staiger (1995), whose model has the 
property that if a round of trade liberalization fails then protectionism does indeed 
escalate back to the level of the previous round. However, the exact nature of the 
factors that give rise to gradualism fundamentally affect the specific characteristics 
of the liberalization process. Other theories where trade liberalization is gradual do 
not exhibit a collapse back to higher levels of protectionism if negotiating rounds 
fail. 
The combination of tariff-liberalization-induced resource reallocation and the 
cuse-it-or-lose-it' sector specific skills in Staiger (1995) delivers a prediction of 
gradualism that confirms the bicycle theory. Contrastingly, the combination of 
tariff liberalization induced resource reallocation and adjustment costs in Devereux 
(1997) and Furusawa and Lai (1999) mean that if the trade liberalization process 
is stopped by some unforeseen event then it is worthwhile and credible for all 
countries to commit to the maintenance of openness levels achieved up to that 
point. 
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Note that all of the literature outlined above focuses on aspects of the domestic 
economy to explain why trade liberalization is gradual. The model presented in 
Chapter 3, by contrast, presents a model of why trade liberalization has needed to 
be gradual based on a model of the GATT's institutional structure. 
1.4.2 Regionalism versus Multilateralism 
As pointed out above, the question of 'regionalism' has developed in two main 
phases. " The first focused primarily on the welfare implications of the forma- 
tion of PTAs for member and non-member countries as well as for world welfare. 
The second phase looked at whether regionalism is likely to promote or hinder 
multilateral free trade. 
Most research has focused on the static effects of PTAs. These were first 
addressed by Viner (1950) who originated the distinction between trade diversion 
and trade creation. He showed that PTAs were not necessarily welfare improving, 
neither for member countries nor for the world as a whole. Building on the Vinerian 
approach, Kemp and Wan (1976) show that it is always possible to form a PTA 
that improves efficiency. There are two components. First, trade between members 
must be completely liberalized. Second, external tariffs can be adjusted to ensure 
that trade between members of the PTA and the rest of the world remains constant. 
Then the second welfare theorem can be used to show that trade between members 
of the PTA is efficient. And the external adjustment of tariffs eliminates trade 
diversion. This restores the pre-Vinerain intuition that PTA formation is welfare- 
improving. 
However, as emphasized by Richardson (1995), Kemp and Wan's result hinges 
on the assumption that countries behave non-optimally. If non-member countries 
optimally respond to the common external tariff, members of the PTA might be 
worse off than in the pre-union situation. 
'OThis literature review draws on Conconi (2002) as well as Bhagwati, Greenaway and Pana- 
gariya (1998). 
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Other papers have examined political incentives to form PTAs. Richardson 
(1993) considers the effect of an FTA in a setting where governments maximize 
a political support function which gives added weight to export- and import- 
competing producers' interests. Grossman and Helpman (1995b) use a common 
agency framework to analyze the way that contributions from interest groups to 
the government shapes the formation of FTAs. 
Goyal and Joshi (2000) and Furusawa and Konishi (2002) model trade agree- 
ments as networks. Both papers show that free trade will not necessarily arise. 
In the case of Goyal and Joshi (2000) this is due to coordination failure. Furu- 
sawa and Konishi (2002) show that free trade fails when countries form customs 
unions. Both papers take a cooperative rather than a non-cooperative approach to 
the modelling of trade agreements as networks, and neither paper has a regional 
dimension. None of these previous papers considers the spacial dimension in the 
formation of a regional trade agreement. 
Turning to the dynamic implications of regional trade block formation, Krug- 
man (1991) suggests that the enlargement of customs unions would lead to an 
increase in protection against countries outside each bloc. " As a result, the world 
as a whole would be hurt by what appears to be a liberalizing step of promoting 
(preferential) free trade. " However, the process of regional block expansion is 
exogenous in Krugman's model. Welfare is simply evaluated for a division of the 
world into 10,9 .... 2,1 blocks. To answer the so-called 'dynamic time-path ques- 
tion' it is necessary to examine whether forming a particular trade agreement is in 
the interest of the member states. Riezman (1985) was the first to analyze stable 
"A Customs IU, nion is a trade agreement in which all members adopt internal free trade and 
coordinate the setting of a common external tariff. The EU is often cited as an example where 
this happens. 
121n a monopolist ically competitive framework in which provinces are divided into symmetric 
customs unions, Krugman (1991) shows that the division of the world into a smaller number of 
customs unions raises the Nash equilibrium tariff set by each block, and that world welfare is 
minimized when the world is divided into three symmetric blocs. 
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agreement structures by modelling how states choose their partners. Using the 
Core as a solution concept, but precluding the possibility of interstate transfers, 
he concludes that global free trade might not be a stable outcome. The same con- 
clusion is reached by Kerman and Riezman (1990) and Kose and Riezman (1999). 
In each case, a pure exchange general equilibrium model is constructed with three 
countries and three goods, in which trade patterns are determined by comparative 
advantage considerations. Using simulation techniques to compare optimal tariffs 
and welfare gains in alternative agreement structures, both studies show that for 
certain endowment distributions customs unions can pose a threat to the multilat- 
eral trading system since, due to the improvement in their terms of trade, member 
countries can obtain larger welfare gains than at the free trade. 
Yi (1996) uses a multi-country extension of Brander and Spencer's (1984) tariff 
model to describe endogenous trade block formation under imperfect competition. 
He addresses the issue of the sustainability of global free trade under alternative 
rules of Customs Union formation. Yi (1996) finds that customs unions are building 
blocks for global free trade if membership of a trade agreement is open to all 
countries, but they might be stumbling blocs if the formation of a trade bloc 
requires the agreement of all potential members and the number of negotiating 
countries exceeds a critical value. Burbidge et al (1997) describe an explicit model 
in which states choose their coalition partners. They show that with more than 
two states, incomplete federation might be the unique equilibrium, even allowing 
for cooperation and transfers within customs unions. All these studies are based 
on the assumption that trade occurs under perfect competition. 
From a political economy perspective, Levy (1997) studies politicians' incen- 
tives to pursue preferential as against multilateral trade agreements in a median 
voter framework. Voters are affected differently by various different trade agree- 
inents depending on their endowments of labor and capital. The government picks 
the type of trade agreement, preferential or multilateral, that secures victory in 
the next election. 
Part I 




Hotelling Tax Competition 
2.1 Introduction 
Under the conventional view of 'government as a Leviathan', interjurisdictional 
competition has come to be thought of as useful, in that it constrains govern- 
ments' self-serving activities. The view has been expounded by Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980), among others, who say that " ... intergovernmental competition 
may be constitutionally 'efficient', regardless of the more familiar considerations of 
interunit spillovers examined in the orthodox theory" (p. 185). This thinking ap- 
plies conventional wisdom about the beneficial effects of competition between firms 
to the case where (Leviathan) governments behave in monopolistic fashion, using 
the policy variables under their control to maximize the rents to office. Yet the 
empirical literature remains unable to find conclusive support for this view (see, 
for example, Oates 1985). The problem may be that this conventional wisdom is 
based on a standard model, where the focus is on competition over the price of a 
single homogeneous good or public good. Just as firms may compete over product 
characteristics as well as price, goverm-nents may compete over amenities as well 
as taxes. 
The present chapter puts forward the idea that Hotelling's (1929) model can be 
31 
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adapted to understand why competition between Leviathan governments does not 
promote efficiency. In his classic article, Hotelling (1929) called into question the 
extent to which competition promotes efficiency when firms compete not just over 
prices but over product characteristics as well, and when consumers' preferences 
for product characteristics vary. We question, along parallel lines, the extent to 
which competition promotes efficiency when goverm-nents compete not just over 
taxes but over levels of amenity provision, and when firms' preferences for levels of 
amenity provision vary. ' This chapter shows how competition among governments 
for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and 
public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied 
in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. ' Not only may there 
be excessive differentiation but in addition, equilibrium may fail to exist. We 
interpret non-existence of equilibrium as a metaphor for intense tax competition. 
Thus, our argument provides an explanation of why the empirical literature has 
remained inconclusive. This present chapter represents the first occasion on which, 
to my knowledge, Hotelling's model and the possible nonexistence of equilibrium 
have been adapted to think about amenities and taxation competition. 3 
1 We use the term 'amenity' because the usual attributes of a 'public good, ' namely non- 
excludability and non-rivalry, are not features of the goods that governments provide in our 
analysis. We refer to firms' 'preferences' rather than firms' technologies to emphasize that each 
firm has a clearly defined preferred or ideal level of amenity provision from which the actual level 
can vary. 
2 In contrast, Hohaus, Konrad and Thum (1994) consider a Hotelling type model but in 
an analysis closer to that of Hotelling's original 1929 paper argue that competition between 
jurisdictions for consumers will lead to insufficient differentiation of public good quality. 
3We are not the first to model interjurisdictional competition in tax and spending levels 
between Leviathan governments as a two stage game; this approach has been taken previously 
by Edwards and Keen (1996) among others. Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2001) treat 
a local public good and contrast efficiency under complete information with inefficiency under 
incomplete information. Their model is similar to ours in the feature that firms' preferences for 
public good provision are captured by their location on an interval of the real line. The Devereux, 
Lockwood and Redoano (2002) model also has this feature but in their model, location captures 
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A key element of our analysis is that firms have diverse technological require- 
ments for levels of amenity provision. Suppose, for example, that the amenity in 
question is a legal system. It is generally agreed that some type of legal system 
will benefit a firm in its production activities and in bringing goods to market. 
But the ideal level of coverage differs across firms and certainly across industries. 
One firm's necessary legal protection is another's excessive red tape. 
In broad terms, some firms within an industry operate with much less input of 
government provided public amenities than others. Take firms in the apparel and 
clothing industry as an example. Those that produce designs at the cutting edge 
of fashion rely more heavily on government provided amenities such as intellectual 
property protection, the availability of highly trained staff, and good communica- 
tions networks to reach their rarefied clientele. At the other end of the spectrum 
are firms turning out clothing using already established patterns and brand images, 
for example firms producing counterfeit Levis jeans. For such firms, arguably, the 
more lax the levels of intellectual property protection the better. Moreover, they 
may have limited need of highly trained staff, and basic communications may be 
sufficient. 
In the previous literature, where all firms tend to have the same technological 
requirements for amenities, the forces of competition tend to push all governments 
in the same direction. ' With technological diversity among firms, it is not clear 
the cost of relocation to another country rather than a "preferred level" of amenity provision 
that we have in our model. 
'Situations where competition tends to push all governments away from efficiency are studied 
by Gordon and Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), Wilson (1986), Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon 
(2009) and Zodrow and Miezkowski (1986). In a broader context, Gordon and Wilson (1999) 
examine how the benefits derived by government officials from the size of the tax base can affect 
the design of the tax system itself. Situations where competition tends to promote efficiency 
are studied by Boadway, Cuff and Marceau (2002), Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) 
Wildasin (1989), Wooders (1985) and Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon (2002) among others. 
Oates and Schwab (1988) show that majority rule can select the efficient outcome when there 
is interjurisdictional competition for mobile resources. Besley and Smart (2001) argue that the 
Introduction 34 
whether competitive forces will act similarly to push all governments in the same 
direction, or whether they will be pushed apart. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum 
Product Differentiation predicts that governments will provide amenities at the 
same (inefficient) level. However, research by d'Aspremont, Gabszwicz and Thisse 
(1979) has called into question Hotelling's Differentiation result. Extending the 
intuition arising from their results on competition between firms to competition 
between governments suggests that competition might instead maximize the dif- 
ferentiation between governments' levels of amenity provision. Demonstrating this 
constitutes one of the main contributions of the present chapter. 
Before considering our equilibrium analysis, we explain in a bit more detail how 
our model compares to Hotelling's original work. In the classic Hotelling model, 
consumers are located on a beach. Two ice-cream sellers chose their locations 
on the beach to maximize sales. Each consumer has inelastic unit demand for a 
sZngle unit of ice cream and the only issues affecting utility are the price that the 
consumer has to pay for an ice-cream and the distance that he has to walk to buy 
it. Thus, each consumer maximizes utility by purchasing ice cream from the seller 
from whom the 'delivered price', including the cost of going to get the ice-cream, 
is the lowest. 
In our model, amenity space corresponds to the beach. The further to the 
right that a firm is located on the interval, the higher is its preferred level of 
amenity provision. While Hotelling's ice cream sellers choose where to locate on 
the beach, in our model each government chooses a level of amenity provision 
in its jurisdiction. By locating within a jurisdiction, each firm is provided with 
the level of amenities provided by that jurisdiction. As in Hotelling's original 
paper, each firm is able to sell a single unit. So the only issues affecting profits 
issue of whether tax competition raises or lowers efficiency depends on whether politicians are 
more likely to be benevolent or rent-seeking. Gordon and Wilson (2002) show that efficiency is 
promoted by competition when 'officials benefit by taking a smaller piece from a larger pie'. See 
Wilson (1999) for a comprehensive review of the earlier literature. 
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in our model are the tax that the firm has to pay and the difference between 
the firm's ideal level of amenity provision and the level actually provided in the 
jurisdiction where it locates. We refer to this difference between the firm's ideal 
level of amenity provision and the level actually provided by the government as 
the degree of amenity mismatch. The firm maximizes profits by locating in the 
jurisdiction where the cost of obtaining the amenity is lowest, given taxes in each 
jurisdiction and the degrees of amenity mismatch. 
Of course, it would not be satisfactory simply to re-label Hotelling's (1929) 
model using the governments' variables instead of firms' variables and so on. A 
government's location is associated with its cost of amenity provision. In the 
conventional Hotelling set up, by contrast, costs of sellers are exogenous and are 
not linked to their location. (Applying our model to Hotelling's beach setting, it 
would be as if the beach gets hotter towards one end than the other, increasing 
a seller's costs to keep the ice cream cool. ) This apparently minor modification 
to the set-up of Hotelling's model leads to some quite far reaching changes in its 
analytical properties. 
The stages of the game in our model correspond to standard Hotelling analysis 
as well. In the first stage governments simultaneously choose the levels of amenity 
provision. In the second stage, after having observed each others' levels of amenity 
provision, governments set taxes. Of course, this ordering of events is by no means 
the only possible, and alternatives may well affect the outcome. ' As Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983) argue in their study of firm behavior, the appropriateness of 
the set-up, or the game context as they call it, is essentially an empirical matter. 
Certainly, it seems reasonable to argue that governments first put in place the 
capacity for amenity provision in the same way that firms set up the capacity for 
production at the first stage. Then in the second stage they announce taxes in the 
5 In principle taxes could be set before amenity levels, both could be set at the same time, one 
government could behave as a Stackelberg leader at each stage and so on. 
Introduction 
same way that firms announce prices. 6 
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Aspects of our equilibrium analysis of our model carry over from d'Aspremont 
et al (1979) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). First, when equilibrium exists 
then, as in d'Aspremont et al, differentiation between governments in the level of 
amenity provision is maximized, contrary to the suggested prediction of Hotelling's 
original analysis. Given the adaptations of our model to a policy setting, however, 
the interpretation is different to the outcome analyzed by d'Aspremont et al. When 
differentiation is maximized, this implies that one government supplies no ameni- 
ties at all whilst the other government supplies amenities at a maximal level. 
In equilibrium governments make positive rents, as under Cournot competition, 
as opposed to zero rents, as under Bertrand competition. The result is particularly 
striking for the jurisdiction that supplies no amenities at all even though it levies a 
positive tax. This arises as a result of the monopolistic power that each government 
has over location within its jurisdiction. Each firm must have a jurisdictional 
location in order to produce, and the government of that jurisdiction is able to 
exploit its resultant power when setting taxes. 
Recent research has drawn attention to the persistent differences between what 
have come to be known as the core and the periphery of Europe. The core includes 
Benelux, Rance, Germany and Italy. The periphery includes Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece. For example, Baldwin and Krugman (2000) show how sig- 
nificant differences in taxes, and therefore amenity provision, have persisted over 
the last thirty five years or so, even as capital markets have become more inte- 
grated. ' Stylistically, the core of Europe could be associated with the high tax high 
'In a wider setting, beyond the context of our model, governments have the power to tax 
citizens first and then spend the revenue on public services. But multinational firms can be 
thought of as more like customers, choosing to locate in a jurisdiction only once the amenity is 
available for use there. 
7 The theoretical model presented by Baldwin and Krugman (2000) motivates persistent dif- 
ferences in taxation and amenity provision between the core and periphery by allowing the core 
to move first in the policy setting game. First mover advantage gives them an incentive to act as 
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amenity providing government of our model and the periphery could be associated 
with the low tax low amenity providing goverm-nent. Our equilibrium prediction 
that differentiation between levels of amenity provision is maximized provides a 
way of understanding why these observed differences between the European core 
and periphery have persisted. 
To fix ideas, return to the example of the clothing and apparel industry. Our 
analysis may suggest that the forces of competition drive governments in the Eu- 
ropean core to over-provide amenities in order to attract (or retain) the companies 
of haute couture, that have a preference for a relatively high level of amenity pro- 
vision. Given that a government in the European periphery provides amenities at 
a relatively low level (none at all in this stylized setting) and sets taxes relatively 
low, a government in the core cannot do any better by mimicking the periphery 
government. At the same time, the amenities offered by core governments are not 
sufficiently important to the production technologies of more standard clothing 
producers, and it is not worth paying the higher taxes of the core in order to be 
able to locate there. 
As noted above, it is a possibility in our framework that an equilibrium does not 
exist. When firms are highly responsive to a government's efforts to attract them to 
its jurisdiction by changing its level of amenity provision then this situation arises. 
Firms are more responsive to change when a move away from their ideal level of 
amenity provision incurs a relatively high cost. Non-existence of equilibrium in this 
present setting is a formal metaphor for intense tax competition. No equilibrium 
level of taxation exists at which governments stop undercutting each other in tax 
levels. 8 
Stackelberg leaders, setting high taxes and providing a high level of amenities. This then creates 
agglomeration of industry through external economies, as highlighted in the recent literature on 
the economics of location; see Krugman (1998) for a review. 
'At first sight, this appears to imply that rents fall to or below zero. This is not the case. 
As shown by d'Aspremont et al for prices, no equilibrium exists when a small reduction in taxes 
is sufficient to attract all firms to the jurisdiction. In this case, governments keep responding to 
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In light of the equilibrium existence issue raised by the foregoing analysis, 
perfect tax discrimination is analyzed to examine the extent to which it provides 
a solution. As with perfect price discrimination, where firms can tailor prices 
to individual consumers, under perfect tax discrimination goverm-nents can tailor 
taxes to individual producers. One interpretation is that governments are able to 
offer tax breaks from a uniform schedule to firms in order to attract them to the 
jurisdiction. ' Bhaskar and To (2002) show that the issue of equilibrium existence 
in the Hotelling model is completely resolved under perfect price discrimination. 
In our model we find that allowing governments to discriminate perfectly in setting 
taxes only partially resolves the equilibrium existence problem. There is a larger 
range of values for which the cost of amenity mismatch supports an equilibrium. 
But even under perfect tax discrimination, if the cost of amenity mismatch is 
relatively high then tax competition is so intense that the system does not settle 
down to an equilibrium. 
Finally, under conditions where equilibrium exists, efficiency implications of 
the respective regimes are compared. The same inefficiency exists under Hotelling 
tax/amenity competition with uniform taxes as under the conventional Hotelling 
model analyzed by d'Aspremont, Gabszwicz and Thisse (1979). Product differ- 
entiation is maximal and therefore excessive. Research by Spence (1976) (in the 
context of firms) suggests that giving governments more power to discriminate 
between firms in terms of the taxes they are charged will increase and possibly 
maximize efficiency. Bhaskar and To (2002) show that this reasoning carries over 
to the original Hotelling framework of firm location and production. But we find 
that for our model efficiency loss is worse under perfect tax discrimination. In 
equilibrium, both governments offer no amenities at all. This exerts a high effi- 
each other's tax plans with smaller and smaller but unending tax reductions. 
9Earlier research by Bond and Samuelson (1986), Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996) 
and King, NlcAfee and NVelling (1993) model situations where governments offer some firms more 
favorable treatment than others but they either model competition for a single firm or assume 
firms' technological requirements for amenities are identical. 
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ciency loss on firms that have a high public good requirement, and leads to a lower 
aggregate level of efficiency. There is a key difference in Bhaskar and To's analysis 
of firms. In their setting, each firm has the same fixed level of cost. In our analysis, 
recall that governments' costs depend on their level of amenity provision. Under 
perfect tax discrimination, the higher-amenitY-providing government looses out to 
the lower one because of the higher cost of provision. This creates a unilateral 
incentive to deviate from any relatively high level of amenity provision, bringing 
about a 'race to the bottom' of taxes and amenity provision. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model. Sections 
3, and 4 examine Hotelling tax/amenity competition, looking for existence of sub- 
game perfect equilibrium under uniform taxation and perfect tax discrimination 
respectively. Section 5 then compares the welfare implications of the regimes when 
equilibrium exists. Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
We adapt Hotelling's model to the problem of tax competition. The governments 
of two countries, A and B, compete over taxes and the level of amenity provision in 
attempting to persuade firms to locate in their jurisdictions. These governments 
are assumed to be Leviathans, maximizing the rents to office through amenity 
provision. There is a continuum of firms uniformly distributed on a (non-empty) 
interval sE [0, z]. " The position (fixed in technology space) of each firm in the 
interval sE [0, _-] reflects its ideal level of amenity provision to facilitate production. 
The location on the interval [0, z] of the two governments A and B is given 
by variables a and b respectively. The variable a measures the distance from 0 
and b measures the distance from z; a+b<z, a>0, b>0. The location 
of the government determines the level of amenity provision to each firm in the 
IOThis could be generalized so that there are multiple firms at each point on the interval, but 
this would not add insight. 
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jurisdiction; a to each firm in Jurisdiction A and (z - b) to each firm in Jurisdiction 
B. The tax on the firm positioned at 8 is TAs if the firm locates in Jurisdiction .4 
and 'rBs if it locates in Jurisdiction B. 
In conventional Hotelling fashion, each firm is able to sell a single unit and to 
charge price p == d. The cost function for the firm at sE [0, z] is given by 
C+ TAs+k Is - al C. 9 == 
C+ 7'B, +k Is - (z-b)l 
if the firm locates in Jurisdiction A 
if the firm locates in Jurisdiction B. 
If the firm at s locates in A, for example, it must pay private cost c, and tax 
TAs. The firm's position s indicates its ideal level of amenity provision. The degree 
of amenity mismatch of the firm positioned at s is given by the distance of the 
firm from the location of the government. For example, if the firm locates in A 
then the degree of amenity mismatch is given by Is - al. The impact on costs 
of a divergence from this ideal level of amenity provision would then be captured 
by the term k Is -aI, where k parameterizes the impact of the degree of amenity 
mismatch on costs. We refer to k as the cost of amenity mismatch for short. Firm 
profits are given by 7r, =- p-c,. To focus the analysis on location decisions, it 
will be assumed throughout that p is high enough to ensure that all firms make 
positive profits. 
The model described above is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows the set 
of firms sE [0, z]. The locations of governments A and B at points a and b are 
also pictured. The point 9 shows the position of the marginal firm choosing to 
locate in Jurisdiction A. The firm at 9 is indifferent between Jurisdiction A and 
B because it makes the same profits in either. 
To summarize, in terms of their technological requirements for amenity provi- 
sion, firms' positions are fixed, but firms axe able to pick their preferred jurisdiction 
to maximize profits. Each government, on the other hand, is able to pick its level 
of amenity provision but obviously its jurisdiction (A or B) is fixed. 
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Under a uniform tax game, each government is able only to set a uniform tax on the 
firms that choose to locate in its jurisdiction. Government A sets a taX TA, : -- TA 
and makes rents Of TA -a on each firm in its jurisdiction while Goverm-nent B sets 
a taX TB, 9 :: -- TB and makes rents Of TB - 
(z - b) on each firm in its jurisdiction. 
It is a condition of equilibrium that TA -a>0. The same condition applies to 
Government B; 7-B - (z - b) > 0. 
Given that a and b measure the distances of governments A and B from 0 and 
z respectively, and that a+b<z, it must be the case that a<ý<b. Then 
-TA- k Is - al -:::::: - TB-k Is - (z-b) 
Hence 
(TA; TB) 
7-B - TA + 
(z - b+ a) 
2k 2 
A firm may be closer to one government, say Government A, in terms of its degree 
of amenity mismatch, Is-aI<Is- (z - b) 1. But if the net cost of public good 
procurement is sufficiently low, the firm may choose to locate in Jurisdiction B, 
accepting a higher degree of amenity mismatch; formally, this holds when-TB - 
kIs- (z - b) I< -TA- k Is - al. Thus if it could set TB < TAby a sufficiently 
wide margin, Government B could attract any firm 8E [0, z] - 
The solution to the governments' problems, the levels of amenity provision and 
the taxes that they set, can now be determined in the outcome of a game. The two 
governments, A and B, play respective pure strategies TA E R+ and 7-B E R+. " 
II It will be assumed throughout that mixed strategies in tax rates are not available to gov- 
ernments. This is generally deemed to be an acceptable assumption in the applied literature 
on policy setting in a perfect information environment. Intuitively, it would not be regarded as 
reasonable for a government to announce a policy of randomizing over tax rates. Admittedly, 
there may be more complex tax setting environments in which mixed strategies would make more 
sense. Developments in that direction are left for further research. 
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Payoffs are given by the 'rents to office' which are defined by the foHowing rent 
functions: 
rA(TA, TB): -- 
Z (TA - a) 
(z +a- b) (7A - a) - -I- 
(TA 
- a) TA + "I' 
(TA 
- a) TB 2 2k 2k 
0 
if TA < TB- k(-- -a - 
if 17A - 7"B 
I< k(z -a - b) 
if TA > -rB+k(z -a - b) 
rB (TA , TB) :::: -- 
Z (TB- (z - b)) 
(z -a+ b) 
(7-B 
-(z - b)) - 2 
Tk 
(TB 






if TB < TA- k(z -a - b) 
if ITA-TBI <k(z-a-b) 
if TB > TA +k (z -a- 
If TA < 7B- k (z -a- b) then Government A attracts all firms to locate in 
Jurisdiction A and it makes overall rents Of Z 
(7-A- 
a); see the first line on the 
right hand side of the rent function rA 
(TA, TB)- If Government A sets TA > 
TB+ k (z -a- b) then no firm finds it profitable to locate in Jurisdiction A and 
there are no rents to be made from office there; see the last line on the right hand 
sideOf rA 
(TA 
7 TB) -Over the firm shanng interval, 
ITA 
- TBI :! ý k (z -a- b), some 
firms locate in each of the jurisdictions. Then rents for Government A are given 
byrý4 (TA, TB) = (TA- a) ý, the reduced form of which is given in the middle line 
on the right hand sideOf rA 
(TA 
7 TB) - 
The 'rent function' of Government A is shown in Figure 2 for a fixed value 7ýB- 
It shows two discontinuities, which occur at the taxesTA 7- TB-k(z -a-b) and 
TA ý-- TB+ k (- -a- b). At each discontinuity, all firms are indifferent between 
locating in either of the two jurisdictions. This property of the pay-off function, 
that it has two discontinuities, is familiar from the previous literature on stability 
in Hotelling's model (see d'Aspremont, Gabszwicz, and Thisse 1979, for example). 
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It is clear that rA 
(TAi TB) is linear in TA for TA < TB- k (z -a- b) and equal 
to zero for 7A > TB +k (z -a- b). To see that 7A 
(7Ai TB) is strictly concave over 
a2 lar2 the firm sharing interval, note that rA 
(TA, TB) Aý -Ilk over the interval 
ITA 
- TBI <k (z -a- b). The same holds for rB 
(TA, TB)- 
Amenity provision and tax setting is modelled as a two stage game. In the 
first stage, the governments A and B simultaneously determine their levels of 
amenity provision. In the second stage, they set taxes. Once the governments' 
decisions have been taken, firms take taxes and amenities as given and choose 
their geographical locations (ie, A or B) to maximize profits. Each of the two 
stages constitutes a subgame for which it is possible to determine whether or not 
there exists a Nash equilibrium. Then we say that there exists a subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibnum if the players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame. It follows that if in either period there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies then there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies). 
We identify conditions on the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of 
this game. 
2.3.1 Stage 2: Taxes 
The purpose of this section is to solve for Stage 2, where the location of the two 
governments is taken as fixed at distances a and b from the ends of the interval 
[0, 
--] (ie at distances a from 0 and b from z respectively). 
As we shall see, when a 
and b are 'too close' an equilibrium fails to exist. 
For given locations a and b, a strategyT* of Government A is a best response A 
tax against a strategy TB when it maximizes rA 
(TA, TB) on the whole of R+. A 
Nash eqmlibrium M taxes is a pair 
(T *7 T* ) for which (i) -r* is a best response to ABA 
TB and vice-versa (H) 7-ý ý: a andTý ý! z-b. A-B- 
By standard results, if the rent functions were everywhere continuous and con- 
cave, then e., ustence of a unique best response would be guaranteed. Because 
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the rent function for each government is discontinuous, the usual first and sec- 
ond order conditions cannot be used to find best responses. However, it will be 
possible to show that when a Nash equilibrium does exist it is unique. More- 
over, the tax choice of each jurisdiction maximizes its rents, and maximal rents 
are given by the maximum of the rent function on the firm sharing interval 
ITA - TBI < k(z -a-b); see Figure 2. 
The first step is to solve for the tax that maximizes rent on the firm sharing 
interval. 
Lemma 1. Assume governments play a uniform tax game. For given TB, the 
unique tax that maximizes rA (TA7 TB) on the firm sharing interval is 
a+ 7B (z +a- b) 
7'A (7-B; a, b, k, z) =k-+ 
( 
2k 2 
For given TA, the unique taX TB that Ma)dnliZeS rB (TA, TB) on the firm shaxing 
intervalis 
TB (TA; a, b, k, z) =k 
(z - b)+ TA + 
(z -a +b)) 
2k 2 
If TA (TB; a, b, k, z) andTB 
(TA; a, b, k, z) are set simultaneously, then they can be 
solved for simultaneously to obtain: 
TA(a, b, k, z) 3 
(2a + (z - b) + (a - b) k+ 3kz) , 
TB(a, b, k, z) 
1 (2 (z - b) +a+ (b - a) k+ 3kz). 3 
As the rent function is strictly concave on the firm sharing interval, each govern- 
ment has a unique maximizing tax on that interval, taking the tax set by the other 
government as given. From the positive sign that the tax of the other government 
takes on the right hand side, it is clear that taxes are strategic complements. 
The second part of the result says that when both goverm-nents setTA (7-B; a, b, k, z) 
andTB 
(, T, A; a, b, k, z) simultaneously, each can be expressed strictly in terms of 
model parameters; -T, A (a, b, k, z) and 7B(a, b, k, z). Of course, if this is the case 
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then7A (TB; a, b, k, z) and TB (TA; a, b, k, z) are mutual best responses and consti- 
tute a Nash equilibrium point. This will only be the case, though, if, given the 
other government's tax, there is no tax outside the firm sharing interval that yields 
higher rent. 
It is straightforward to check whether the highest payoff is yielded by the rent 
maximizing tax on the firm sharing interval or some other tax that attracts all 
firms to the jurisdiction. This check is performed in the next result. 
Lemma 2. Under a uniform tax game, the taxTA (TB; a, b, k, z) that maximizes 
TA (TA) TB) on the firm sharing interval JIFA - 7B I :! ý k (z -a- b) is a best response 
to -rB if and only if, for anyTBand E>0, 
rA (TA (TB; a, b, k, z), TB) ý! z (-rB-k(z- a -b) -a -e). 
Similarly, the tax 7-B (TA, a, b, k, z) that maximizes rB (TA7 TB) on the firm sharing 
interval I TA - TB <k (z -a- b) is a best response to TA if and only if, for any 
TA and E> 07 
rB (7A) TB (TA; a, b, k, z)) ý! Z (TA- k (z -a- b) - (z - b) - 6) . 
The only meaningful alternative to a best response tax in the firm sharing interval 
is a best response tax that attracts all firms to the jurisdiction. " In the first 
inequality, rA (-rA (TB - a, b, k, z) , TB) gives the maximum rent 
for Jurisdiction A on 
the firm sharing interval, and Z (TB -k (z -a- b) -a- e) gives the rent from 
setting a tax low enough to attract all firms to A. In the case of Government 
A, for example, this tax is TA = 7-B -k (z -a- b) - E. The second inequality 
gives a parallel expression for Jurisdiction B. Recall that a firm would accept a 
higher degree of amenity mismatch if the tax were low enough to make the net 
cost of pubic good procurement lower. At the tax implied by the right hand side 
12 From Lemma 1,7, A (TB; a, b, k, z) and 7B (7"A; a, b, k, z) are both non-negative. So given that 
each country has a positive share of firms rents cannot be negative, and raising taxes to the poiiit 
where no firms are attracted to the jurisdiction can be rejected as a possible best response. 
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of the inequality all firms, even those which have a smaller degree of amenity 
mismatch with Government B, would locate in Jurisdiction A because of the more 
favorable tax. Lemma 2 says that theTA (TB; a, b, k, z) that maximizes rents on 
the firm sharing interval is a best response tax if and only if no tax TA :` TB 
k (z -a- b) -E exists that yields higher rents. 
We are now ready to state conditions on the existence and uniqueness of a 
Nash equilibrium in the second stage, taking locations a and b, and parameters k 
and z as given. It will show that an equilibrium of this Stage 2 subgame exists 
if and only if each government has a best response tax that is on its firm sharing 
interval. 
Proposition 1. Assume governments play a uniform tax game, and that a and b 
are fixed on the interval [0, z], with a+b<z, a> 07 b>0. For a+b=z, both 
governments are at the same location and there e. ýdsts an equilibrium in which 
T* =a, T* =z-b. AB 
For a+b<z there exists an equilibrium point if and only if the two following 
conditions hold: 
(C1): rA (, r* (-r* ; a, b, k, z),, T* )ýz (-r* -k (z -a- b) -a- e) <=: > ABBB 
((a - b) k+ (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 > z 
(2 (a + 2b) k+2 (z -a- b) - 3s) 
l8k 3 
* (FB; a, b, k, z) T*) ý: Z(T* - k(z- a -b) - (z-b) -E) (C2): rB 
(TB 
AA 
((b- a) k- (z -a -b)+3kZ)2 > z 
(2 (2a + b) k-2 (z -a- b) - 36) 
l8k 3 
Whenever it exists, an equilibrium point is determined uniquely by the taxes 
-) =I (2a + (z - b) + (a - b) k+ 3kz) T* (a, b; k, .43 
7ý (a, b; k, z) =1 (2 (z - b) +a+ (b - a) k+ 3kz). B13 
The first line of conditions C1 and C2 is familiar from Lemma 2. Here in Propo- 
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sition 1, however, equilibrium values have been substituted. The Proposition es- 
tablishes conditions under which the taxes that maximize rents in the firm sharing 
intervals of each government are mutual best responses. It also shows that if such 
taxes are not mutual best responses then equilibrium fails to exist. 
The second line of C1 and C2 gives conditions for existence and uniqueness in 
terms of model parameters a, b, k and z. As stated, these reduced form conditions 
are not transparent. However, in the next section where stage 1 of the game is 
solved it will become clear that a=0 and b=0 are the only candidates for 
equilibrium. Checking that C1 and C2 hold having made these substitutions for a 
and b is straightforward. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. First, the 
situation where a+b=z is directly analogous to a standard model of Bertrand 
competition, where each government offers the same amenity level. So there exists 
a Bertrand equilibrium, which is efficient in that neither government makes rents. 
Second, in the situation where a+b<z, so that governments supply differing 
levels of amenities, Proposition I says that an equilibrium exists if and only if the 
tax set by each government is in the firm sharing interval. Suppose not. Suppose 
at the rent maximizing tax, where firms are shared, one government can do better 
by setting a tax sufficiently low to attract all firms to its jurisdiction. Then the 
other government has an incentive to undercut the first. The undercutting process 
continues ad infiniturn and equilibrium is never reached. This does not mean 
that taxes become infinitely negative. The budget surplus condition always holds. 
As d'Aspremont, Cabszwicz and Thisse (1979) show for firms, only a small tax 
reduction is needed in such a situation to attract all firms to the local jurisdiction. 
Although the basic insight of d'Aspremont et al (1979) carries over the present 
context of tax competition, the analysis in the present context is more complicated. 
The additional complications arise because our model allows governments to differ 
by offering different levels of amenities. The choice of amenity level affects the 
government's cost of provision. Recall that this is somewhat different from the 
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conventional Hotelling set-up where firms offer a product that is homogeneous 
in all respects other than the location at which it is supplied. Varying location 
does not affect a firm's costs in Hotelling's conventional model. In our setting, 
by contrast, varying location does affect a government's cost of amenity provision. 
This adds an extra part to the process of solving for equilibrium. Lemma 1 shows 
that taxes become strategic complements in the firm sharing interval. That is, TB 
enters positively inTA (TB; a, b, k, z) andTAenters positively inTB (TA; a, b, k, Z). 
This is different from the analysis of d'Aspremont et al, where there is no strategic 
substitution or complementarity at all. 
Because taxes are strategic complements in the firm sharing interval, conditions 
C1 and C2 are somewhat less transparent than in d'Aspremont et al (1979). A 
nice feature of their formative analysis is that each condition is shown to depend 
in a clear way on the difference between a and b. When a and b are 'too close' 
equilibrium fails to exist. It is through this route that d'Aspremont et al (1979) 
introduce their main result; that Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation 
fails to hold. Contrastingly, the relationship between a and b in C1 and C2 cannot 
be discerned so clearly in the present analysis. However, a nice clear alternative 
demonstration of the present model's failure to exhibit the Principle of Minimum 
Differentiation will be given in the next section. 
2.3.2 Stage 1: Level of public good provision 
We now solve for Stage 1, defining an equilibrium in locations, which determines 
the level of public good provision by the respective governments. For Government 
. 4, the rent function is r. 4 
(7*Ai TB). Using the equilibrium values T* = T* (a, b; k, z) AA 
and T* = T* (a, b; k, z) that we derived for Stage 2, the rent function for Govern- BB 
ment A can be written as follows: 
r, A 
(T* (a, b- k, z) T* (a, b; k, z)) = rA(a, b- k, z) .47BI 
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Similarly, the rent function for Government B can be written as follows: 
7'B (7* (a, b; k, z) , -r* 
(a, b; k, z)) ` 'rB(a, b; k, z) AB 
A location a* of Govemment A is a best response against a location b when it 
maximizes rA (a, b; k, z) on the whole of R+. A Nash equilibnum in locations is a 
pair (a*, b*) such that a* is a best response against b* and vice-versa. 
Substituting -rA* -' (2a + (z - b) + (a - b) k+ 3kz) and T* =: 1 (2 (z - b) +a+ (b - a) k+W 3Bj 
into rA (T *7 T* )= (T* - a) ý 
(7-* 
, -F* ), Government A's problem in Stage 1 of the ABAAB 
game can be written as follows: 
max ? -A (a, b; k, z) 
a 
b) k+ (z -a- b) + 3kz 
l8k 
Similarly, Government B's problem can be written 
MaX rB(a, b; k, z) b 
((b - a) k- (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 
l8k 
The game played between these two governments has an unconventional but nonethe- 
less appealing form. To demonstrate that the Principle of Maximum Differenti- 
ation holds, we will first show that the second derivative of the rent function is 
everywhere nonnegative. This implies that, when the first derivative of the rent 
function is strictly negative, each government's rents will be maximized by moving 
as far from the location of the other government (in amenity provision space) as 
possible. 
Lemma 3 shows how the second order condition of the government's problem 
in the first stage is non-negative. 
Lemma 3. Assume a uniform tax game. 
02r, 
4 - k, 1)2 (a, b, 
(9a2 9k 7 
a2 rB(a, b; k, z) 
W 
(k + 1)2 
9k 
Lenima 3, along with (Cl) and (C2), are used to check that in equilibrium rents 
to office cannot be increased by changing location. 
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Our next proposition shows that the maximal differentiation result of dAspremont, 
Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) extends, when equilibrium exists, to the present 
model. 
Proposition 2. There exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies of a uniform tax game if and only if 0<k<1. If such an equilibrium 7 
exists then it is characterized (un-iquely) by the point a* = b* = 
This result shows that an equilibrium exists only if and only if the costs of 
amenity mismatch are relatively low (k < 1/7). If an equilibrium exists then differ- 
entiation in amenity provision is maximized. (Recall that a measures the distance 
from 0 and b measures the distance from z. ) To see why it is the case, consider 
the incentives to deviate from the equilibrium a* = b* = 0. As governments move 
away from each other they increase the degree of differentiation of the amenity 
level that they offer. This in turn softens the degree of tax competition that they 
face, which increases the rents that can be made from any given level of amenity 
provision. If the costs of amenity mismatch are relatively high (k > 1) then more 7 
firms switch to the government that is closer to the centre of the interval, producing 
a unilateral incentive to deviate from a=b=0. However, if governments have an 
incentive to deviate from a=b=0 then equilibrium fails to exist. The reason is 
that as the governments move closer to the centre of the interval, tax competition 
becomes more intense. That is, the incentive for one government to reduce taxes 
and in so doing attract all firms to its jurisdiction increases. No equilibrium level 
exists at which taxes stop falling. Thus, in non-existence of equilibrium we have a 
formal metaphor for intense tax competition. 13 
Comparing the results obtained here with those of d'Aspremont, Gabszwicz and 
Thisse (1979), in their earlier analysis, when mismatch costs were linear, a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium failed to exist for all parameter values. D'Aspremont et 
"'As mentioned in the introduction, this does not mean that taxes become infinitely negative. 
The budget surplus condition always holds. As d'Aspremont et al (1979) show for firms, only a 
small tax reduction is needed in such a situation to attract all firms to the local jurisdiction. 
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al were able to demonstrate existence of equilibrium only in an alternative model 
where mismatch costs were quadratic. In our present model with just a linear 
framework, we have been able to show that existence of equilibrium or otherwise 
depends on the cost parameter associated with mismatch k. Quadratic costs are 
not required to show existence. This difference of model properties arises out 
of the differences of our model to the standard Hotelling set-up. In our model 
location affects rents directly through costs. For example, for Jurisdiction A, 
'rA (TA i TB) :" 
(TA- 
a) ý 
(TA7 TB). The analogous expression in the conventional 
Hotelling set-up would be rA 
(TA, TB) ý_- TAý (TA, TB). The differences in model 
behavior are driven by the feature that location affects rents directly through 
costs. 
Given the adaptations of the Hotelling model to our policy context, the inter- 
pretation is different to that provided by d'Aspremont et al (1979) as well. In the 
conventional model, other than location there is no difference between the char- 
acteristics of the products being supplied by the two firms. When differentiation 
is maximized this simply means that the goods are supplied at different locations. 
Here in the context of this present chapter, when differentiation is maximized this 
implies that one government supplies no amenities at all whilst the other govern- 
ment supplies amenities at a maximal level. 
2.4 Perfect Tax Discrimination 
In a perfect tax discrimination game, each government is able to set an individ- 
ualized tax for each firm sE [0, z]. Each government is able to set an individual 
tax for the firm at s, in the same way as firms that perfectly price discriminate 
are able to set an individualized price for each consumer. Unlike in the previous 
section where each government set a single tax which all firms locating in that 
jurisdiction had to pay, now each government is able to set a different tax for 
each firm. The two governments A and B then engage in Bertrand competition 
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separately for each firm. In this section, we consider the extent to which perfect 
tax discrimination resolves the problems of existence of equilibrium under uniform 
taxation. 
Thinking more loosely, there is an alternative interpretation of the perfect tax 
discrimination game. If there existed a uniform tax schedule in each country then 
this model of perfect tax discrimination could be seen as capturing the incentive 
for governments to offer individualized tax breaks to firms in order to attract them 
to the jurisdiction. 
For each firm sE [0, z], the two governments, A and B, play respective strate- 
gies TAs G R+ and TB, E R+. The rent functions to competition for this single 
firm are given as follows: 




if TAs < TBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
if TAs > -rBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
7'Bs (TAs i TBs) - 
(TBs- (z - 
0 
if 7-Bs < TAs+k (Is - al - I(z - b) - sl) 
if TBs > TAs+ k (Is - al - I(z - b) - sl) 
The rent received by each government whenTAs - TBs= k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
will be specified presently. 
Each of the rent functions has a single discontinuity. An exampleOf 
rAs (TAsi TBs) 
is shown in Figure 3. For any7-As < 'FBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al), the 
firm finds 
it profitable to locate in Jurisdiction A. That is, the difference between the costs 
of amenity mismatch k (I (z - b) -sI- Is -a 1) across the two jurisdictions 
is more 
than offset by the difference in the taxes. The government makes rent 7As- a on 
the firm at s. If TAs > TBs+ k (I (z - b) -sI-Is-a 1), the difference 
in taxes more 
than offsets the difference between the costs of amenity mismatch across 
the juris- 
dictions, and the firm locates in Jurisdiction B. Then, obviously, the government 
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makes rents of zero on the firm at s. 
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The firm is just indifferent between the two jurisdictions at the point 7As -: -- 
TBs +k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al). This is the point of discontinuity in rAs (7, AsirBs) 
shown in Figure 3. The difference in the costs of amenity mismatch and the 
difference in the taxes across the two jurisdictions is exactly equal. We need 
to specify how firm s will decide its location when it is just indifferent between 
jurisdictions. The following assumption stipulates that either jurisdiction is chosen 
with probability one half. 
Al: If TAs - TBs = k(l(z-b) -sl - Is-al) for 8E [O, z] then s is indifferent 
between A and B and chooses each jurisdiction with probability 1. The expected 2 
rent for Government A is a) and the expected rent for Government B is 2 
(TAs 
(TB, 
- (z - b)). 
Again, as in Section 3, the level of amenity provision and tax setting is mod- 
elled as a two stage game. As before, the governments A and B simultaneously 
determine their levels of amenity provision in Stage 1, and set taxes in Stage 2. 
Each of the two periods constitutes a subgame for which it is possible to determine 
whether there exists a Nash equilibrium. Then there exists a subgame-perfect Nash 
equffibTium if the governments' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame. As in the previous section, it follows that if in either period there exists 
no Nash equilibrium then there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
2.4.1 Stage 2: Taxes 
As usual, Stage 2 is solved for first, where the location of the two governments is 
taken as fixed at distances a and b from the ends of the interval [0, z]. For given 
locations a and band for a given firm 8E [0, z], a strategy T* , of Government A is A 
a best response against a strategyTBswhen it maximizes rAs 
(TAq 
, -rBs) on R+. A 
Nash equffibrium in taxes for firm s is a pair 
(Tý,,, 
-Týj for which (i) T, * , 
is a best AB 
responsetO T* , and vice-versa. (ii) T* >a andT* >z-b. BA-B- 
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Let TA = f7AsIsE [0,,, j be a tax schedule for Government A, consisting of one tax 
for each firm, and similarly let TB = fTBsIE[o, ý] be a tax schedule for Government 
B. A pair of tax schedules, T; and Tý is a Nash equffibnum in taxes if for each 
sE [0, z] the pair (Tý,,, Tý, ) is a Nash equilibriw-n in taxes for firm s. AB 
The literature on entry deterrence through pricing strategy has had to broach 
the issue of what constitutes a best response when payoff functions defined by the 
game are discontinuous and do not have a well defined maximum (in the sense 
that first derivatives are not equal to zero). This issue carries over to the present 
context where the payoff function is increasing up to the discontinuity; see Figure 
3. In a model of continuous strategy choices, such a payoff function does not have a 
well defined maximum because, for any strategy chosen by a player, there is always 
a strategy that yields a slightly higher payoff. Consider, for example, the present 
setting where any choice of e implies a tax TAs = -rBs +k (I (z - b) -sI- Is -a 1) - 
E>0, (E > 0) and rent 7As = 7-As - a. Government A could choose a smaller value 
for E (whilst still maintaining E> 0) thereby setting a higher tax and earning 
higher rent. 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) provide a way of resolving this issue by defining 
(discrete) strategy choices over a grid. In such a framework, E has a smallest value 
defined by the distance between grid lines. Their approach has gained substantive 
support in the literature and, in the present setting, has intuitive appeal. Let 
E>0 be thought of as the smallest monetary unit; one cent in the Euro zone or 
the US and a penny in Canada or the UK, for example. With a smallest money 
unit, the nidnimum amount by which one government can undercut the other is 
well defined as E. Then rAs (TAs) 7-Bs) has a well defined maximum. Strategies can 
be made continuous by making the distance between grid lines arbitrarily small. " 
"'A formal game theoretic treatment, along the lines of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), could be 
developed for Hotelling Tax Competition. In such an approach, discrete taxes would be defined 
over a grid, with distance between grid lines equal to 6, and E would then be allowed to become 
arbitrarily small. Inclusion of such a derivation would not contribute substantively to the results 
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For our purposes, we simply define a 'limit tax' for a firm s as a tax very close 
to but less than the tax that would make the firm indifferent between the tý'ý-o 
jurisdictions. To formalize a limit tax, let E>0 be given. For a particular firm 
s, a tax 7B,, and amenity levels a and b satisfying z-b>a, the liTnzt tax far 
Government A IT lim is given by: 7 As, 
lim 
TAs = TBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) -, F. 
Analogously, for a particular firm s, a tax 7As, and amenity levels a and b satisfying 
z-b>a, the limit tax for GoveT-nment B, "m is given by: 7'B, q 1 
T 
lim 
Bs = TAs+k (Is -al - I(z - b) - sl) -6. 
Notice that the limit tax is not relevant for the case z-b=a, where competi- 
tion between governments is analogous to Bertrand competition in homogeneous 
products. When setting a limit tax in Stage 2, Government A effectively takes a, 
bI k) s, z and7Bs, as given, so we write the limit tax "m as a function of E only- _TAs I 
71im (E) - Analogously , for the limit tax of Government B we writeT 
lim As Bs (E) 
The notion of limit tax that we introduce here extends to a tax policy setting 
the idea of a limit price originally introduced by Bain (1956). Bain suggested that 
pricing strategies could be used to discourage entry-15 Bhaskar and To (2002) show 
that pricing strategies can be used to discourage entry into a market that is defined 
geographically. A particular firm can supply its nearby market relatively cheaply 
because it can provide the good in question at relatively low delivery cost. Then 
the limit price is the highest price the firm can charge without making it possible 
that we discuss in the present paper. Such a formal treatment of limit pricing by firms has been 
undertaken by Chowdhury (2002). The price that maximizes the payoff as the grid size becomes 
small is defined as the limit price. 
"'Spence (1977) re-interprets limit pricing as competition in capacities, where an incumbent 
accumulates a large capacity and thus charges a low price, deterring entry. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982) formulate a model based on informational asymmetry, where an incumbent charges a low 
price to signal that profits in the market are low. 
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for other more distant firms to profitably supply the market. For limit pricing to 
be a best response, profits must be maximized if the firm is the local market's sole 
supplier. 
In the policy setting of this present chapter, tax strategies can be used to 
discourage competition for a particular set of fim-is defined not in terms of their 
location but in terms of their degree of amenity mismatch. A particular government 
can provide an amenity to a firm with a relatively small degree of amenity mismatch 
at a tax that enables the firm to make relatively high profits; the closer is the level 
of amenity provision to the firm's ideal the higher are the profits that the firm 
makes, all else equal. From the point of view of one government, the limit tax is 
the highest tax that it can set for a firm while making it impossible for the other 
government to profitably provide an amenity on more favorable terms. The hinit 
tax then maximizes the rent that can be made. 
Using the definitions of limit taxes, we can now characterize the best response 
for each government in Stage 2. 
Lemma 4. Consider a perfect tax discrimination game and assume Al holds. Fix 
a and b so that z-b>a. 
If, forsomefirm sE [O, z], a< TBs+k(l(z-b) -sl - Is-al) then for E>0 
sufficiently small Government A's unique best response is T*, --'Z: T 
lim If a> A As (E) - 
TB, +k b) -ss-a 1) then -r* ,=a 
is a best response for Government A. A 
If, for some firm sE [0, z], z-b< TAs +k (I s-a (z - b) -s then for 
E>0 sufficiently small Government Bs unique best response is T* sT 
lim B Bs 
If z-b >TAs+k(Is- al - J(z -b) - sj) then -r*s = z-b is a bestresponsefor B 
Government B. 
The first part of the result says that if, from Government A's point of view, 
the degree of amenity mismatch with a firm at s is small relative to that firm's 
mismatch with Goverm-nent B, then it is a best response for Government A to 
set a limit tax for that firm. Formally, if a< 7B. 5 + k(I(z - b) - sl - 
Is - al) 
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then -r* = 71im (E). Notice that TB, +k (I (z - b) - sl - Is - al) is decreasing in As As 
the degree of amenity mismatch Is - al, making the condition more likely to hold 
if s is close to a. For given tax and location of Government B, Governnient 
A limit taxes the firm so it just prefers to locate in A. If, on the other hand, 
a> TBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) then Government A can do no better than to 
*=a. Clearly, settingTA*, <a would make negative rents. And given that set TA, 
the firm is not attracted to A at TA*, As a, then it certainly will not findT* >0 
more attractive. The second part of the result states that parallel arguments hold 
for the best response of Government B. 
In Lemma 4 and in the following, we mean by 'E >0 sufficiently small' that 
the smallest monetary unit is small enough to enable the government that has 
the smaller degree of amenity mismatch with a given firm to undercut the other 
government using taxes. That is, we rule out the possibility that one government 
is closer in amenity space to a firm than the other government but not able to 
undercut the other on taxes and still make positive rents because the smallest 
monetary unit is too large. The formal bound on the size of E is established in the 
proof. 
The best responses determined above are now used to define equilibrium in the 
next two propositions. 
Proposition 3. Consider Stage 2 of a perfect tax discrimination game, with a and 
b fixed on the interval [0, z]. Assume Al holds and that a+b<z, a>0, b>0. 
If k<I then for E>0 sufficiently small there exists a unique Nash equilibrium 
in taxes for this stage of the perfect tax discrimination game. A unique Nash 
equilibrium in taxes for each firm sE [0, z] is determined by the foflo'g4ng taxes: 
if a+b=z, 
TAS Bs 
if a+ b<z, 
TT 
lim T* =z As B 
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Proposition 3 can be explained as follows. If a+b=z then we have the standard 
Bertrand case. If a+b<z then, with relatively low costs of amenity mismatch 
(k < 1), Government A is always able to undercut Government B by offering a 
lower tax to every firm sE [0, z]. " Government A maximizes rents by setting a 
limit tax. Because the cost of amenity mismatch is relatively low (for k< 1), the 
(lower) limit tax set by Government A is always enough to more than compensate 
for the larger degree of amenity mismatch. 17 
In the next result we show that if k>I then it is not possible for Government 
A to undercut Government B for all firms. Even if Government A sets taxes as 
low as possible, at TAs = a, a set of firms will still be better off locating in B. 
Therefore, when analyzing the case where k>1, it will be helpful to re-introduce 
the notion of the marginal firm, 9, that is just indifferent between locating in either 
country. In the perfect tax discrimination game, the definition must be altered to 
allow for the fact that firms face individualized taxes: 
(TAs 
7 TBs) - 
TBs - TAs+ (z -b +a) 
2k 2 
The outcome in Stage 2 of the perfect tax discrimination game with costs of 
amenity mismatch relatively high are characterized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. Consider Stage 2 of a perfect tax discrimination game, with a and 
b fixed on the interval [0, z]. Assume Al holds and that a+b<z, a>0, b>0. 
If k>I then for s>0 sufficiently small there exists a unique Nash equilibrium 
in taxes for this stage of the perfect tax discrimination game. A unique Nash 
equilibrium in taxes for each firm sE [0, z] is determined by the following taxes: 
16 Note that this possibility of undercutting depends on the existence of a sufficiently small 
monetary unit. As a gets arbitrarily close to z-b, the smallest monetary unit must become 
arbitrarily small. But for given a and b, such a smallest monetary unit (6) can always be found. 
17 The value of - must be small enough so that Government A can set a tax -rAs sufficiently 
low and still make positive rent TAs - a. An explicit upper bound for the smallest money unit 
EE (0, ý), where ý= (1 - k) (:, -a- b) /2, is established in the proof. 
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if a+b=z, then 
T* ==T*, =a=z-b for a+b=z and 8E [O, z]; As B 
if a+ b<z, then 
T*=a T* =z-bfors=ý, As 1 Bs 




, -r* s =z-b, 
f or s EE [0, A), 
TAig a T., = =1 
m 
T' Bs 
(e) for s z]. 
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Proposition 4 works in exactly the same way as Proposition 3, except that 
Government B is able to limit tax the firms that are towards the upper end of 
[0, z]. Because the cost of mismatch is relatively high, firms towards the upper end 
of [0, z] find it profitable to locate in B even when Government A sets its lowest 
possible tax -r* = a. Government B maximizes the rents that it extracts from As 
them by setting a limit tax. In fact, Proposition 3 can be thought of as a special 
case of Proposition 4. In general, we should expect some firms to locate in each 
country. It is only when costs of amenity mismatch are below k=1 that the 
government providing the amenity at a relatively low level can undercut the other 
government to such an extent that it attracts all firms. 
Taking Propositions 3 and 4 together, we have seen that a Nash equilibrium 
exists for all possible values of k in Stage 2 of the perfect tax discrimination game. 
We close this subsection by making the observation formal. 
Corollary 1. Consider Stage 2 of a perfect tax discrimination game, with a and b 
fixed on the interval [0, z]. Assume Al holds and that a+b<Z, a>0, b>0 and 
c>0 sufficiently small. There exists a Nash equilibrium in taxes of the perfect 
tax discrimination game. 
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2.4.2 Stage 1: Location 
We now solve for Stage 1, defining an equilibrium in locations. Let TA and TB 
be tax schedules for Jurisdictions A and B respectively and let rA (TA; TB) ý-- 
JsE[O, 
zj 
rAs (TAsi TBs) and rB(TA, TB) ý JsE (0, z] rBs 
(TA., 7Bs) be the corresponding 
overall rent funchons. Using the equilibrium values T* * (a, b, s, 6 k, z) and As TA 
T* =* (a, b, s, E; k, z) that we derived for Stage 2, the overall rent function for B 7B 
Government A can be written 
rA(Tý (a, b, s, s; k, z), TL (a, b, s7 6; k, z)) =- rA(a, b, s, E; k, z) . 
Similarly, the overall rent function for Government B can be written 
rB(Tý (a, b, s,, F; k, z) , Tý 
(a, b, s, E; k, z)) ý-- rB(a, b, sl E; k, z). 
A location a* of Government A is a best reply against a location b when it maximizes 
rA (a, b, s, E; k, z) on the whole of R+. A location b* of Government B is a best reply 
against a location a when it maximizes rB (a, b, s, E; k, z) on the whole of R+. A 
Nash equilibrium in locations is a pair (a*, b*) such that a* is a best reply to b* 
and vice-versa. 
First we characterize equilibrium when the cost of amenity mismatch is rela- 
tively low; that is, k<1. 
Proposition 5. If k<I and E>0 sufficiently small then there e-3dsts a unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the perfect tax discrimina- 
tion game. Equilibrium is characterized by the point a* = 0, b* = z. 
In the unique equilibrium, neither government provides any amenities. " To see 
the significance of this result, first recall that in the more fwniliar setting of perfect 
price discrimination by (private goods producing) firms, costs are exogenously 
given and in equilibrium, the price of the last unit sold is equal to its marginal 
"Recall that b measures the distance from z, so when b* =z and a* =0 then both governments 
provide no amenities. 
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cost (limit pricing) and so the outcome is efficient. A firm's profit is equivalent 
to its contribution to social welfare, so profit maximization is equivalent to social 
welfare maximization. But in our model, governments' costs are endogenously 
determined by their location. Rom any position where governments are providing 
a positive level of amenities, Government A makes positive rents by attracting 
all firms to its jurisdiction while Government B makes zero rents (Proposition 
3). Therefore, no government wants to be in the position of Government B. Each 
government has a unilateral incentive to undercut the other by reducing the level of 
amenity provision, in turn reducing taxes and attracting all firms to its jurisdiction. 
Because costs of amenity mismatch are relatively low, any firm can be more than 
compensated for amenity mismatch through lower taxation. Hence we have a 'race 
to the bottom' in tax rates and public good provision. 
We now move on to consider the situation where amenity mismatch has a 'large' 
impact on costs; that is, k>1. Rom Proposition 4 we saw that if k>I then, given 
a and b, some firms locate in each jurisdiction in the equilibrium of Stage 2. We 
now use the equilibrium taxes from Proposition 4 to solve overall rent functions in 
locations a and b for Stage 1. The overall rent function rA (a, b, s, E; k, z) is shown 
to be strictly concave in a and the overall rent function rB (a, b, s,, --; k, z) is shown 
to be strictly concave in b. So from these we obtain candidates for equilibriw-n 
points a* and b* of Stage I of the game in the usual way. But these candidate 
points are based on the assumption that a<z-b. As we shall see, Proposition 
6 shows that although b* maximizes overall rents given a<z-b, Government B 
can make higher rents by setting z-b<a, presenting an incentive to deviate and 
undermining existence of equilibrium. 
Assume z-b>a. Let a* E arg maxa rA (a , 
b) s) E; k, z) and b* E arg maXb rB (a , 
b, s, k 
Using T* , and -r* , 
from Proposition 4, note that AB 
(a, b, s, E; k, z) = 
f3E-=[O'Z] 
rAs (TAs, TBs) = (a + (9 - a) /2) (1 + k) (z -a- b). 
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Taking the first derivative and solving for a yields a candidate for a*: 
(k - 1) (z - b) (b, k, z) 3k -1 
Observe that for k>I the second derivative is negative - i9rA/i9a 
2 (Tl -2- 3k) k 
0. So the objective function is concave. Again, from Proposition 4, 
T'B(a, b, s, 6; k, z) 
[O, Z] 
rBs (TAS) TBs)= (b + (z -b- ý) /2) (k - 1) (z -a- b). 
Taking the first derivative and solving for b yields a candidate for b*: 
b (a, k, z) = 
+ k) (z - a) 
3k +I 
2=1 Taking the second derivative, 09rBlab (2 + 3k) <0 for k>1. So the k 
objective function is concave (weakly for k= 1). The functions a (b, k, z) 
(k- 1)(z- b)1(3k- 1) and b(a, k, z) = (I+k)(z-a)1(3k+ 1) are reaction 
functions and can be solved for simultaneously to obtain a unique crossing point: 
a (k, z) 
(k 1) z 
and 4k 
(k + 1) z (k, 
4k 
At the points a (k, z) = (k - 1) z/4k, b (k, z) = (k + 1) z/4k, each government 
maximizes its rent, taking as given the location of the other. But also notice that 
in solving this problem it has been assumed that a<z-b. Indeed, a (k, z) 
(k- 1)z < 
(3k-1)z 
=z-b (k, z). But to establish that this is indeed an equilibrium, 4k 4k 
it must be checked that Government B does not have an incentive to adopt a level 
of amenity provision (z - b) :! ý a. It is through the recognition of the possibility 
that Government B may have an incentive to deviate by setting b) :5a that 
we obtain the following surprising result: 
Proposition 6. If k>I then there exists no subgame perfect Nash equffibrium 
in pure strategies of the perfect tax discrimination game. 
The intuition behind the result is as follows. At a (k, z) 
(k-l)z, 
z-b (k, z) 4k 
(k+l)-- 
, 
Government .4 makes higher rents than 
Government B. The clifference in 4k 
E fn . fhciency 63 
rents when the Goverrunents locate at these positions, and then adopt best re- 
2 
sponse taxes in the second stage is ýý: in Government A's favour. But because A 4 
does so much better, Government B has an incentive to deviate from b (k, z) 
(k+ 1)' by locating in the same position as Government A, a (k, z) = 
(k-1)z 
, and set- 4k 4k 
ting taxes slightly lower than Government A. (Thus B gives some of the additional 
surplus 
2 
back to firms in exchange for relocation to B. ) Jurisdiction B does not 4 
need to worry about loosing the firms that, prior to the deviation, located in B 
because Government B makes more rents from the firms lured away from A. And 
prior to the deviation, B made zero rents from the firms that it now lures away 
from A. Thus, the rents that Government B makes under such a deviation are a 
net gain. This deviation contradicts equilibrium. Moreover, an equilibrium fails 
to exist because, from any position where a =h a (k, z), b =ý b (k, z), there would be 
an incentive to move to these positions. And from these positions there is still an 
incentive to deviate, as just described. So no equilibrium can exist. 
In the light of Corollary 1, the non-existence of equilibrium shown in Propo- 
sition 6 comes as a surprise. Corollary I shows that an equilibrium exists for all 
k. However, in Stage 2 of the game a and b are taken as fixed. In addition, it is 
assumed that z-b>a. The failure of equilibrium to exist comes about because 
a government positioned at z-b on the interval has an incentive to deviate by 
setting a level of amenity provision equal to a and then undercut Government A 
on the tax. Then Government A has an incentive to deviate itself by changing its 
location. This possibility could not be accounted for in Stage 2 when locations 
were taken as fixed. 
2.5 Efficiency 
A standard social loss function is used to examine the efficiency implications of 
equilibrium (when it exists) under the respective regimes. The social loss function 
Conclusions 
is of the form 
L : -- kjs -alds+ k Iz -b- sl ds. 
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This function aggregates the loss of potential profits that result from the divergence 
between amenity provision by each government and the ideal level of each firm. 
Proposition 2 shows that a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists 
under the uniform tax game if and only if 0<k<1, and that the point a* = 0, 7 
b* =0 is the equilibrium. Proposition 5 shows that a unique subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium exists under the perfect tax discrimination game if 0<k<1, 
and that the point a* = 0, b* =0 is the equilibrium. To facilitate a comparison of 
efficiency across the two regimes, we assume that 0<k<1. Denote social loss 7 
under uniform taxation and perfect tax discrimination as L,, and Lp respectively. 
Then substituting equilibrium values and integrating it is immediate to see that 
Lu 
(1)2 
Z2 < 2 kk Lp. 
22 
So under conditions where equilibrium would exist in both regimes, perfect tax 
discrimination brings about a lower level of social efficiency than uniform taxation 
under Hotelling amenity/tax competition. These solutions can be compared with 
the socially efficient outcome of L* kz', which occurs when a=b= ýý 4 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter seeks an explanation of why competition between governments fails to 
promote efficiency. The explanation we propose builds on Hotelling's observation 
that when firms compete not just over prices but over product characteristics, 
and when consumers' preferences over product characteristics vary, then efficiency 
is not promoted by competition. In the policy setting of the present chapter, 
competition between (Leviathan) governments fails to promote efficiency when 
governments compete over levels of amenity provision as well as taxes, and where 
firms' preferences for the level of amenity provision vary. 
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In the uniform tax game, when an equilibrium exists one government provides 
the amenity at a maximal level, which is inefficiently high, whilst the other govern- 
ment provides no amenity at all, which is inefficiently low. This result is driven by 
the variation in firms' ideal level of amenity provision. Then competition pushes 
governments 'too far' in opposite directions, rather than bringing about a universal 
race to the bottom or efficiency, the two outcomes on which most of the previous 
literature has focused. 
The equilibrium that we demonstrate for uniform taxation appears to fit with 
recent empirical evidence, which shows persistent differences in levels of taxation 
and public good provision in areas where greater convergence had been expected. 
One example is in Europe, where a core and periphery has emerged despite sig- 
nificant efforts to avoid such an outcome. The core tends to be characterized by 
governments that tax and provide public amenities at a significantly higher level 
than in the periphery. 
Interpreted more broadly, the equilibrium outcome may help to understand 
why aspects of economic development or legal reform may actually work against 
a government's (rent seeking) interests. A government in a country where public 
good provision is reckoned to be sub-optimally low may encounter resistance to 
reform. It has difficulties raising taxation because of resistance from both domestic 
and foreign firms whose original decision to locate or remain in that country was 
based on relatively low levels of amenity provision and taxation. An interesting 
thing about our analysis is that the usual presumption of downward pressure on 
developed country taxes and public good provision resulting from intergovernmen- 
tal competition for firms does not follow. In this sense our theoretical predictions 
accord with the observation of a high-tax high-amenity providing core and low-tax 
low-amenity providing periphery of Europe. Our framework could similarly be 
used to help understand differences in amenity provision between the developed 
and developing worlds. 
The failure of equilibrium to exist is taken as a metaphor for intense tax com- 
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petition. When the level of amenity provision offered by governments is similar 
then the weight of competition falls on tax levels. In the limit, because there 
is very little to choose between the two governments in terms of amenity levels, 
each government can attract all firms to its jurisdiction by undercutting the other 
with a small reduction in the tax level. When the degree of amenity mismatch 
has a sufficiently large impact on firms' costs, making them relatively responsive 
to changes in levels of amenity provision, then the system never settles down to 
(subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. The*governments both have an incentive to 
offer similar levels of amenities in an effort not to loose firms to the other. From 
the view point of each goverm-nent, there is no tax level at which the other gov- 
ernment does not have an incentive to attract all firms by setting a tax that is 
slightly lower. 
One way to circumvent the incentive for governments to undercut each other is 
for each to offer tailor made tax-amenity packages to firms. There is a widespread 
perception that tax breaks are used in a similar vein. We model this policy en- 
vironment as a 'perfect tax discrimination game'. We show that under perfect 
tax discrimination the equilibrium existence issue is partially resolved but that 
efficiency is worse than under uniform tax discrimination. The price paid by gov- 
ernments for greater stability through 'head to head' competition for each firm is 
that, once again when equilibrium exits, each government can attract the firm in 
question by lowering taxes, resulting in a 'race to the bottom'. In equilibrium, no 
amenities are provided by either government. As with uniform taxation, though, 
when the degree of amenity mismatch has a sufficiently large impact on firms' 
costs, making them relatively responsive to changes in levels of amenity provision, 
then the system never settles down to equilibrium. When no amenities are being 
offered, one government has an incentive to deviate by offering a level of amenity 
provision at a relatively high level. But when one goverm-nent offers a positive level 
of amenities, then the other government can always do better by setting amenities 
at a slightly IoNver level and undercutting the first using taxes. 
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An alternative way to prevent intensive tax competition might lie with tax 
harmonization. For taxes set in the second stage governments could agree to set the 
same tax. Then the only issue would be in setting the level of amenity provision in 
the first stage. In the model of this present chapter it is clear that, given locations, 
under collusion the governments would have an incentive to raise taxes to the point 
where they had extracted all rents from firms. If perfect tax discrimination were 
possible then it is clear all rents would be extracted and the outcome would be 
efficient. Whilst economists might see such efficiency as an advantage, it is not 
clear that citizen-entrepreneurs would be happy to see all their profits transferred 
to politicians in the form of rents. Under uniform taxation the outcome is less 
obvious. Because of their differing requirements for amenity provision, firms make 
different profits. At a level of taxation where some firms could make positive profits 
and so a higher tax could extract further rents, other firms cannot make positive 
profits. The outcome would be dependent upon assumptions made about whether 
all firms must be profitable in equilibrium. The issue of tax harmonization within 
this framework is left to future research. 
The framework of the present chapter is similar to a Tiebout model in that 
all firms can 'vote with their feet' for the jurisdiction that makes them better off 
(see Oates and Schwab 1988, Wooders; 1989). So the inefficiencies that arise in the 
present model may seem surprising given that such mobility promotes efficiency in 
a Tiebout setting. The difference in outcomes appears to lie in the fact that in our 
setting there are just two jurisdictions whilst in a Tiebout setting there are many, 
combined with the fact that governments in a Tiebout setting are not Leviathans. 
One might conjecture that increasing the number of jurisdictions in the model 
of this present chapter should bring about efficiency. On the face of it this appears 
to be true. To see why, assume that there are three governments in a uniform tax 
game. Introduce a third jurisdiction to the uniform tax game and assume that 
governments locate as far from each other as possible in amenity space, as in the 
equilibrium that we demonstrate for two jurisdictions. Computing social loss as 
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in Section 5, we find that the same efficient level of social loss is obtained as if 
two governments had located at a quarter and three quarters of the way along the 
interval. But it is far from clear that the three jurisdiction outcome is in fact an 
equilibrium. The government in the middle attracts half of all firms whilst the 
other two share a half. Therefore the other two may well have an incentive to 
deviate from such a situation. Given the discontinuities in the reaction function, 
it is not clear whether existence of equilibrium can be established in the three 
jurisdiction game. 19 
It is worth considering the implications of the present analysis for the public 
choice literature on tax competition, of which Besley and Smart (2001) is an ex- 
ample. In that literature, citizens are able to use yardstick competition to evaluate 
the performance of policy makers who may or may not be self-interested. Yard- 
stick competition is shown to be a relatively effective mechanism in an environment 
where preferences for public good provision are uniform. If the level of public good 
provision in the other jurisdiction is higher than at home then there is evidence of 
under-performance by domestic politicians. It remains to be investigated whether 
the same holds in an environment where preferences for public good provision 
varies. One possibility would be to allow citizens to choose between a benevolent 
dictator and a Leviathan in a framework like the one of the present chapter, where 
agents' preferences for public good provision vary. It might then be possible to see 
whether Leviathan policy makers were induced to provide more efficient levels of 
public good provision or driven out of the policy arena all together. This seems 
like a promising area for further research. 
19A larger number of agents has been introduced to a Hotelling framework by Salop (1979) 
where firms that compete for consumers are located on a circle. Note that such an approach 
would not be appropriate in our model because points on the interval denote levels of amenity 
provision rather than points in geographical space or time. So it does not make sense to join the 
two ends of the interval in order to form a circle. 
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2.7 Appendix 
Lemma 1. Assume governments play a uniform tax game. For givenTB,, the 
unique tax that maximizes rA (TA, '7-B) on the firm sharing interval is 
7-A (-rB; a, b, k, z) =k 
a+ TB 
+ 
(z +a- b) ( 
2k 2 
For given TA, the unique taX TB that maximizes rB (TA, TB) on the firm sharing 
interval is 
TB (TA; a, b, k, z) =k 
(z - b)+ TA + 
(z -a+ b) 
2k 2 
If TA (TB; a, b, k, z) andTB (TA; a, b, k, z) are set simultaneously, then they can be 
solved for simultaneously to obtain: 
TA(a, b, k, z) 
I (2a + (z - b) + (a - b) k+ 3kz); 3 
TB(a, b, k, z) 
1 (2 (z - b) +a+ (b - a) k+ 3kz). 3 
Proof To maximize rents over the firm sharing interval, Government A solves 
the problem 
iiiax, rA (TA, TB) ý-- (TA - a) 
ý (TA) TB) - TA 
Expanding the objecting function using ý (TA) TB) : -- (TB - TA) /2k+(z -b+ a) /2, 
we obtain 
(T. 
4- a) 9= -1 (z +a- b) 
(TA- 
a) -1 
(TA- a)TA +I (TA- a)TB. 
2 2k 2k 
Setting the first order condition equal to zero and rearranging obtains TA (TB; a, b, k, z). 
The second order condition is 
(rA (TA, TB)) 
197-A = 
so r, A 
(-r. 
A , 7-B) must be strictly concave and 7A 
(TB; a, b, k, z) is the unique maxi- 
inizer on the firm sharing interval. 
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Government B solves the analogous problem 
max 7B (7A; TB) : --: (7-B- (z - b)) (z -ý 
(7-Ai 7-B)) 
TB 
Expanding the objecting function, we obtain 
(7'B- (z - b)) (z - ý) = 
1 (z -a+ b) 
(TB 
-(z - b)) 
(TB- (z - b)) +I 
(TB- (z - b)) -rA- 2 2k 2k 
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Setting the first order condition equal to zero and rearranging obtains TB (7"A; a, b, k, 
The second order condition once again is 
(rB (TA, TB)) 
(9TB 
=- Ilk, 
SO rB (TA, TB) must also be strictly concave and TB (7A; a, b, k, z) is the unique 
maximizer on the firm sharing interval. D 
Leymna 2. Under a uniform tax game, the tax TA (TB; a, b, k, z) that maximizes 
'rA (TA i TB) on the firm sharing interval 
ITA 
- TB 
I<k (z -a- b) is a best response 
to TB if and only if, for any 7-B and s> 07 
rA (TA (TB; a, b, k-k (z -a- b) -a- s). I) 
Z) 7 TB) 
ý! Z (7-B 
Similarly, the tax TB (TA; a, b, k, z) that maximizes rB (FA, TB) on the firm sharing 
interval I TA -TBI<k (z -a- b) is a best response to TA if and only if, for any 
T, 4 and E>0, 
rB (TA, 7-B (7-A; a, b, k, z» >- Z (TA- k (z -a- b) - (z - b) - e) . 
Proof For Government A, it is only necessary to check whether the tax -r,,, 
7-B- ka- b) -e yields a higher rent thanTA = TA 
(TB; a, b, k, z); the rent 
maximizing tax on the firm sharing interval. By Lemma 1, TA 
(TB; a, b, k, z) > 
0 and by construction ý>0, SO rA 
(TA (TB; a, b, k, z) , 
TB) > 0. Therefore, the 
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alternative of setting TA = -rB +k (z -a- b), which yields zero rents, cannot yield 
higher rents than setting TA = TA (rB; a, b, k, z). 
A parallel argument holds for Government B. 
Having ruled outTA ý TB+ k (z -a- b) as a strategy for Government A, suffi- 
ciency is immediate by definition of a best response. The taxTA -Z:::: 7A (TB; a, b, k, z) 
yields a rent rA 
(TA (TB; 
a, b, k, z) , 
TB), while the taxTA ý TB- k (z -a- b) - 
yields a rent Z 
(7-B- k (z -a- b) -a- 6). 
If 7A (TA (TB; a, b, k, z) , 
TB) 
Z (TB- k (z -a- b) -a- E) then by definitionTA ý TA 
(7B; a, b, k, z) is a best re- 
sponse. Conversely, if to the contrary, rA (TA (TB; a, b, k, z) , 
7-B) <Z (TB- k (z -a- b) -a- 6) 
TA (TA, TB) for some taxTA :::: ý TB- k (z -a- b) - E, then by definitionTA 
(-FB; a, b, k, 
cannot be a best responsetO TB. A parallel argument holds for Government B. 0 
Proposition 1. Assume governments play a uniform tax game, and that a and 
b are fixed on the interval [0, z], with a+b<z, a>0, b>0. For a+b=z, 
both governments are at the same location and there always exists an equilibrium 
in which7-* = a, T* =z-b. AB 
For a+b<z there e. 3dsts an eqWlibrium point if and only if the two following 
conditions hold: 
1): rA (T* (-F* ; a, b, k, z) , -F* 
) ýý z (-r* -k (z -a- b) -a- E) 9z> AB 
((a - b) k+ (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 
l8k 3 
z (2 (a + 2b) k+2 (z -a- b) - 3E) > 
* (7-B; a, b, k, z), 7-* >z (-F* -k (z -a 2): rB 
(7-B 
A 
((b - a) k- (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 
l8k 3 
z (2 (2a + b) k-2 (z -a- b) - 3s, ) > 
Whenever it exists, an equilibrium point is determined uniquely by the taxes 
7- * (a, b; k, z) 
I (2a + (z - b) + (a - b) k+ 3kz); 14 3 
7-* (a, b; k, 
1 (2 (z - b) +a+ (b - a) k+ 3kz). B3 
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Proof. For a+b=z both governments are located in the same place and we 
effectively have a standard Bertrand equilibrium in homogeneous products. 
Consider the case where a+b < z. Following d'Aspremont et al (1979), begin by 
showing that any equilibrium must satisfy the condition IT* - T* I<k (z -a- b). AB 
>k (z -a- b). Then the government Suppose that on the contrary, ITA - 7B 
that charges the strictly higher tax gets zero rents and gains by charging a tax 
equal to that of the other, contradicting the fact that (T B A) T* ) is an equilibrium. 
Suppose then that IT* - T* I=k (z -a- b). Take, for example, the case where AB 
T*- T* =k (z -a- b). If -r* =0 then the rents of Government B are zero and ABB 
it would make positive rents by charging 0< 7-ý < -rý +k (z -a- b). 
IfT* >0 BAB 
then there are two cases to consider: (i) Either Government A gets all firms to 
locate in A, in which case Government B can obtain positive rents by reducing 
T*. So Government B has an incentive to deviate fromT* ;a contradiction; Or BB 
Government A has only a share of all firms and is able to capture all of them 
and make larger rents by charging a slightly lower tax. Let 3<z be given by 
(TB 
- TA +(z -b+ a) k) /2k for which T* = 7-* +k (z -a- b), given T* . At ABB 
T* 
, Government A makes rents 
rA (T T* T* 3. ForTA = T* -e, the government AABAA 
makes rents rA 
(TA, 7-*B) = 7-AZ. For TA 7-* -E, where E= E(z-3)-F*1z >0 AA 
So for all 0<E<E 
(Z 
- 3) TA the government makes rents TAZ = TA, 
/Z, it is 
the case that rA 
(T E7 T* TAZ> r* a contradiction. The only remaining ABA1 
possibility is that equilibrium must satisfy 
IT* 
- T* I<k (z -a- b). AB 
By definition of the 'rent to office' functionsrA 









- a) T, 4 + ABA2 2k 
I 
Tk (TA - a) TB in the firm sharing interval (7-B -k (z -a- b) , TB +k 
(z -a- b)). 
An equivalent condition must hold for Tý B* 
By Lemma 1, the first order conditions of this problem yield 
a+ TB 
T, 4 
(TB; a, b, k, z) =2+ 
Tý (T,. l ; b, k, z) B 
(z +a - b)k 
(z - b)+ TA 
2 
2 
(z -a+ b) k 
2 
Appendix 1-3 
As we have just proved that firm sharing is necessary for equilibrium, the simul- 
taneous solutions 7-* (a, b, k, z) and T*B (a, b, k, z) given in Lernma 1 provide the A 
equilibrium taxes. 
To establish conditions under which this pair (-T*, -r* ) is indeed an equilibrium, AB 
A US it remains to check that 7-* maximizes rA (7-A , 7-B) not jt on the interval (TB - 
k (z -a- b) 7 7-B+ k (z -a- b)) but on the whole of the domain R+, and similarly 
for -r* . For fixed a and b if -r* is to be an equilibrium strategy givenT B*, by Lemma BA 
2 we must have that for any E>0, 
rA (7A 7 T*B) = 
(-rý 
- n) -Z = 
((a - b) k+ (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 
\'A -J l8k 
Z(T* -k(z-a-b)-a-E). B 
Substituting for ý using 9 (TAi TB) (TB - TA) /2k+(z -b+ a) /2 and simplifying, 
we obtain condition (CI). By synnnetry, we get (C2). 
To show that (CI) and (C2) are also sufficient for (-r* , T* 
) to be an equilibrium AB 
ti remains only to check that they imply 
IT* 
- T* 
I<k (z -a- b). This completes AB 
the proof of our proposition. 0 
Proposition 2. There exists a unique subgarne perfect Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies of a uniform tax game if and only if 0<k<1- If such an equilibrium 7 
exists then it is characterized (uniquely) by the point a* =V=0. 
Proof Write rA(a, b; k, z) as rA(a, b) and rB(a, b; k, z) as rB(a, b) because k and 
., are held constant throughout. 
First assume 0<k< ý' 7 
Suppose that the pair (a*, b*) is a Nash equilibrium, where either a is interior or 
b is interior (or both); aE (0, z) or bE (0, z). Take b* as given and let a* E (0, z). 
But by Lemma 3,02 rA (a*, b*) laa 2= (k - 1)2 /9k > 0. If 19rA (a*, b*) laa > (<) 0 
then rents can be increased by increasing (decreasing) a, contradicting equilib- 
rium. If ar, 4 (a*, b*) laa =0 then rents can be increased either by increasing or 
by 
decreasing a, again contradicting equilibrium. The same argument can be made 
for b* E (0, Z), holding a* constant, as a2 rB (a, b) /W = (k + 1)2 /9k > 0. 
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Therefore, the only candidates for an equilibrium pair are the corner solutions 
(a*, b*) = (0 7 0), 
(0, z) and (z, 0) (noting that (z , z) violates a+b< z). The three 
cases are taken in order. First we show why (a*, b*) = (0,0) is an equilibrium. 
First observe that arA (a, b) laa = (I - k) ((I - k) a+ (I + k)b - (I + 3k) z) /9k. 
Using b* = 0, OrA (a, b*) laa = (I - k) ((I - k) a- (I + 3k) z) /9k <0 for all 
aE [0, z]. To see this, note that even when a takes its largest positive value at 
a=z, arA (a, b*) laa = -4 (1 - k) /9z < 0. Thus we have a corner solution. Rents 
could be increased were it possible to reduce a below the level a=0. But this is 
not possible so a* =0 is a best response to b* = 
Now take- a* =0 as given and observe that arB(a*, b*) lab = (I + k) ((1 + k) b -4- z (3k - 1) --) / 
If b=0 then arB (a*, b) lab = (1 + k) (3k - 1) /9k < 0. But if b=z then 
arB (a*, b) lab =4 (1 + k) z/9 > 0. So both b=0 and b=z could in principle be 
stable corner solutions (see from above that the second order condition is satisfied). 
The matter of which is a best response depends upon which yields the higher rent; 
rB (0,0) =((3k - 
1) Z)2 /18k orrB (0, Z) == 8kZ2/9. Solving rB 
(0,0) = rB (01 Z) in 
terms of k we find that k=1. It is then easy to see that rB (0,0) ýý rB (0, Z) for 7 
0<k<1 withrB (0,0) > rB (07 Z) for 0<k<1. So b* =0 is a best response to 71 7 
a* = 0. Therefore, (a*, b*) = (0,0) is a Nash equilibrium in locations. 
Next suppose (a*, b*) = (0, z) is a Nash equilibrium in locations. But then (C I) 
74 
fails; 
b) k+ (z -a- b) + 3kz)2 
l8k 




Next suppose (a*, b*) = (z, 0) is a Nash equilibrium in locations. But then (C2) 
fails; 
((b - a) k- (-- -a- b) + 3kz)2 
l8k 
a contradiction. 
Now assume k>1, 
z (2 (2a + b) k-2 (z -a- b)) 10k Z2 
39 
Suppose that (a*, b*) = (0,0) is a Nash equilibrium in locations. But 'rB 
(0, -') 
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rB (0,0) - So there is a unilateral incentive for Government B to deviate from 
b* = 0; a contradiction. 
The solutions (a*, b*) = (0, z) and (a*, b*) = (z, 0) can be ruled out as candi- 
dates for a Nash equilibrium in locations for the same reason as when 0<k< _'- 71 
Conditions (CI) and (C2) fail in the respective cases. El 
Lermna 4. Consider a perfect tax discrimination game and assume Al holds. Fix 
a and b so that z-b>a. 
If, for some firm s (E [0, z], a< TB, + k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) then for >0 
sufficiently small Government A's unique best response isT* = 
"m If a> As As 
W- 
TBs+ k (I (z - b) -sI- Is -a 1) then r* a is a best response for Government A. A 
If, for some firm sE [0, z], z-b <TA3+ k(Is-al - I(z-b) -sl) then for 
6>0 sufficiently small Government Bs unique best response is -T* sT 
lim 
B Bs' 
If z-b>7As+k(Is-aI - I(z-b) - sl) thenT* s=z-b 
is a best response for B 
Government B. 
Proof It is assumed that E>0 and arbitrarily small. The exact bound on 6 is 
established below. 
Consider Government A's best response first. Fix a, b andTBs so that a< 
lim = TBs +k (I (z - b) -s Is -a 1) and suppose to the contrary that TA, TBs + 
k b) -s Is -a I) -E is not the unique best response. Then by definition, 
there must be some other tax that yields a higher rent. First suppose that the best 
response tax is lower than T"m obtained by setting E' > E. Write 'rAg (E) for the As) 
rent obtained from setting tax TAs = TBs +k (I (z - b) -s Is -a 1) -E- Taking 
the difference in rents we obtain rAs (El) - rAs 
(E) = -El +E< 0- So rents are lower 
under a lower tax; contradiction. 
lim Next suppose that the best response tax is higher than TA, . 
Suppose that 
Government A raises the tax by the smallest possible amount, to 7-As = TBS + 
k (I (-- - b) -sI- Is -a 1). Write the rent associated with this tax rate as r. 4, 
(0). 
At this tax, the firm s is indifferent between the two jurisdictions. By Al, the firm 
AP)Dendix 
s locates in A with probability 1. Taking the difference in rents we obtain 2 
? 'A. 9 
(0) 
- rAs 
(6) : 7--- 
1 
(TBg+k(I(z -b) - sl -is - al) -a) 2 
(TBs+k(I(z-b) - sl -Is - al) -E -a) 
I (TBs+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) - a) + E. 2 
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But it is always possible to pick e sufficiently small to ensure that rA. (0) - rAs (6) 
0; contradiction. 
By definition of rAs 
(TAs 
7 TB3), if Government AsetsataXTAs > TB, +k(l(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
then 7As (TAs) 7-Bs) = 0, whilst 'rA. 




higher tax; contradiction. So we have established that if a< TBs+k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
then the unique best response isT* =T 
lim 
As As 
Now fix a, b andTBs so that a>- TB, + k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) and suppose 
to the contrary that '7-A*, ýa is not a best response. Then by definition there must 
be some other tax that yields a higher rent. First note that TAs (TAs I TBs) =0 
Clearly, TAs <a would yield rAs (TAs 7 TBs) < 0; contradiction. Now suppose 
TAs > a. But then TAs > 7-Bs +k (I (z - b) -sI- Is -a 1) and so, by definition of 
the rent function, rAs (TAs7 TBs) = 0. So rents are not higher under a higher tax; 
contradiction. 
An analogous set of arguments can be used to establish the corresponding 
results for the best response of Government B. 0 
Proposition 3. Consider Stage 2 of a perfect tax discrimination game, with a and 
b fixed on the interval [0, z]. Assume Al holds and that a+b<z, a>0, b>0. If 
k<I then for E sufficiently small there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in taxes 
for this stage of the perfect tax discrimination game. A unique Nash equilibrium 
in taxes for each firm sE [0, z] is determined by the following taxes: 
if a+b=z, 
=a=z-b; As Bs 
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if a+ b<z, 




For a+ b == z, both governments are located in the same place and we effectively 
have a standard Bertrand equilibrium in homogeneous products. 
Consider the case where a+b<z. It is assumed that 6>0 and arbitrarily 
small. An explicit upper bound ýý = (I - k) (z -a- b) /2 for E will be established 
in the proof below. 




As As z- b+k(lz -b- sl -Is -al) -E-, 
z-b. 'rB. 
First check the firm's location decision. We take the difference between the 
cost to locating in B and locating in A: 
CBs (T **= T* +klz-b-sl - T*, -kls-al Bs) - CAs 
(TAs) 
Bs A 
=z- b+klz - b- sl - (z - b) 
-(k(lz -b- sl -Is -al) -E) -k Is -al 
=6 
For each firm sC [0, z], profits made in Jurisdiction A are higher by E than profits 
made in Jurisdiction B. Therefore, each firm locates in A. 
To check that the pair (T* ý,, T* j does indeed represent a Nash equilibrium, AB 
lim 
suppose not. Then eitherTAs = 7-As (6) is not a best response toT*,, =z-b or B 
lim 
vice versa. First suppose thatTAs = 7As (6) is not a best response toT* z-b. B 
If T* =z-b then for all k<1 Bs 7 
<+k (I(Z - b) - sl - Is - al). -rBs 
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To see this, note that for s>z- bj it is the case that I(z - b) - sl - Is - al = 
- Iz -a- bl and fors < z-b it is thecasethat J(z - b) - sl-Is - al >- lz -a- bl. 
Using this and -r*, =z-b we have 0<z-a- b+ k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al). But B 
by Lemma 4, if a< -r*., +k(l(z-b) -sl - Is-al) thenTAs = 7-11m (E) is a best B As 
response to T* z-b; a contradiction. B 
We now establish the upper bound ýý = (1 - k) (z -a- b) /2 on F. Recall that 
Lemma 4 required 6 to be sufficiently small as to ensure that rAs 
(0) 
- rA. 
(E) < 0- 
Let ýý = (1 - k) (z -a- b) / 2. If E< ýý then rA. 
(0) 
- rA. 
(6) <0 for all sE [0, z]. To 
seewhy, usethefact that (I(z-b) -sI - Is -al) > -Iz-a-bI andT*,, =z-b B 
in the expression for rAs (0) - rA., 
rAs (0) - rAs 
(ýý) : -- -1 (z - a-b+k(I(z -b) - sl - Is-al» 2 
+1 (1 - k) (z -a- b) 2 
<-1 (z -a-b-k Iz -a- bl) 2 
+1 (1 - k) (z -a- b) 2 
=0 for all s Ei [0, z] . 








7 TAs :ý TAs (E) is a 
best response to -rý, =z- 




lim 7-As ': ý 7As (E) then 
+k (Is -al - I(z-b) - sl) As 
= b+k(lz - b- sl -Is -al) -E 
+k (Is - al - I(z - b) - sl) 
= 
But byLemma4, if z-b> -r*, +k(Is-al - I(z-b) -sl) then-r*, = z-bis a AB 
A As (E); a contradiction. Note that this does not depend best response to T* s= 7-lim 
on the value of k and s. 
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We now demonstrate uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium. We already know 
from Lemma 4 that -r* 'rhm -r-* =z-b. On A As (e) is the unique best response to Bs 
11M 
as any the other hand, T* =Z-b is not a unique best response to TA*s = TAs Bs 
T>zb earns rBs (T T BS - As i Bs) =0 for Government B. However, 7-As 7-lAi 
T. 
TBs >zb is not a Nash equilibrium. To see this, set some TB, >z-b and 
lim TAs = TAs (6) = TB, +k(lz-b-sl - Is-al) -E. As A is limit pricingthe firm 
s, the firm locates in A and Government B makes rent rBs (TAs, TBs) = 0. As long 
lim as TB, W>z-b, Government B has an incentive to deviate from TB, by setting 
lim TBs (6), attracting the firm s to Jurisdiction B and making 'rBs (7As , TBs) >0 
Only at T* s=T 
lim 
B-b does Government B not have a deviation that A As (s), T*s =z 
could make positive rents. In order to attract the firm s to B the government must 
set TB, <z-b and this would violate condition (ii) of equilibrium. 
As we have characterized a unique Nash equilibrium for all sC [0, z], we have 
demonstrated that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in taxes. 0 
Proposition 4. Consider Stage 2 of a perfect tax discrimination game, with a and 
b fixed on the interval [0, z]. Assume Al holds and that a+b<z, a>0, b>0. If 
k>I then for E sufficiently small there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in taxes 
for this stage of the perfect tax discrirnination game. A unique Nash equilibrium 
in taxes for each firm sE [0, z] is determined by the following taxes: 
if a+b=z, then 
T* =T*, =a=z-b fora+b=z and sE [O, z]; As B 
if a+b<z, then 





, T*, =z -b, f or sE [0,9), 
T* =aT*=T 
lim for sE (ý, z]. As ) Bs BsW 
Proof. For a+b=z, both governments are located in the same place and we 
effectively have a standard Bertrand equihbrium in homogeneous products. 
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Consider the case where a+b<z 
small. 
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It is assumed that 6>0 and arbitrarily 
First take the firm s=9. To solve for its location, useT* =a andT* .=z-b As B 
in ý= (7Bs - 7-As)12k + (z -b+ a) /2 to obtain 
(1 +k) (z - b) + (k- 8 2k 
It is straightforward to verify that a<9<z-b for k>1, and that 9 -ý z-b 
from below as k --+ I (from above). By construction, s=9 makes the same profits 
in Jurisdiction A as in Jurisdiction B. - Therefore, by Al, the probability that it 
locates in each jurisdiction is 1 2 
We will now show that the followin pair (T * 81 T* 9AB. 




To check that the pair (T* ý,, T*, ) does indeed represent a Nash equilibrium for AB 
s=s suppose not. Then either 7A. =a is not a best response toTýs =z-b or B 
vice versa. 
First suppose that TA. =a is not a best response to T*B, =z-b. For TAs = a, 
rents are given by 
? 'As (TAs7 T*Bs) ý 7As -a 
= 
Setting 7As <a contradicts condition (ii) of equilibrium. If Government A deviates 
by setting TAs >a then the firm makes higher profits by locating in Jurisdiction 
B, as a result of which rAs (TAs) T*Bs) ý 0- So there exists no profitable deviation 
from T=a; contradiction. An analogous argument holds for T*s =z-b. As B 
Next take firms in the interval sE [0,9). We will show that for all such firms 
Appendix 
the following pair (T *7* Av Bs) is a Nash equilibrium. 
lim -b+k(lz-b-sl -Is -al) -6; TAs = TAs 
(E) =zI 
Bs 
where it is assumed that 6>0 and arbitrarily small. 
81 
First check the firm's location decision. We take the difference between the 
cost to locating in B and locating in A: 
TB, 9) - 
CA. (r* )= -F* s+k 




- (z - b) - (k(lz - b- sl - 1.9 - al) - 6) -k Is - al 
- 
- 
For each firm 8E [0,9), profits made in Jurisdiction A are higher by e than profits 
made in Jurisdiction B. Therefore, each firm locates in A. 
t 
To check that the pair 
(T* 
S) 
T* A B. 
) does indeed represent a Nash equilibrium, 
lim suppose not. Then either TA. -:: ý 7As W is not a best response to 'F* z-b or B 
lim 
vice versa. First suppose that 7-As : -- 7-As (E) is not a best response to T* z-b. B 
lim Check that Government A makes non-negative rents at 7As : -- TAs W- Otherwise 
condition (ii) of equilibrium is violated. Note that we can represent any firm 
sE [0, ý) as s6>0, where 0<6<9. Using this notation, we find that 
lim ? 'As = 2H - E. To see why, use 9= ((I + k) (z - b) + (k - 1) a) /2k, TAs =-- TAs 
and -rý =z-b in rAs = 7As - a. As k, 6>0, it is always possible to pick an 6 Bs 
sufficiently small to ensure that rAs = 2ký -E>0. 
If T* =Z-b then for 8E [0, Bs 
a*+k b) - sl - Is - al). <7B. 
To see this, now use s= ((l + k) (z - b) + (k - 1) a) /2k -J andTý,, =z-b in 
the above expression to show that 
a+k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) = 2kJ > 0. Bs 
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But by Lemma4, if a< -rý, +k(l(z-b)-s 
best response to T* ý, =z-b; a contradiction. B 
82 
lim al) thenTA. ý7-- TAs W is a 
Suppose thatTBs= z-b is not a best response toT* = T"m As As (6). Exactly the 
same argument as in Proposition 3 is used to establish a contradiction. (Recall 
that the argument used in Proposition 3 was independent of the value of k and s). 
We have that, for all sE [0, ý), the pair (T*,,, T*,, ) is a Nash equilibrium. AB 
We now demonstrate uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium. Once again, exactly 
the same argument as in Proposition 3 is used to establish that T* s=T 
lim 
A As 
T*ýz-b is unique. Bs 
Now consider all sE (ý, z] - For such 
firms we will show that the following pair 
(T *57T* 
A B. 
) is a Nash equilibrium: 
7*= a- As 7 
T*7 
lim 
Bs Bs (6) =a- k(lz -b- sl - Is - al) -E. 
First check the firm's location decision. We take the difference between the cost 
to locating in B and locating in A: 
CBs(7'Bs)-CAs(T T*,, +klz-b-sl-T*,, -kls-al ABA 
= k(lz -b- sl -Is -al) -E+klz - b- sl -a -k Is - al 
= -E 
So costs are lower and therefore profits are higher for the firm if it locates in 
Country B. 
A B. 




s z], suppose not. Then either T=a is not a best response to T* ,= 
Am As B Bs (S) 
or vice versa. 
Suppose that TAs =a is not a best response to T* ý, =T 
lim (6). If Týs =T 
lim 
B Bs Bs 
Appendix 
then 
T*+k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) Bs 
=a -k(lz-b-sl -Is -al) -s 
+k (I(z - b) - sl - Is - al) 
=: a-e 
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But by Lemma 4, if a ýý' TBs +k (I (z - b) -sI- Is -a 1) then -r* ,=a 
is a best A 
response toT* = Thm Bs Bs 
(6) for Government A; contradiction. 
lim Now suppose that 7-B, = 7Bs (e) is not a best response to T* = a. Check that As 
Government B makes non-negative rents at TB, = TIM, W- Using the fact that 
s+6>0, where J>0, we find that rB. (T * 87T * A Bs) = 2kJ - E. To see this, 
use 9= ((I+k)(z-b)+(k - I)a)/2k and7Bs = TIM, 
W inrBs = TBs -z-b. 
As k, 6>0, it is always possible to pick an 6 sufficiently small to ensure that 
rBs = 2kö -E>0. 
If 7A*s =a then for sE (ý, z], 
b <Tý +k (Is - al - I(z - b) - sl) As 
To see this, use s= ((I + k) (z - b) + (k - 1) a) /2k -J and T*,, =a in the above A 
expression to show that 
7'As - (z - b) +k (Is - al - I(z - b) - sl) = 2kJ > 0. 
ButbyLemma4, ifz-b<T* +k(js-aj-j(z-b)-sj) thenT*., =z-bisa As B 
best response toT* ýa for Government B; contradiction. As 
We now demonstrate uniqueness of this Nash equdhbrium. We already know 
from Lemma 4 that 7-* = Am is the unique best response to 7-A*s On Bs Bs = a. 
the other hand, T=a is not a unique best response to T*, =T 
lim 
As B Bs (6), as 
any T*,,, >a earns rAs 
(T * 
s7T 0 for Government A. However, >a . 11 -A Bs) 
TAs I 
TBs = Am is not a Nash equilibrium. To see this, set some TAs >a and Bs 
lim TBs = TBs 
(E) =: T, -,, -k 
(Iz -b- sl - Is - al) - E. As B is limit pricing the firm 
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s, the firm locates in B and Government A makes rent rA, 
(TAs, 7Bs)= 0. As long 
lim as TA. 9 
W>a, Government A has an incentive to deviate fromTA, by setting 
lim TAs (E), attracting the firm s to Jurisdiction A and making rAs (7A. 7 7Bs) >0 
Only at T* ý, = a, -r* , 
=T"m AB Bs (E) does Government A not have a deviation that 
could make positive rents. In order to attract the firm s to A the government 
must set T As <a and this would violate condition (ii) of equilibrium. 
As we have characterized a unique Nash equilibrium for all sE [0, z], we have 
demonstrated that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in taxes. El 
Proposition 5. If k<I and 6>0 sufficiently small then there e.? dsts a unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the perfect tax discrimina- 
tion game. Equilibrium is characterized by the point a* = 0, b* = z. 
Proof. We assume that E>0 and arbitrarily small. First we show that, for a* =0 
and b* = z, a* is a best response to b* and vice-versa. 
Look for B's incentive to deviate. At b* = z, (a* = 0), 1 (z - b) -sI- Is -aI=0 
for all SE [0, z] - 
So 7-* z-b=0 and rB ABB B .9 
(T* 
s, T* s) = T* ý, - 
(z - b) =0 for all s. 
Government B cannot deviate by raising b, so the only option would be to deviate 
by lowering b. But by Proposition 3, it follows that if Government B sets b<z so 
*=a0, then all firms make that TBs =z-b>0, whilst Goverm-nent A sets TA, 
7- higher profits by locating in Jurisdiction A; and so rBs (TAsi B,, ) =0 for all s. So 
there is no profitable deviation for B. By symmetry, A has no incentive to deviate 
by raising a. 
Now suppose that some other equilibrium exists where aE (0, z] and bE [0, z) 
and zb>a. If z-b=a then T* T* z-b and rAs(T*siT*s) As Bs AB 
A Bs) =0 for all s. But by Proposition 3, Government A could attract 7'Bs 
(T T* 
all firms by lowering a and make positive rents. By symmetry, Government B has 
an incentive to raise b to a point where z-b<a and attract all firms in order 
to make positive rents. Therefore, no values aE (0, z] and bC [0, z) can be an 
equilibrium. 0 
Proposition 6. If k>I then there exists no subgame perfect Nash equffibrium 
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in pure strategies of the perfect tax discrimination game. 
Proof First let z-b>a. Let a* G arg MaXa rA (a, b, s, E; k, z) and b* cz 
arg inaxb rB (a, b, s, E; k, z). Using T* , and T* , from Proposition 4, AB 




Taking the first derivative and solving for a yields a candidate for a*: 
a (b, k, z) = 
(k - 1) (z - b) 
3k -1 
n-2 
Recall that, for k>1, 
a? 'Alaa =1 (1 -2- 3k) <0. So the objective function ýk 
is concave. 
Again, from Proposition 4, 
bsE; k z) = rB (a, ,))7 
JSC[O, 
z] 
rBs (TA,,, TBs) = (b + (z -b- ý) /2) (k - 1) (z -a- b) 
Taking the first derivative and solving for b yields a candidate for b*: 
b (a, k, z) == 
(I + k) (z - 
3k +1 
1D -2=1 1-tecall once again that 197-Bli9b (2 + 3k) <0 for k>1. So the objective k 
function is concave (weakly for k 1). Solving a (b, k, z) and b (a, k, z) simultane- 
ously for a and b in terms of parameters k and z we have 
a (k, z) 
(k 1) z 
and 4k 
b (k, z) 
(k + 1) z 
4k 
At the points a (k, z) = (k - 1) z/4k, b (k, z) = (k + 1) z/4k, each government 
maximizes its rent. 
Now suppose, contrary to the statement of the proposition, that there exists 
a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. Then given the global concavity of 
the payoff functions rA (a, b, s, E; k, z) and rB (a, b, s, 6; k, z), equilibrium must be 
characterized by the points following points: 
a* 
(k - 1) z. 
4k 
b* 




Now using these values calculate the difference in rents to governments a and b: 
z2 
rA(a*, b*, s, 6; k, z) - rB(a*, b*, s, s; k, z) -- -, 4 
Therefore, for any location z-b>a chosen by Government B, it can profitably 
deviate by choosing z-b == a and setting a tax TBs = T*, - E, for all firms in the A 
interval [0, ý). (Part of the additional surplus z'/4 is transferred to the firms in 
this interval when government B sets TB, = Týý, - e, inducing them to move to B. A 
This deviation contradicts equilibrium. As there is always an incentive to deviate 
from a ý4 a*, b ý4 b* no equilibrium can exist. 0 
Figure I 
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A Theory of GATT Rounds 
3.1 Introduction 
The experience of trade liberalization in the period since World War II has pre- 
sented economists with two puzzles. First, even in developed countries, free trade 
has remained stubbornly elusive, with average trade-weighted tariffs remaining at 
low but still positive levels. ' Second, tariffs have been cut only gradually in suc- 
cessive rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Since the GATT was drawn up after the war, tariffs have fallen from a 
trade weighted average of 50 percent to around 5 percent today. Neither of these 
two facts sits well with the simple textbook view that sees a trade agreement as a 
simple repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: that is, as a situation where it is individually 
rational for countries to impose tariffs, but collectively rational to abolish them. 
The purpose of this present chapter is to propose an explanation of these two 
puzzles by modelling the rules imposed on trade liberalization by the GATT. In 
I It could be argued that there is no puzzle in the failure to reach free trade. In a world where 
trade carries externalities, current positive tariff levels could be efficient. However, in practice 
there appears to be a consensus that efficiency has not been reached; that mutual gains from 
trade are still available from further multilateral trade liberalization. To keep things simple, free 
trade will be used as a metaphor for this *yet to be obtained' efficient level of international trade. 
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particular, we will focus on the implications for the liberalization process of the rule 
on a wtthdrawal of equivalent concessions (WEC) as set out in Article XXVIII, and 
taTiff bindings as set out in Article II of the GATT charter. Suppose that a deviant 
country fails to implement some agreed market access measure, whilst all other 
parties to the agreement proceed to do so. When the deviation is discovered, under 
GATT rules trade partners are allowed to do no more than to withdraw market 
access concessions equivalent to those that the deviant failed to implement. We 
model exactly this penalty structure in the context of a dynamic game and examine 
its implications for trade liberalization under the GATT. In terms of the applied 
game theory literature, WEC imposes paTtZal irreversZbility on punishments in this 
game. This is new, in that only complete iTreversibility has been analyzed in the 
past (Lockwood and Thomas 2002). 
The focus of this chapter is on the broad sweep of trade liberalization under 
the GATT in the post war period, up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 
1996. The idea is to take as read the rules imposed by the GATT regime, and 
analyze the dynamic equilibrium (liberalization) path that results when the tariff 
reduction game is played according to these rules. This seems to be a reasonable 
approach given that the GATT rules were adhered to very closely over that period 
and did not appear to be questioned. For example, violations of tariff bindings 
were almost never observed; see Chapter 2 of Whalley and Hamilton (1996) for 
further details. 2 
The first main result is that the WEC rule does facilitate trade liberalization 
but, when retaliation is limited by the WEC rule, free trade certainly cannot be 
21n 1996, as part of the conclusion to the Uruguay Round, signatories to the GATT formed 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). To some extent the analysis of the present chapter is 
relevant for the period since 1996 too, because the GATT Articles were adopted in the Charter 
of the WTO (GATT 1994). But since the WTO's inception, we appear to be observing a change 
in members' attitudes towards the rules of the regime, with a number of instances where rules 
have been broken. The reasons for this change present an interesting agenda for future research, 
but will not be taken up here in this present chapter 
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reached no matter how little countries discount the future. This result contrasts 
markedly with conventional insights from the theory of repeated games, which 
indicate that free trade can be achieved, given sufficiently little discounting. The 
intuition behind this first main result is simple. A standard repeated game allows 
trade partners to implement the worst (credible) punishment against a deviant. 
In general, the WEC rule makes such severe punishments illegal. By outlawing a 
class of severe punishments, the 'ATC rule compromises efficiency. Note that for 
this first result, partial irreversibility is imposed only on one side of the agreement. 
That is to say, WEC limits only the actions of punishers. 
The second main result concerns the gradualism of trade liberalization. Specif- 
ically, if punishments are constrained by the WEC rule and the initial deviation by 
any country is also constrained, then the most efficient self enforcing path of trade 
liberalization is gradual. Article 2 of the GATT specifies that a schedule of com- 
rnitments be maintained. Results of tariff negotiations are recorded as scheduled 
commitments in the form of tariff bindings; a permanent and irrevocable com- 
mitment that tariffs will not nse above bound levels for the product in question. 
This implies that the worst possible deviation is simply not to cut tariffs from the 
previous period's level (but not to raise them either). ' Under Article 2, because 
punishment is limited, current tariff cuts can only be made self enforcing by the 
promise of future tariff reductions. Moreover, if deviation can at worst entail not 
raising tariffs, then it is always possible to promise liberalization over a number 
of future periods that would more than compensate. So on the equilibrium path, 
trade liberalization must take place over a number of periods or 'rounds'. 
The chapter builds on a substantial hterature going back to Johnson (1953-54). ' 
31n Lockwood and Zissimos (2002) attention is given to the subgarne perfection of deviation 
under Article 2. 
"Horwell (1966), and more recently Lockwood and Wong (2000) compare trade wars with 
specific and ad valorem tariffs, showing the outcomes to be different under the respective instru- 
ments. Hamilton and Whalley (1983) broaden considerably the basis on which tariff wars can 
be examined by showing how they can be studied using numerical simulations. 
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Early contributions explain trade liberalization in a standard repeated game frame- 
work, where tariff cuts from their one-shot Nash equilibrium values are explained 
as the outcome of self enforcing trigger strategies (Dbdt 1987) .' As remarked 
above, this trigger strategy approach has two limitations. It cannot explain grad- 
ualism and moreover, free trade is always a self-enforcing outcome with sufficiently 
little discounting. More recent literature has offered several explanations as to why 
self-enforcing tariff agreements are gradual. The general idea is that initially, full 
liberalization cannot be self-enforcing, as the benefits of deviating from free trade 
are too great to be dominated by any credible punishment. But if there is partial 
liberalization, structural economic change within the domestic economy reduces 
the benefits of deviation from further trade liberalization (and/or raises the costs 
of punishment to the deviator). The individual papers differ in their description 
of the structural change induced by partial liberalization. Staiger (1995) endows 
workers in the import competing sector with specific skills, making them more pro- 
ductive there than elsewhere in the economy. When they move out of this sector, 
they lose their skills with some probability. In Devereux (1997), there is dynamic 
learning-by-doing in the export sector. In Furusawa and Lai (1999), there are lin- 
ear 6 adjustment costs incurred when labor moves between sectors. Bond and Park 
(2000) consider gradualism in a framework where countries are asymmetric. 
Finally, Bagwell and Staiger's (1999) work relates closely to our own, in that 
they too model specifically the GATT/WTO institutional framework. However, 
their focus is different. First, they make the very important point that the only 
thing that matters in a trade agreement is the terms of trade externality- This 
5 Among many others, some contributions to the literature on trade agreements that use the 
threat of retaliation as threat points in cooperative or non-cooperative models include Mayer 
(1981), Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and McLaren (1997). Syropou- 
los (2001) examines the effect of country size, showing that if one trade partner is larger than 
another by a significantly large ratio, then it will prefer a trade war to a free trade agreement. 
6Furusawa and Lai have an Appendix where they show that with strictly convex adjustment 
costs, a social planner would choose gradual tariff reduction. 
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point is made very forcefully by constructing a model that is broader than ours 
in that it allows for a wider set of political variables to be present. And vider 
aspects of the GATT institutional framework than just the withdrawal of equiv- 
alent concessions are also examined in their work. But our model of withdrawal 
of equivalent concessions is built around a dynamic game, which theirs is not, and 
this enables us to bring out some implications of the institutional framework that 
they do not. ' The theory of repeated games has also been used by Bond, Syropou- 
los and Winters (2001) to study trade block formation, where a preferential trade 
agreement is supported by the credible threat of punishment. 
This present chapter also makes a wider contribution to the applied game 
theory literature on gradualism. In particular, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) study 
the effect of complete irreversibility, showing that irreversibility on the side both of 
the initial deviant and the punisher are sufficient for gradualism. As pointed out 
above, in the first part of this present chapter, paTttal irreversibility of the strategic 
instrument is assumed - here tariffs - on the side of the punisher, but with the initial 
deviation itself unrestricted. We then see explicitly that gradualism cannot result. 
Only when there is a degree of irreversibility on both sides does gradualism arise. 
In this sense, the present chapter extends Lockwood and Thomas (2002). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section sets up the basic analytical 
framework, defines formally the tariff reduction game and a withdrawal of equiv- 
alent concessions. Section 3 then defines symmetric equilibrium tariff paths and 
examines their properties under a withdrawal of equivalent concessions. It is here 
that we will see how trade liberalization is achieved in this framework but that free 
trade cannot be reached. Section 4 then examines the circumstances under which 
gradual trade liberalization can take place, presenting computed equilibrium tariff 
reduction paths for various parameterizations of a quasi-linear example. Section 5 
concludes. 
7The differences between Bagwell and Staiger's analysis and ours are discussed further in the 
Conclusions. 
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3.2 Optimal Tariffs, Trade Agreements and Lim- 
ited Punishments 
3.2.1 Tariffs and Welfare 
We work with a simple and standard model of international trade. There are 
n countries iEN and the same number of goods. Each country i has an endow- 
ment (normalized to unity) of good i (or is endowed with a factor of production 
that can produce I unit of good i). We denote by x. ý the consumption of good 
j in country i. The preferences of the representative consumer in country i over 
xi -` (Xji)jENare then 
8 
'(x') =: u(x', (P(x (3.1) 
where x-' X1 (X11 --X -1, 
Also, we assume that in equilibrium, some iin 
quantity of imported goods will be consumed i. e. we make the Inada-type as- 
sumption that lim,, ,, o 
Ou(xi', W(x`))IOxý = +oo, i. An example of this form 





with o- > 1, and where o- measures the elasticity if substitution between different 
"varieties" of imported goods. 
The consumer in country i faces a budget constraint 
n 




where pj, Tj 7 
Ri are respectively: the world price of good j, the tariff set by country 
i on good J, and tariff revenue in country i which, as is usually assumed, is returned 
to the consumer in a lump-sum. Without loss of generality, we set T' = 0; also 
note that -I < 7'3ý < oo. 
8NVe adopt the usual convention that bold characters denote vectors., and non-bold characters 
denote scalars. 
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Within a period, t=1,2,. - -, the order of events is as follows. First, each 
country i simultaneously chooses an import tariff vector -r' =(ý 7', 
)jc-N. Then, 
given world prices p= (Pj)jCN, and -r', the consumer in country iEN chooses x' 
to maximize ui subject to the budget constraint, which yields the usual indirect 
utility function v' = v'(p, -r, R, ) and excess demands. Then, conditional on -r =: 
(T 1 
1.. T 
n), markets clear and world prices p for the goods are determined. ' These 
world prices will of course depend on tariffs i. e. p= p(-r), and so will tariff revenues 
ni i. e. Ri = Ej=1 pj (-r) -rjX' (p(-r)). We assume that equilibrium prices are unique, 
given tariffs, so the mapping p(. ) is one-to-one. It is also assumed that technology 
(embodied in u' or v') is identical across countries. 
So, we can write equilibrium welfare of country i, v', as a function of -r 
(. 1'.., n) only i. e. Vi = Vi(7-l'.. Tn) = vi(p(, r), 7-i, Iý-(-r)). Now we can define 
a Nash equ%lZbnum in taTiffs in the usual way as a 7-, such that 
all -r' E (_ 1,00) n, all iEN. We will focus on Nash equilibria where 
(i) all countries set common taTiffs i. e. -ý3ý = -ý', all iEN; (ii) all these common 
tariffs are equal ý' = -ý, all iEN. Such equilibria exist for the special cases that 
we consider below, due to the symmetry of the model". 
We are interested in how fast countries can reduce tariffs from this non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium, and also whether they can ever reach free trade i. e. Tj = 0, if the 
tariff reduction plan must be self-enforcing i. e. the outcome of a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. It is convenient to impose the constraint that the cooperative tariff 
reductions have the same structure as does the Nash equilibrium i. e. each country 
sets a common tariff, T'. In this case, we may write country welfare as a function 
of common tariffs only i. e. vi= V'(T', 7-'). The following result establishes that, 
9As this is a general equilibrium model, prices are determined only up to a scalar, and so 
some normalization (e. g. choice of numeraire) must be made. This technical detail, and others, 
are dealt with in Section 3 below. 
"More generally, it is possible to show that if all j 54 i set the same common tariff, the unique 
best response of i is to set the same tariff on imports on all countries i. e. a common tariff, 
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furthermore, countries have symmetric preferences over (common) tariffs. " 
Proposition 1. v' = V(T 
i7 T-'), and if 7r(7--i) is any permutation of T-i, then 
(T i, 7-') V(T', 7r(T-'». 
For example, if n=3, then v1 = v(T 




V(TI)7.2lT3) = V(Tl, T3, T2 ) etc. We can now use the function 
v (or, more precisely, functions based on it) to formulate the tariff reduction game 
precisely. As we are focussing on tariff reductions, we will assume throughout that 
Ir = (T 
1.. 7n)C: [03 ýý] n= Fn. 
From now on, for all T, T 
IE IZ+, let w (-r, T') -= v 
(T, T', --- T) so w 
(-r, 
T') is any 
country i's payoff in the event that i sets T, and all j =ý i set T'. Without much 
loss of generality, we will assume that w is twice continuously differentiable i. e. let 
Wli W2 be the first partial derivatives of w with respect to T, -r' respectively. We 
assume three properties of w: 
Al. Wl (T, 7-1) >0, W2 (7- 1 TI) :ý0, 
for all (T, T') CF2, and wl (7-, 7-) >0 if -r < -7, 
W2(T7 TI) <0 if 0< 7j. 
Al asserts that whenever other countries' tariffs are below Nash equilibrium, any 
country likes an increase in its own (common) tariff, and a reduction in the tariffs 
of the other countries. In other words, the static tariff game has a Prisoner's 
Dilemma structure. Our second assumption is very weak: 
A2. Wl (T i T) +W2 
(7 
, 7-) <0 for all (-F, -r) CF2 with -r > 0. 
This says that any equal reduction in all tariffs, starting from a situation of equal 
tariffs at or below the Nash level, makes any country better off. Moreover, note 
that from the optimality of free trade, W1(0,0)+W2(0,0)= 0. Our third assumption 
is: 
A3. W12(7-3 7»1) < 0, all (7-, -r') CF. 
"This result, and all others, are proved in the Appendix, where a proof is required. 
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That is, tariffs are strategic substitutes; the closer other countries' tariffs are to 
Nash equilibrium tariffs, the smaller the gain any country makes from increasing 
its own tariff. 
Payoffs over the i4finite horizon are discounted by a common discount factor 
67 0<6<Ii. e. 
00 
Jtw(Ti, T-i) tt 
t=l 
(3.4) 
A game htstory at time t is defined as a complete description of past tariffs 
ht (T T n) I'-' All countries can observe game histories. A tariff strat- 
egy for country Z=1,.. n is defined as a choice of tariffs T' in periods t=1,2... t 
conditional on every possible game history. A taTiff path of the game is a sequence 
f (T 17 
-T 
n) loo 1 that is generated by the tariff reduction strategies of all countries. tt t= 
Given the symmetry of the model, we restrict our attention to symmetnc equi- 
librium" tariff paths where Tt = Ttj t =1)2.... , i. e. where all countries choose 
the same tariff in every time period, and we denote such paths by the sequence 
00 jTtjt=j, 
3.2.2 Limited Punishments; Withdrawal of Equivalent Con- 
cessions 
Suppose that fýtjc*j is a candidate for an equilibrium tariff sequence, where `ýt t= 
is the tariff "agreed" for period t. Note that there are two kinds of punishment 
that i ý4 j could levy on j for deviating from fFtlool. One is to raise tariffs to the t= 
Nash level ý, the most severe credible punishment (which we call an unconstrained 
punishment). The other type of punishment is where i =ý j, upon observing that j 
has deviated at time t-1, withdraw precisely the equivalent concessions to market 
access at time t. That is, if the deviant j has set Tt-1 = TI >Ft-1, then in the next 
period instead of retaliating by setting ý the other parties withdraw the concessions 
1211, the sequel, it is understood that "equilibrium" refers to subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 
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made, implementing -r' = -r' = -rt-, as well. We call this form of punishment payoff t 
a unthdrawal of equivalent concessions (WEC). In practice, GATT signatories were 
bound by Article XXVIII to adopt exactly this penalty structure. To support WEC 
as a subgame perfect equilibrium punishment strategy, there must exist an implicit 
cost to a country of breaking the WEC (i. e. by setting some7't >T t7 -1 > 
ýt-j in 
retaliation). Otherwise, it would never be observed to hold in practice. We denote 
this cost by ci. Thus we have a stylized characterization of the GATT rule on 
withdrawal of equivalent concessions. 13 Finally, we assume that ci is so high that 
no country would wish to violate the VVTC rule. Given this, it is clear that the 
worst credible punishment that the set of countries Nlfjl can impose on j is to 
match the deviator's tariff in all subsequent periods. 
3.3 Symmetric Equilibrium Paths 
3.3.1 Optimal Deviations 
We begin by characterizing the optimal deviation from a symmetric equilibrium 
path fýtj"Oj for any country i, given that it rationally anticipates that it will be t= 
punished by the WEC rule. That is, all i will match i's deviation tariff in 
all subsequent periods if and only if i deviates by setting a tariff 7" > 'ýýt. Let i's 
optimal deviation at t from the reference path fýtjtcZj be denoted zt. 
Note that the withdrawal of eqtfivalent concessions applies only to deviation 
by setting a tariff above the agreed rate ýFt. Thus there is an asymmetry in the 
penalty. Formally, the payoff any country can expect from a deviation to zt is: 
13EIsewhere in the literature, reputation effects are modelled explicitly (e. g. Kreps, Milgrom, 
Roberts and Wilson 1982,, Kreps and Wilson 1982, Milgrom and Roberts 1982). Here they are 
simply introduced by assumption as an enforcement device because we want to focus on the 
effect of the WEC penal code itself. 
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A(zt, 1ýýtjt=l) 
101 
(I - J)W(Zt, -Tt) + Jw(zt, Zt) if Z, > F, 
ý)W(zt, -Tt) + (I - J) Ello t+j is-lw(-Tt, -Tt) if Zt < ýýt 
(3-5) 
We are interested in the optzmal deviation zt i. e. the choice of zt that maximizes 
A(zt, fýtj'j given the reference path. Due to the discontinuous nature of the t= 
payoff A(zt, fftjtcý, ), an optimal deviation does not exist, but we can precisely 
bound the gain from deviation. Technically, the largest possible gain from devia- 
tion is the supremum of A(zt, fýtj'j across all values of zt -=ý'Ft, which we denote t= 
by A(fFtj"j). tý 
Lemma 1. Assurne Al-A2. Then, 
00 
maxf max [(I - J)w(zt, -Tt) + Jw(zt, zt)], (I-J)E6s-tw(, Tt, t= Zt>-Tt 
-Tt) I- 
S=t 
This result says that the best that a country can do is either to replicate the 
payoff on the equilibrium path - the second term in curly brackets - or to deviate 
by setting tariffs above the agreed level; zt > ýTt. It can never benefit by a unilateral 
deviation zt < -Tt. " Now, from the first term in curly brackets which gives the 
gains to deviation, define 
z (-rt) = arg max w (zt, -rt) + Jw (zt, zt) Zt >Tt (3.6) 
z (. ) can be thought of as a kind of "reaction function" indicating how the optimal 
deviation varies ývith the agreed tariffTt. We can now obtain a characterization 
of z(. ) that is very useful. Define 
(T) 
= arg inax 
J)W(Z, T) + 6W(Z, Z) 
z 
(3.7) 
"'To see why, recall that a withdrawal of equivalent concessions applies only to upward devi- 
ations. If a country were to deviate by setting a tariff that were lower than agreed - zt < Tt - 
the WEC rule would not require all other countries to follow the deviant downwards. We can 
therefore ignore the possibility that zt < rt because, by Al, a country would make itself worse 
off by deviating in this way. 
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This is the solution to the problem in equation (3.6), ignoring the inequality con- 
straint. We can think of ((7-) as a kind of reaction function. Note that 
(I (T) =::: 
9)7,012(Z) T) 
D 
where D>0 from the second-order condition for the choice of z in (3.7). So, note 
that if A3 holds, ( (T) < 0. Also, define T to satisfy: 
(3.8) 
This is a self-enforcing tariff level: i. e. at ýT the optimal deviation is in fact not to 
deviate at all. 
We now have the following characterization of z(. ) : 
Lemma 2. Assume Al-A3. Then, there is a unique solution to (3.8), for which 
T< -7. The solution to (3.6) satisfies: (i) for all -r < T, z(T) (T) > 7F > T; 
for all T> T7 Z(T) = T. 
We now have a complete characterization of the optimal deviation zt, given any 
cO 
tariff Tt. So for any ýýt in a candidate equilibrium sequence f ýýt It=, we know the 
optimal deviation for that period under VVEC. This wiH now be used to characterize 
uniquely the efficient equilibrium path. 
3.3.2 Efficient Equilibrium Paths and Failure to Reach Free 
Tý-ade 
We can now formally define the conditions that must hold if a symmetric tariff 
path is to be a subgame-perfect one in our game. In every period, the continuation 
payoff from the path must be at least as great as the maximal payoff from deviation, 
given that a punishment consistent with the WEC will ensue. From Lemma 1, the 
maximal relevant payoff from deviation at t is 
(1 
- 
J) W (Z (Tt), Tt) + 6W (Z (Tt), (Z (Tt)) 
So, formally, we require: 
(1-Ö)(W(Tt, 7-t)+ÖW(Tt+J, Tt+J)+... 
) ýý (1-6)W(Z(Tt), Tt)+ÖW(Z(Tt), (Z(Tt», 
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30) . F. I/ ý 
Of course, a whole set of paths will satisfy this sequence of inequalities: let this 
set of equilibrium paths be denoted E. An efficZent taTiff reduction path in the set 
00 E is simply a sequencef Tt It=, of tariffs in E for which there is no other sequence 
fT'J"O I also in E which gives a higher payoff to any country, as calculated by (3.4). t t= 
Following the arguments of Lockwood and Thomas (2002), it can be shown that 
if fTtjt'ýj is efficient, (3.9) holds with equality at every date i. e. 
(1-ý)(W(Tt, Tt)+JW(Tt+l, Tt+l)+... )ý (I-J)W(Z(Tt), Tt)+JW(Z(Tt), (Z(Tt)), 
(3.10) 
The intuition is that if (3.9) held with strict inequality, it would be possible to 
reduce the tariff path by a small amount without violating (3.9). 
Of the class of equilibrium paths E, it is obviously the efficient path (shown to 
be unique below) that is of most interest. We now turn to characterizations of the 
efficient equilibrium path. Our first main result, Proposition 2, establishes that 
free trade is in fact impossible under WEC. 
Proposition 2. (Failure to reach free trade) Let fTtl", be an equilibrium path. t= 
ThenTt > 0, for all J< 17 aLl t. 
The proof of this Proposition works by showing that if all other countries agree 
to adopt free trade at any point in time, then the last will have an incentive to de- 
viate by levying a positive tariff. So such an agreement would not be self-enforcing. 
This is clearly in contrast to the standard case with unlimited punishments. For 
in that case, countries can credibly punish deviators by reverting to (for example) 
Nash tariffs, and then it is well-known that for some 60 < 1, free trade can be 
attained in equilibrium for all 6> 60. Instead, Proposition 3 is reminiscent of the 
results of Lockwood and Thomas(2002), who study a repeated prisoner's dilemma 
with complete irreversibility of actions. 
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We now turn to the more difficult question of what form the efficient path 
takes. Say that an equilibrium tariff reduction path is a stationaT-y path if 7-t = -F, 
all t>I (recall To = fl; that is, there is an immediate and permanent tariff 
reduction. A stationary equilibrium path must satisfy: 
a(7) --z:: max{(l - 
ö)w(z, 7) + dw(z , z) 
1 :5 w(7-, 7-) ý(7-). 
z>-r 
To characterize such paths, note first the properties of a, ý. First, 0 is decreasing in 
Tby A2, and a is decreasing by Al, A2. Second, at the Nash equilibrium, as /I =, ý 
is a best response to -ý, a(fl = 0(fl i. e. the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is 
a stationary equilibrium path". Third, 
a(0) -= maxf 
(1 - 5)w(z, 0) + dw(z, z)1 > w(0,0) = o(0) z>O 
as a small increase in z from 0 strictly increases w(z, 0) (from AI), while leaving 
w(z, z) unchanged (as w(z, z) is maximized at zero, by A2). 
So, the possibilities are shown in Figure 1. Next, as a, ý are both downward- 
sloping, they may have multiple crossing-points, as shown. Note that Ce(T) and 
O(T) coincide over the range -T <T< -ý. This is because, by Lemma 2, z 
(T) =T 
for allT>7. SO 
a(-r) = max,, >, j, (1-6)V)(z, -r)+JO(z, z)j 
= 'O(TIT) =ý3(T) for all -r >; F 
Finally, the smallest stationary equilibrium tariff will be at the lowest crossing 
point of a, 0, namelyT*. Moreover, using Lemma 2, it is possible to show that 
under some additional assumptions, 7-* = 7T. Formally, we have: 
Proposition I Let 7-0 = ý. There is a unique efficient stationary path, rt = T*, 
all t>1, whereT* >0 is the smallest root of the equation a(T) = 
ý(7-). Moreover, 
if A3 holds, and wi 1 
(T, T), W22 (T 7 T) <0 on [0, T], then -r* =7< -ý. 
"5Note that it is not claimed that -ý = ((ý). In fact, it is easily checked from the definition of 
(3.7) that ý(ý) < ý, so the constraint z> 'ý in the definition of a binds, implying that -ý7 
and consequently, that a(i-) = (1 - -ý) + 60(ý, fl == 
Symmetric Eqwhbrium Paths 
Proposition 3 shows that under a withdrawal of equivalent concessions it is 
possible for all countries to agree to reduce tariffs immediately to the level -T, hold- 
ing them there indefinitely, and moreover, this is the best equilibrium stationary 
path. The result is illustrated in Figure 2, which refines Figure 1. 
The question then arises as to whether there is a non-stationary path in E 
which is more efficient than the stationary pathTt= T, t>1. The following result 
answers this negatively: 
Proposition 4. The stationary path, which has `ýt = -T, afl t>1, is the unique 
-M emcient path in E. 
The idea of the proof is the following. If there is a more efficient equilibrium 
path, then it must involve a tariff 7-t < T. But, the dynamics of (3.10), expressed 
as a difference equation, tell us that once -rt < T, Tt+l < -rt i. e. the path must be 
monotonically decreasing. But this is impossible, as either it implies a stationary 
equilibrium path below 7 (impossible by definition), or a tariff sequence diverging 
to minus infinity (which cannot be efficient). 
We now illustrate our results with the quasi-linear example i. e. we assume 
that preferences take the form (3.2). This example is analyzed thoroughly in 
the appendix. First, it can be shown that the Nash equilibrium tariff is -ý =: 
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11(u - 1). Also, we show that 
7 == 1-6 (3.11) 
0, (1 + J) -I 
Note from (3.11) that in general, 0<7<ý. That is, 7 --+ -ý as J --+ 0, and 7 --+ 
as 6 --+ 1. When agents place a high weight on future outcomes, tariff rates close 
to zero can be achieved under VVEC. The elasticity of substitution between goods 
is also inversely related to the level of T. 
If the GATT provides a means by which countries select the efficient tariff 
reduction path, then Propositions 2,3 and 4 provide a complete characterization 
of this path. Accordingly, under WEC trade liberalization can be achieved, but 
free trade cannot be reached. However, at present our model cannot "explain" the 
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gradualism in tariff-cutting obser-ved in practice. 
3.4 Loss of Political Good Will and Gradual Tar- 
iff Reduction 
In Section 3.2.2, it was argued that there must exist an implicit cost to countries of 
breaking the VVEC penal code. If not, then it would never actually be observed to 
hold. This cost was posited as a loss of political good will, which would be exerted 
in other areas of the international political arena. This loss of political good will is 
now extended to the initial deviant. Specifically, we will assume the following. If 
country i setsTt > Tt-1, it incurs a polffical cost of deviation ai. " If on the other 
handTt :ý Tt-1, country i incurs no such cost at the initial deviation. 17 
A justification of this penalty structure is as follows. Article 2 of the GATT 
specifies that a schedule of commitments be maintained. Results of tariff ne- 
gotiations are dutifully recorded as scheduled commitments in the form of tariff 
bindings; a permanent and irrevocable commitment that tariffs will not "se above 
bound levels for the product in question. Violations of tariff bindings become the 
subject of dispute settlement; with initial complaint, investigation and hearing 
before panels, panel findings, and rulings by the GATT council to come into com- 
pliance. Failure to return to compliance will eventually lead to retaliation being 
sanctioned by the GATT on the part of parties affected by the violation of bindings 
against violators. 
Why has this been so? Why have tariff bindings under GATT de facto become 
permanent and irreversible commitments, and what has been the penalty struc- 
16 We do not assume in general that ci = Ej. For example, it may be that the political cost of 
reneging on the original agreement in the first place is higher than the cost of deviating later, in 
the punishment phase. Or there may be a higher cost to losing the moral high ground. 
'-'Note that a country can deviate from the agreement without incurring a loss of political 
good will by setting -r' so that ý: t < -r' < 7-t-1. 
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ture to maintain this system? Firstly, tariff bindings have acquired the status of 
an international commitment comparable to that of other international treaties. 
Bindings, if committed to, effectively slot into a box of enshrined cross coun- 
try commitments comparable to military and diplomatic treaties (Jackson 1989 
chapters 2,4). Violation of tariff bindings brings into question the soundness of a 
country's financial commitments, its trustworthiness in strategic and military mat- 
ters, its diplomatic reputation. Violating tariff bindings incurs large costs outside 
the tariff area (Keohane 1982,1984 chapter 4). 18 
It is somewhat unsatisfactory that these political costs of tariff reversals are not 
firmly micro-founded. However, it appears that such costs exist and are important 
in the international arena. And no theory exists of which we are aware to explain 
the impact on tariff reductions of this type of cost. Therefore, in the absence of 
such a theory, it seems appropriate to simply assume that such costs exist in order 
to examine their consequences. 
We will assume in what follows that ai is high enough so that a deviation at 
t will never be aboveTt-1 and thus incur loss of political goodwill. We can now 
reformulate the equilibrium conditions (3.9) under this new constraint. It is clear 
that in the event that a country deviates, the "optimal" deviation given in (3.6) 
will be chosen unless z (T, ) > -rt-1, in which caseTt-1 will be chosen. So, defining 
X(Tt, Tt-1) = min fz (-rt), Tt-11, the equilibrium conditions become 
(I-J)(W(Tt, Tt)+6W(Tt+I, Tt+l)+.. - 
) ý! (3-12) 
(I 
- 
6)W(X(Tt, Tt-1), Tt) + 6W(X(Tt, Tt-1), X(Tt, Tt-1)), 
As before, let the set of equilibrium tariff paths be E, and define the efficient tariff 
paths in E as those paths that maximize (3.4). Also as before, any efficient path 
18We thank John Whalley for suggesting this synthesis of work by Jackson and Keohane in 
support of our present argument. 
Current (at the time of writing) protectionist measures, imposed on steel imports by the 
European Union and US, appear to be in breach of tariff bindings. Yet over the postwar period 
in general, the focus of this chapter, instances of violations of tariff bindings were rare. 
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must satisfy (3.12) with equality. 
To proceed, we first introduce the following result. By Lernma 2, we know that 
z(Tt) >7 for all Tt < -T.. So, z(Tt) > 7-t-1 also if Tt-1 < T. Formally: 
Lemma 3. If 7-t, 7-t-, :! ý, T, thenX(Tt, 7t-l) = Tt-1. 
This says that as long as Tt I Tt-I :5 7T, the optimal retaliation is Tt-1. Recall 
from Lemma 2 that C ff) >7 if T<T. But now a loss of political good will 
prohibits a deviation to this level because ( (F) =z 
(Tt) > -T > Tt-1. If the cost 
from a loss of political good will is high enough, the country is better off adopting 
Tt- I rather than C (F) =z (-rt); ie X(Tt, Tt-1) = min fz (-rt) Tt-11 = 7t-i- 
Now, suppose that fTtjt'ý, is an efficient path from s onwards with -rt 
t>s. Rom (3-12) and Lemma 3, this path must satisfy 
(1-6)(W(Tt, Tt)+6W(Tt+I, Tt+l)+... )= (3-13) 
(I 
- 
J)W(Tt-1, Tt) + JW(Tt-1, Tt-1), 
Advancing (3.13) one period, multiplying both sides by J, subtracting from (3.13), 
and dividing the result by 1-6, we get: 
W(Tt, Tt) W(Tt-1, Tt) +6 W(Tt-1, Tt-1) W(Tt, Tt+l) + W(Tt, -Ft) 
(3-14) 
which is a second-order difference equation" inTt. This can be seen more clearly 
by rearranging (3.14) to get: 
W(Tt, 7-t+l) [W(Tt-l, Tt) - W(Tt, Tt)] +W 
(Tt- 
II Tt- 1) 
JW(Tt, Tt) 
)t>1. (3-15) 1-j 1-6 
0 -0, T1. We Let f Tt (TO, T 1) 1 ct)=2 be the sequence that solves (3.15) with initial conditions 7 
can now establish gradualism by showing that as long as there is a tariff reduction 
in the first period then tariffs must strictly fall in all subsequent periods along any 
efficient equilibrium path. 
"This is an unusual difference equation in that it has a continuum of stationary solutions i. e. 
setting 'Tt-, = 7, t = -rt+l always solves (3.4 ). 
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00 that satisfies (3.15), Lemma 4. Any sequence 
frt(TO, 7'1)lt=2 with initial condi- 
tions To, -r, %4th 0 <Tj < ro is strictly decreasing i. e. 0< Tt+l (TO, 71) < Tt(TO, 71) 
all t>1. 
Now consider the construction of an efficient path, given these results. First, 
-ro is given at -ý. Second, from t=2 onwards, i. e. conditional on ro7 T1, the unique 
efficient path is simply f-rt(To7 -rj)ItOO2 = as 
long as (i) T, < -ro (required by Lemma 
4), and (ii) 7-1 < -T (required by Lemma 3: otherwise, the efficient path does not 
satisfy (3.15)). So, it remains to chooseT, < -T < -ý. If the path is to be efficient, 
the incentive constraint (3.12) must hold with equality in period I i. e. 
(I 
- 




J)W(X(Tj, flj TI) + ýW(X(Tj, 'ý), X(Tj, 'ý)) 
We now have: 
Proposition 5. There exists a smallest value of T1,0 < -T, <T that satishes 
(3.16). Consequently, the path (; r-l, 'ý2, 'ý3, .... ) is the unique efficient path, iirith 
-Tt =: Tt (-ý, -T 1), t>1. This path exWbits a gradually decreasing tariff i. e. 7- t+ I< Tt, 
t>1. 
From Proposition 5 we learn that it is possible to achieve an equilibrium path 
for which -Tt < T, all t>1. Consider some period s in which tariffs have been 
reduced by a gradual process over periods t=1...... s-I to some tariff level 
< T. Now suppose that the agreement requires Ts+i < T, in period s+1. If 
the agreement proposes no further reductions in future periods, then country t 
may do better by maintaining T. In s+I whilst all other countries proceed to set 
, T, +, < T,, even if all countries impose the WEC penal code in all periods after 
that. But it is always possible to promise additional reductions in future periods 
that can compensate for the gains to deviation in period s. 
Why is the cost from loss of political good will necessary for this process? In its 
absence, the unilateral gains from deviating to ;T are greater than the gains from 
all future reductions. Indeed, the gains from deviation grow with the size of the 
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overall reduction. But if a loss of political good will limits a deviation to the tariff 
level in the previous period, -Tt-1, then the promise of all future reductions can be 
large enough to compensate for the gains from deviation in a single period. 
Proposition 5 establishes that we can restrict attention to a tariff reduction 
sequence ITtloo, for which 0< ýýt :5 -f all t>1. We are able to explore the t= 
properties of the efficient equilibrium tariff reduction path further by looking at 
specific examples. To do this, the functional form must be specified and it must be 
verified that for the example under consideration assumptions AI-A3 are satisfied. 
3.4.1 Computed Paths 
A computational algorithm is used to find the efficient equilibrium path. This 
entails finding the smallest possible value ofT, - -T, - that satisfies (3.16) and 
therefore, by Proposition 5, gives rise to the unique efficient path -Tt = Tt (-ý, 'Tj). 
There exists no analytical way of finding Tj, but it can be approximated in the 
following way. First, set the second initial condition, TI, of the difference equation 
defined in (3.16) equal to the efficient stationary tariff, T. (Recall that the first 
condition is fixed at 7-0 = -ý. ) Then reduce this second initial condition by a small 
step 6 and check that the resulting difference equation converges to some positive 
tariff rate. Continue in this way, reducing Ti by steps of E until it is so low that 
the difference equation diverges. The final convergent difference equation is then 
the approximation to the efficient path. The approximation is more accurate the 
smaller the step size E. Intuitively, the efficient tariff reduction path cannot bring 
about non-positive tariffs, because free trade cannot be reached, by Proposition 2. 
The algorithm is as follows: 
1. Let k=k+l. 
2. Set To =ý and 0< Tj = 7T - kE <T as initial conditions and solve (3.15) 
forward for T periods. 
3. If TT(Tl; To, 6) > 0, set Sk = Sk-, U J-ý - kel and go to I. 
Loss of Political Good Will and Gradual Tariff Reduction ill 
4. If -rT(Tl, TO, 6) :! ý 0, stop. Discard this path. 
This algorithm is initialized by setting So = 0. Note that the algorithm can 
only run at most for m steps, where m is the largest integer smaller than 7T/E. Let 
K+I<m be the number of steps after which the algorithm stops. The algorithm 
stops when a path fails the criterion0f TT(TI; TO, J) > 0. Having failed, this last 
path must be discarded. Then SK = SK-1 U -rl - KE and T, = ýr - K-ý- is the 
smallest member. SK then comprises the full set of tariff reduction paths that 
satisfy (3.16), and T, =7- KE = -T, gives rise to the efficient path, as required. 
The technical details are as follows. The utility function (3.2) is substituted 
into the second order difference equation that defines an equilibrium tariff reduc- 
tion path (3.15). The resulting expression is used to solve sequentially for the 
equilibrium tariff level Tt+,, given levels in Tt-1 and Tt. Recall that the algorithm 
requires the size of the steps between simulations E and the total number of periods 
T to be determined. We use, respectively, E=0.0001 and T= 10000. A smaller 
value of E and a larger value of T would yield greater accuracy in computation of 
the equilibrium reduction path, but take longer. 
The procedure is begun with k=0, so in calculating So the procedure is 
initialized using To = ý, -rl = -7-. Let K be the highest value of k for which 
TT(71; T07 6) > 0. The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3, for 0- =2 and ý =: 0.5, 
where the path corresponding to step k=K is the approximation to the efficient 
tariff reduction path. The tariff level is shown on the vertical axis, with simulation 
periods on the horizontal axis. OnlY the first 1000 periods of the simulation are 
presented. We also show what happens for k=K+I and k=K+2. Note that no 
value for the number of countries is specified. The reason is that n has no impact 
whatever on the equilibrium path under the quasi-linear preference specification. 20 
Given o- =27ý=0.5 7 andTo = 
^T, 
=I we have 7-1 =T=0.25 for k=0 
andT, = 0.2499 for k=I and so on. One of the paths shown in Figure 3 is for 
2')To put this another way, if a closed form solution for the reduction path could be found, 
then n would cancel from the expression. 
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k=K= 1426, so that -rl = 0.1704. Note that for this set of initial conditions, 
the reduction path stabilizes; -rioooo = 0.102748 > 0. This is the efficient gradual 
reduction path. How do we know? When k is increased by 1 to K+I= 1427, the 
criterionTT (72; T 17 6) >0 fails. 
This path that fails the criterion is also presented in Figure 3. Observe that 
k=K+I= 1427 implies T, = 0.1703. The path diverges sharply downwards and 
T10000 - were it to be displayed - would be significantly below 0, failing the criterion 
for that path to be an equilibrium. At t= 100, f -rjOO(7T - (K + 1) 6; 1,0-5)1 = 
0.099384, and is close to f Tloo(-T - K6; 1,0.5) 1. However, as t increases further 
the path of the sequence ITt(-T - (K + 1) 6; 1,0-5)jtý=j diverges downwards sharply 
from f Tt(7 - KE; 1,0-5)jtý=,, SO TT(Tl; TO) J) 0 for K+I and the path must be 
discarded (see Step 4 of the algorithm above). For K+2, where T, = 0.1702, the 
divergence takes place at an even lower value of t. 
Figure 3 also shows the one off tariff reduction path, with the tariff being 
reduced immediately to -T in period 1. Between this tariff and the most efficient 
tariff reduction path lies the 'Region of gradual reduction paths' which (in the 
limit) fills the area between the one off reduction path and the efficient gradual 
reduction path. 
On a cautionary note, the algorithm may pick a path that appears to approx- 
imate the equilibrium path for a given value of T, but fails for some larger T. In 
view of this possibility the value of K and corresponding T, for the optimal path 
given here by -ri = 0.1704 was checked for robustness by setting T= 100000 and 
verifying that TT(Tj; To, J) >0 continued to hold. The same robustness check was 
also performed on all other computed optimal paths presented below. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate efficient tariff reduction paths that result from com- 
parative dynamics exercises carried out using the quasi-linear preference function 
on the same format as Figure 3. These latter figures present only the first 250 
of 10000 periods. Figure 4 shows how the optimal reduction path varies with the 
substitution elasticity a, whilst Figure 5 indicates the impact of variation in the 
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discount factor 6. 
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Look at Figure 4 first. There are oPtimal reduction paths for three substitution 
elasticities o- = 21 5 and 10 with the other parameter held fixed at J=0.5. The 
key data and results for these simulations are presented in boxes on the far right 
hand side of the figure. As in Figure 3, for each value of o- we already know -ý 
and -f from the analysis. Both are decreasing in u, and the figure shows that the 
optimal reduction paths are monotonically decreasing in o- as well, as one would 
expect. 
The discount rate J only affects the reduction path, and not i-, explaining why 
the optimal reduction paths in Figure 5 start at the same point and decline towards 
different limits. Simulations for J=0.1,0.5 and 0.9 are shown, holding 0- =2 
constant. We see that for higher values of 6 the liberalization path exhibits greater 
liberalization at each point in time t. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This present chapter helps to explain two stylized facts about trade liberalization, 
namely failure to reach free trade and gradualism, by studying the interplay be- 
tween countries' unilateral incentive to set tariffs and the institutional structure 
set up in the framework of the GATT to achieve trade liberalization, paying special 
attention to the role of time in the process. We use a dynamic game framework, 
which makes it is possible to take account of the fact that a country is able to 
renege on an agreement for some time before being found out. In addition, the 
GATT institutional structure limits the extent of allowable retaliation. It is the 
interaction of these two features in our model, novel in the present context, which 
enables us to explain the failure to reach free trade and gradualism. 
We return to an apparent difference in the outcome from our modelling frame- 
work to that of Bagwell and Staiger (1999). They also model a trade agreement 
using a penalty structure based on the GATT's withdrawal of equivalent conces- 
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sions as a penalty structure. However, in their model it is possible to achieve full 
efficiency whilst in ours it is not. In their conclusion, they point out that there may 
in fact be enforcement difficulties. (As Bagwell and Staiger point out, enforcement 
difficulties have been studied in a wider context by Dam 1970). Our dynamic game 
captures and formalizes an element of this enforcement difficulty that Bagwell and 
Staiger' model does not; that a country is able to reap the benefits of deviation 
for a period before retaliation occurs. It is this that drives the inability to obtain 
full efficiency in our model, which is not a feature of Bagwell and Staiger's. 
Inevitably, the theoretical framework simplifies the situation in a number of 
key respects. All countries are assumed to be symmetrical, and small in terms of 
their purchasing power on world markets relative to the political costs of raising 
protectionism. Each country exports only a single good, with all countries equally 
open at a given time. In practice countries export a number of goods, with levels 
of openness varying across sectors. Variation in country size and purchasing power 
across different markets is likely to make the actual dynamics of perpetual liberal- 
ization considerably more subtle and complex, with more rapid progress achieved 
in areas where countries receive greater gains from protectionism relative to the 
political costs incurred. Gradualism in a context where there are asymmetries 
across countries has been studied by Bond and Park (2000), but not within the 
context of the GATT penalty structure that we examine here. By defining a sym- 
metrical modelling framework this issue is completely suppressed in our present 
chapter. 
Another simplification of the present framework is that there are no stochas- 
tics in the present model. In the real world, an important aspect of the negotiat- 
ing rounds under the GATT must be to renegotiate existing arrangements in the 
light of technological innovations. The proposed agenda for negotiations in the 
latest round at Doha is dominated by electronic and telecommunications based 
commerce, both areas that did not exist when the GATT was first drawn up. The 
framework of the present paper does not allow for such innovations. But it presents 
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a framework on which an allowance for such innovations might be built. 
A promising direction for future research would allow trade block formation 
to be considered. The theory of repeated games has been used to study trade 
block formation, where a preferential trade agreement is supported by the credible 
threat of punishment. In a recent paper using a repeated game framework Bond, 
Syropoulos and Winters (20 01) point out that trade liberalization within the Eu- 
ropean Union has been very slow. It may be that our framework provides a way 
of understanding gradualism between members. 
There may be many other competing pressures other than the standard terms- 
of-trade motive working against further liberalization, and these are also sup- 
pressed in our model. One area that has attracted significant attention recently is 
the incentive for politicians to be protectionist in order to gain financial backing 
from industrialists (Grossman and Helpman 1994,1995a) and for electorates to 
elect politicians who signal that they will adopt protectionist measures in order to 
increase their chances of being elected (Lausel and Riezman 2001). These protec- 
tionist forces may be outweighed at an early stage by the gains that we describe 
which are relatively large early on in the process, but not later once the potential 
gains become relatively small. Riture research could study the interaction of these 
counteracting forces. 
3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 Proof of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix iEN, and normalize prices by setting pi = 1, so 
p= (pl,.. pi-,, pi+,,.. p,, ). Then, by the symmetry of the model, and taking -ri as 
fixed, 
p(T1,7r(7--1» = 7r(P(T", 7-1», R' = R'(-r', ir(-r-» (3-17) 
Appendix 116 
where 7(. ) is any permutation function i. e. a permutation in tariffs of other coun- 
tries leads to the same permutation in their equilibrium prices, as tariffs are the 
only variables affecting excess demands that differ across countries. Now note that 
by definition, 
v (T 77-11) = vi 
(p (Tz, T-Z) ý TZ, Rz 
(TZ 
7 T-Z)) (3.18) 
Also, by symmetry of the model, 
T-. I)), Tz, )= VZ(P(T'l I T-z), T 17 R) (3.19) 
i. e. country utility is the same if the worl, d prices of imports are permuted. So we 
have 
VZ('Fz, 7r(T-7'» VI(P(TZ, 7F('F-Z», -r', 
R'(TZ, 7F(T-Z») (3.20) 
V'1(7T(P(Tz, T-'I)), TzI Rz(Tt 7 T-")) 
v2 
(P(T? ', T-? '), Tz R (T T-")) 
v (T T-') 
where the first line of (3.20) is from (3.18), the second is from (3.17), the third 
is from (3.19), and the fourth is from (3.18) again. This proves the second part 
of the Lenu-na. To prove the. first part, note that as all countries are identical 
up to a permutation of the indices of the goods, vi = v'(Ti, 'r-i ), all ij so v' 
V ('T i 7(T-')) as required. 0 
Proof of Lemma 1. (a) First, suppose that a country deviates to zt < "ýt. Then, 
from (3.5), as there is no retaliation, future payoffs are unaffected by the choice 
of deviation. Moreover, as is increasing in zt by Al, the payoff to deviation of the 
form Zt < 'Tt is increasing in zt. Therefore, there is no optimal deviation, but the 
supremum of the payoff to this kind of deviation is 
Oo Oc 
hill [U, '(Zt 
J)W(Zt, 7Ft) + (1 - 
6) EJ S-t W('Tt, -Tt)] = 
(I 
- 
6) E6 S-t w(-Tt, -Tt) 
zt-iýt s=t+l S=t 
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(b) If a country deviates to zt > 'Ft, it receives 
g(Zt, Tt) = (I - ý)W(Ztý Tt) + JW(Zt, Zt) (3.21) 
So, it suffices to show that (3.21) has a global maximum zt* on (7-,, 00). If this 
is not the case, then there exists an increasing sequence jz nj with 
liMn, 
oo Zn __., 
oo, for which g(Zn, Tt) is monotonically increasing. But, for Zn high enough, the 
consumption bundle X(Zn, rt) must be close to the autarchy allocation, and by the 
Inada conditions on utility, this will yield the consumer in the deviating country 
a lower utility than (for example) the bundle x(Tt, Tt) generated by not deviating. 
Contradiction. 1: 1 
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition, z(T) = max Moreover, as ((. ) is 
decreasing in T, it must be the case that there exists aT for which ((T) > 7, -F < 77 
((T) < 77 T> -T. 
We now prove that -f < ý. Suppose not; consider 'f = -ý first. By the definition 
of (3.7) we must have C (fl = -ý = arg max,, fw (-ý, fl + Jw (, ý, fl / (I - J) 1. The 
first order condition requires that 
fl + (Wl('ý)fl + W2(ýifl):: ` 1-ý 
But by a standard argument, the myopic best response tariff ý solves w, (-?, -? ) = 0. 
By A2, we have thatW1 + W2 
('ý7 fl 
< 0. Therefore, the first order condition 
cannot be satisfied at Ta contradiction. Then T>-? can also be ruled out 
because w, (T, T) <0 for T>-?. 
Combining the fact that z(T) == maxf((-r), Tl and the fact that there exists 
a unique T for which T= ((T), we see that z 
(T) = ((T), T< T, and Z 
(T) = T, 
T> ; T. F-I 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose to the contrary that 7-t =: 0 for some t. Then, 
at t, the incentive constraint is 
(1 - 5) (0,0) + dw (0,0) ýý (1 - 5) w (Z (0), 0) + dw (Z 
(0), Z (0» (3.22) 
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Now, we will show that at the solution to problem (3.6), z (0) > 0. It will then 
follow that 
(1 - ö)W(Z (0), 0) + 6W(z (0), Z (0» > (1 - 6)W(0,0) + dw(0,0) 
contradicting (3-9). To see that z (0) > 0, suppose to the contrary that z (0) = 0. 
Note that by the optimality of free trade, w(O, 0) > w(-r, -r), 7- =7ý 0, which of course 
implies that 
Wl(0ý 0) + W2(Oi 0) =0 
Now, consider a small increase in zt from 0, say A. Then, the effect of this change 




6)Wl (01 0) + 6(WI (01 0) + W2 (03 0»] : --- 
(1 
- Ö)AW1 
(07 0) >0 
where the last inequality follows from Al. 0 
Proof of Proposition 3. The only part that does not follow directly from Figure 
I is that T* = T. To prove this, it is sufficient to show that on the interval [0, TI, 
the slope of a is greater than the slope of ý in absolute value. This slope condition 





+ W2 (7- 7 7-) (3.23) 
Moreover, from Lemma 2, the constraint z> -r is not binding on [0, T], so differ- 
entiating a and applying the envelope theorem gives: 
Cgl (7-) ::::::: (1 - 
5) W2 (Z 1 7-) (3.24) 
Given z> -Fin (3.24), we must have 
W2(Zi 7) - W2(7-i 7) = 
Ir 
[W12] dx, 
'The case shown in Figure 2, where T* < 7, requires that the slope of ce must be less than 
that of 0 in absolute value somewhere in the interval [, r*, TI. 
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and from A3 we haveW2 
(Z, -r) - W2 
(7) T) <07 SO 
al (7-) (1 - 
6) W2 (71 7). (3.25) 
So, from (3-23), (3.25), the required condition is that 
(1 
- 
6) W2 (T 1 7-) 
< Wl (71 7-) + W2 (7- 3 T) 
T) - lbearranging, this is 
0 '< Wl 
(T 
I T) 
+ 6W2 (T, T) (3.26) 
But, the FOC defining T iS: 
Wl ('ý: ) 





AsT< -T, from (3.27) we must have: 
Wl (7- 1 7-) 
+ 6W2 (7- 
e 7-) -`: - 
[Wll + (1 + d)W12 + 6W22]dx (3.28) 
where the derivatives on the RES of (3.28) are evaluated at (x, x). By A3,7,012 <0- 
By assumption, W11, IV22 :! ý 0- SO) (3.28 ) implies (3.26), as required. 
The fact that -r* =T< -ý follows from Lemma 2. EJ 
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) Following the proof of Lockwood and Thomas 
(2002), Lemma 2.2, the equilibrium conditions (3.10) can be shown to be equivalent 
to the following difference equation, 
a(Tt+l) [a(Tt) - (3.29) 
with initial condition To = -ý, plus the condition that the solution to (3.29) is 
bounded. To see this, note first that advancing the equality in (3.29) by one 
period (i. e. from t to t+ 1), multiplying the t+ I-condition by 6 and subtracting 
from the t-condition, we get: 
J)W(Tt, Tt) (I - 
J)W(Z(Tt), Tt) + 6W(Z(Tt), (Z(Tt)) (3-30) 
[(I 
- 
6)W(-'(Tt+1)7 Tt+l) + JW(Z(Tt+l), (Z(Tt+l))] 
)t=1,.. 
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Using the definitions of a, ý in (3.30) and rearranging, we get" (3.29). 
(b) Now suppose that the path Jrtj is in E and more efficient than the sta- 
tionary path -T. Then, for some t, rt < -T (otherwise, -rt ý: 7, all t, so it cannot 
be more efficient). We now show that ifTt < 7, thenTt+l < -rt. For suppose not. 
then, as a is decreasing in -rt, we would have 
Ce(Tt+l) :5 Ce(Tt) (3-31) 
Combining (3.29) and (3.31), we have 
[Ce(Tt) 
- 
J)ý(Tt)] :! ý O(Tt) Ce(Tt) < O(Tt) 
But as rt < T, a(Tt) > ý(Tt), a contradiction. So, any solution of (3.29) is 
clearly a strictly decreasing sequence. There are then two possibilities. First, 
Tt - T,, > oo. But then a(T,,, ) = ý(T,,, )), contradicting the 
definition of 
T>T,,,, as the smallest root of a (T) =3 (T). The other is limt--., Oo Tt =- oo. But 
this path cannot be more efficient than the stationary path, a contradiction. El 
Proof of Lermna 4. The proof is by induction. Assume Tt < Tt-1. Rewriting 
(3.15), we get: 
6 [W(Tt7 Tt+l) - W(Ttj Tt)] 
By Lemma 3, 
W(Tt-1, Tt) 
max w (zt ''Tt) 7t: ýZt: 57t-j 














max W(Zt, Tt) + 
Jw(zt, zt) 
W(Tt7 Tt) + 
JW(7-t, -Ft) 
rt! ýZt:! ý'Tt -1 
0 




6w( -t, Tt) 
1-6 
1 
22The converse result can be obtained by solving (3.29) forward by substitution to get: 
Cf(Tt) = (1 - 
J)(ý(Tt) + M(Tt+l) + 
--PO(7t+n)) 
+ J'n-lCE(Tt+n+l) 
So, as long as limt-:,., ct(-rt) = 0, (3-29) implies (3.10). 
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where the third line follows by definition. And because 0<J< 11 it follows 
that J [w(-Tt, -rt+, ) - w(-rt, -rt)] > 0. So, w(, Tt, 7-t+1) > w(7-t, 7-t). But then, by Al, 
Tt+l < 7-t, as required. F-I 
Proof of Proposition 5. First, rewrite (3-16) as a function ofT, 
f(TI) 
-(I - 
6)(W(T17 7'1) JW(T2('ý) 71)) 72('ý) 71)) + .. -) 
Now, note that by the definition of T, 
(1 
- 
6) w (X (-ý: ' -7), 
-ý: ) öw (X (ýý 7' 7: ) , ^), X(71 IM = W(7 
Moreover, Tt ('ý, T) < T, all t by Lernma 4. So, if7-1 = -T, (3.12) is slack i. e. 
J) (W (7ýý 7) + JW (T2 ('ý 
77 
7T) > W(7; 
= (1- 6)w(x(), ) + 8w((, f), x()) 
where the inequality follows by A2. So, we have shown that f (T) < 0. 
Next , ifT, = E, we have 
(1 - d)w(X(E, -7), e) +öw(X(sý), X(E, -ý» == max (1 - d)w(z, E) +dw(z, z) > w(e, e) 
for e small enough: the inequality is strict by Lemma 2 above, as for 6 small 
enough, z(e) > E. Moreover, from Lemma 4, for E small enough, 
(I 
- 
5) (W(Ei E) + JW(T2 ('ý) E) 7 T2 
('ý) 6)) +-- 
-) 
ýý- W(Ei E) 
So, it is possible to choose 6 small enough so that 
(1-6)(W(E; E)+6W(T2('ý7 E)) T2('ýi 6))+---) < (1-J)W(X(167 ý')7 6)+JW(X(6i07 
VE7'0) 
i. e. f (E) > 0. Now, by inspection, f (. ) is continuous in 7-1 as X and rt are contin- 
uous 1nTj. So, there exists at least one valueOf Tj for whichf 
(Tj) 
== 0, and so 
there exists a smallest such value. El 
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3.6.2 An Example: Quasi-linear Preferences 
We assume that the utility function is of quasi-linear form given by (3.2). Maxi- 
mization of (3-2) subject to (3.3) gives demands for the two goods; 
pj + 
xi .=IAI, Iýi (3.32) 
i 
Iý- ý)xý -r3ý) 
xi 1+-_EPj(1+73 I+R, 
pj(l + (3-33) 
A joi AA i0i 
IA 
where the demand for good i, xi is determined residually via the budget constraint. 
Indirect utility for the representative household in i is therefore derived by 






Also, tariff revenue is 
pj (1 + T. ý 7) Ri PjT X 
PjT, 
(3-35) Ei3AA 
j: Ai j: Ai 
We substitute (3.35) into (3.34 ) to get: 
pj(l + Tý -01 
vi 




jý4i joi AI 
Now, in Nash tariff equilibrium, a given country will always set the same tar- 
iff on all imported goods. So, we may suppose that all countries j ý4 Z set a 
tariff -r' = -Fjk- on imports from all countries k j, and country i sets tariff 
T= T' k :ýi. Then, we only need to find the best response T 
to T' to char- k) 
-r 7-i) k =A i, then acterize the Nash equilibrium in tariffs. If T' = Tjk, k: ý j,.. n, k 
in equilibrium, pj = p, all j ýý i. So, we may choose pi as the numeraire. Using 
these simplifications, we may rewrite (3.36) as 
1-u 1)pr ý(1 +, r)]-c' (3.37) 
0, - 1 
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Finally, we need to calculate how the (reciprocal of) terms of trade for country i, p, 
changes with7-, -r. Evaluating (3.32) (3-33) at 7' = 7-jk, k =ýý j',.. n, T=Ti)k=, 4 2' k 
pj = p, j =ý i, pi = 1, we get; 
xz 1+ (n - 
I)p7- ý(l + 7-)]-'7 - 
(n 
- i (3-38) 
(I + TI) 
(3-39) xil* 
p 
So, substituting (3-38), (3-39) into the market-clearing condition for good i, namely 
that supply of unity equals the sum of country demands (I EiEN Xi) we have 
I)p7- ý(l + T)] -u - (n - 1) ý(l 







Note that as o- > 0.5 by assumption, p, <0i. e. an increase in i's tariff always 
improves i's terms of trade. So, we may write country i's indirect utility as 
W (T , TI) : --- V 
(P (7, TI), T) =n1 ý(1 +, T)]'-c'+ (n - 1)p7- [p(1 + -r)]-' o-- 1 
So, a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium in tariffs is a, ý such that v(-ý, p(-ý, fl) 
v(T, p (-r, -ý)), all 7- :Aý. 
As v is continuously differentiable, we can characterize -ý as the solution to 
vr(, p()) + Vp(, P())Pr() =0 




P7 =1- 2u 
(1 
+ 7-1) l+T, 




-or (n- 2o- I+ 
Appendix 
Eliminating common terms, we get 
1 -2u 




for the optimal tariff. Recall that o- > 1, so -ý is defined and positive. 
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Now we have ý, we can check that Al, A2 and A3 hold for tariffs set on the 
interval [0, ý] 
Substituting forp(T, 7% we can write the payoff function as follows: 
(I + T)1-0' 
-a 
I+T 
w(T, T') = (n - 1) 
( 
0-- 1-+ 
T(I + T) 
) (I 
+ T') 
We can use this expression to verify that Al, A2 and A3 hold. Take Al first: 
0' + 7)_l-0, (1 - 
(0- 
- 
1) 7») l+T 





The sign of this expression depends on the term in brackets (I - (o, - 
I)T). If 
T 'ý = 11(o--I) and (1-(o--l)T) =0 so w, (T, -rJ) = 0. If 7- < -ý then 
(1 (01 
- 1) T) >0 and soWl (T, T') >0 as required. 
0' (1 + 7)-l-, 7 (1 + 97) 1+T 
(j-U-a2)/(1-2or) 






Wl (r, 71) + W2 (73 71) 
(I + T)-2-o, (u-r (2 +T+ -r') + -r), r') 
(I+. 
(j-u-cr2)/(1-2cr) 
2o-- 11+ TI) 
Now the sign of this expression depends on the term in brackets (oT(2+T + 7-') - 
(I + T) T') 
It is easy to see that whenT = T' =0 we have (o-T(2+T + 7) - 




+ W2 (T) TI) = 0. This is necessary for free trade to maxi- 
mize efficiency. Moreover, by inspection (o-7-(2+7- + -r) - 
(I + T), r') >0 for all 
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T7T (07fl; 0' >Ii SO Wl(T7Tl)+W2(T, 7j) <0 as required. FinallY, regarding A3: 
2 (1 + 7-)-2-u (I _ 
(or 
_ 1) , -a)/(1-2o, 
) 
W12 (T7 TI) 
(a 0- 
(2o-- 1)2 
T. ) I+T (I 
+ -rl) 
SO W12 (Ti TI) <0 because (I - (o- - 1) -r) >0 for -r, -r' (z- (0,, ý) as required. 
Now we want to characterize the constrained deviation, using it to derive -f:. 
Dropping time subscripts and setting this -first order condition equal to zero, we 
have 
WJ (Z (T) , 7) 
+6 (Wl (Z (7») 
1Z 
(7» + W2 (Z (7) 1Z 
(7"») ::::::::: 0- 1-6 
We can write (3.2) as follows 




where -y (z (T)) . 




, T) - 
1-2u W 
(Z (T), T) 
+ (n 
+Z (T) (Z (, T» 
(1 +Z (-F» l+T 
and 
W2 (Z (7) 1 7) 
a(l-a) w (z (T) , -r) 1-2a 
(I + T) 
It is then straightforward to see that the first order condition can be rewritten 
(1 
- 
6) w, (z (T) , T) 
+ 6-ý' (z (T)) = 0. Setting z 
(T) =T=T in the first order condi- 
tion, we get 
(1 
-5) 
o- (U - 1) -y (ýi: ) -fi (-7: ) = 2o--1 1+-F* 
Substituting for -y (T) and -y'(7) and simplifying, the equation becomes 
-5+ 2a- 1 





































































Why Are Trade Agreements 
Regional? 
4.1 Introduction 
In referring to 'regional trade agreements' it is generally recognized that members 
are geographically close to one another. Prominent examples are the North Amer- 
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European Union (EU). In both cases, 
members share common borders. Wider evidence that trade blocks are predomi- 
nantly regional is provided by WTO (2000), a report titled "Mapping of Regional 
Trade Agreements", in which each of the 150 agreements notified to the WTO is 
represented in map form. It shows that member countries tend to be geographically 
close in the majority of cases. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) use a gravity model 
to show empirically that countries behave preferentially towards close neighbors; 
trade volumes in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere are greater than could be 
explained by 'natural determinants' such as distance, size and common languages. 
Similarly, Panagariya (1998) shows, also by taking a gravity model to the data, 
that transport costs alone are not sufficient to explain why trade agreements are 
regional. Yet the theoretical literature has tended to focus on the economic ini- 
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plications of regional trade agreements. Almost the entire literature leaves aside 
the question of why there may be strategic incentives to form regional trade agree- 
ments. 
The purpose of this paper is to argue that politicians balance the increased 
likelihood that they will be voted for if they coordinate an FLk against the co- 
ordination cost itself, The increased likelihood of being voted for results from 
conventional welfare gains to trade due to formation of the FTA. In the model, 
trade based gains to an agreement with (close) countries of the same region are 
higher than gains to an agreement involving (distant) countries from different re- 
gions. The costs of bringing politicians together from different nations in order 
to coordinate an agreement axe assumed to be proportional to the number of 
countries involved, and not dependent upon which countries the politicians come 
from. Therefore, a regional FTA may be worth coordinating whilst one involving 
countries from outside the region may not. ' 
What is the basis for higher production-trade payoffs to a regional agreement? 
According to standard optimal tariff theory, the higher the rents made by a foreign 
'Other papers in the literature have had similar concerns to the present paper, or used modes 
of analysis that are technically similar. Bond (1999) is closest in the question that he addresses. 
He compares the sustaintability of multilateral versus regional trade agreements in a repeated 
game setting, where both types of agreement are sustained through trigger strategies. In Bond's 
model, optimal tariffs are higher between closer neighbors, and this makes regional agreements 
easier to sustain using trigger strategies. Whilst some of Bond's results are related, his approach 
is quite different, not using profit shifting to motivate tariffs, nor the notion of non-cooperative 
networks to determine equilibrium. The approach of the present paper allows a wider range of 
dynamic equilibria to be characterized, as, discussed below. Other papers, by Goyal and Joshi 
(2000) and Furusawa and Konishi (2002) are technically similar, in modelling trade agreements 
as networks. Both papers show that free trade will not necessarily arise. In the case of Goyal 
and Joshi (2000) this is due to coordination failure. Furusawa and Konishi (2002) show that free 
trade fails when countries form customs unions. Both papers take a cooperative rather than a 
non-cooperative approach to the modelling of trade agreements as networks, and neither paper 
has a regional dimension. 
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firm in the domestic market, the more scope there is for shifting rents to domestic 
citizens through the use of higher tariffs. And because trading costs increase with 
distance, firms make higher rents in nearby markets than those that are further 
away. So in the absence of an agreement, optimal tariffs are higher on imports 
from countries in the same region than on imports from countries of other regions. 
It follows that a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between two close neighbors 
brings about larger production and trade gains than between distant countries 
because the former entails a larger mutual tariff reduction. 
Whilst standard optimal tariff theory provides a basis for individual tariff set- 
ting, a general framework is needed in which the overall structure of trade agree- 
ments in the (world) economy can be analyzed. Politicians' incentives to form 
international trade agreements throughout the world is formalized by adapting 
Bala and Goyal's (2000) model of noncooperative network formation. Bala and 
Coyal bring the communication networks previously modelled by others, notably 
Myerson (1977) and Jackson and Wolinski (1996), into a noncooperative setting. 
In communications networks, players benefit from being linked to each other 
directly and indirectly. For example, if you know someone is the friend of a friend, 
you can ring up your mutual friend for their phone number. As pointed out 
by other researchers previously, when communications networks are formed on 
a cooperative basis they can suffer from coordination failures. The problem is 
illustrated most clearly in the present setting of trade agreements by Goyal and 
Joshi (2000). They model FTAs in the manner of a communication network where 
network formation is cooperative. As a result, whilst free trade is the most efficient 
Nash equilibrium, it is by no means unique. Other less efficient FTA structures can 
be an equilibrium because countries may simply fail to coordinate on membership. 
In the present context it is important to rule out such possibilities. Otherv'ise it 
would be possible to have equilibria with only regional trade blocks resulting from 
nothing more than failures of coordination. 
Bala and Goyal address the problem of coordination failure by making indi- 
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vidual agents responsible for the cost of coordinating a network. Through their 
sponsorship, individual agents can form a network if it is in their interest without 
being encumbered by the need to coordinate with other agents. Then a Nash net- 
work is one where no agent can do any better by sponsoring any other network 
or withdrawing their support for the networks that they sponsor, taking as given 
networks that they do not sponsor. 
By taking a noncooperative network approach, coordination failures are ruled 
out as a possible cause for regional FTAs. We will say that in each period, each 
FTA must have a sponsor. A sponsor is the country that meets the cost of bringing 
all other country representatives to the negotiating table in order to make the 
agreement for that period. It will be assumed that an FTA cannot be made 
binding indefinitely. It may be that a government can only credibly commit to 
an agreement for the duration of its parliament. An example of where a country 
plays such a leadership role in coordinating such agreements is the country that 
holds the Presidency of the European Parliament. ' Conditions are derived under 
which, in each period, there is an incentive for some country to step forward as 
sponsor. Moreover, if a country undertakes to sponsor an FTA, all the proposed 
partners accept because they anticipate (and realize) production-trade gains. 
The main result of the paper concerns the characterization of the equilibrium 
FTA structure that emerges over time under different levels of sponsorship cost. 
Not surprisingly, if sponsorship costs are above a certain level then no FTAs will 
2 The Presidency periodically rotates around country members, fulfilling the role of sponsor in 
the European Union. Whilst the sequence of presidencies of the European Parliament is agreed 
before hand, the choice of sponsor is not modelled in this paper. In real life, we often observe 
a number of countries contributing to the sponsorship costs of an agreement. However, in such 
situations an agreement may be vulnerable to breakdown because countries free ride on each 
others' willingness to provide sponsorship. The present paper concentrates on the clear cut case 
in which a single sponsor steps forward in equilibrium. Alternatively, imagine that all countries 
do contribute to the agreement but that a leader contributes slightly more. Then contributions 
by all other countries would be normalized to zero. 
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form at any point on the equilibrium path, and if they are below a certain level then 
world free trade will emerge straight away. It is when sponsorship costs are at an 
intermediate level that regionalism arises and can persist over time. Perhaps most 
interesting of all, a range of sponsorship costs is identified at which regionalism 
emerges first before free trade can be reached, providing an answer to Bhagwati's 
(1992) famous question, "Are trade blocks stepping blocks axe stumbling blocks in 
the path to free trade? " 
It is worth emphasizing that the facility to analyze gains from network forma- 
tion across different types of player, coupled with the fact that differing gains are 
derived from the structure of an underlying micro-model, is a new development 
of the present paper. The greater benefits to a regional agreement are not simply 
assumed. They are derived from the mutual removal of relatively high tariffs. The 
paper develops a way of linking these different micro-founded gains to the payoff 
structure of a network formation game. 
This approach to the analysis of network formation with different types of 
player potentially makes it possible to study a range of different situations that are 
of interest in economics. Perhaps the best known example is due to Coase (1960), 
who points out that firms exerting relatively large externalities on one another 
are better candidates for mergers motivated by internalization. This situation 
examined by Coase mirrors that analyzed in the present paper in that different 
types of player exert externalities of differing size on one another. The substantive 
difference is that the externality discussed by Coase is environmental rather than 
terins-of-trade based. 
Other papers have examined political incentives to form FTAs. Richardson 
(1993) considers the effect of an FTA in a setting where governments maximize 
a political support function which gives added weight to export- and import- 
competing producers' interests. Grossman and Helpman (1995b) use a common 
agency framework to analyze the way that contributions from interest groups to 
the government shapes the formation of FTAs. Both models have similarities to 
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the one presented here in that gains to trade are similarly assumed to affect the 
incumbent government's likelihood of being voted for. But Grossman and Help- 
man show that the government will be pulled away from the outcome that voters 
prefer by financial contributions from interest groups. Levy (1997) studies politi- 
cians' incentives to pursue preferential as against multilateral trade agreements 
in a median voter framework. Voters are affected differently by various different 
trade agreements depending on their endowments of capital. The government picks 
the type of trade agreement, preferential or multilateral, that secures victory in 
the next election. None of these previous papers considers the incentives to form 
regional trade agreement. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section transport costs are intro- 
duced to a model of production and trade. This is then used to derive optimal 
tariffs which vary according to the distance between countries. Section 3 sets up 
the model of regions and trade agreements as a noncooperative network, allow- 
ing the payoffs of network formation to vary depending on the distance between 
members. Section 4 then establishes the main results of the paper for a simplified 
three region model. It is here that the possibility of regional trade agreements is 
demonstrated, as well as the fact that trade blocks can be stepping blocks to free 
trade. Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 A Model of Optimal Tariffs where Distance 
Matters 
The purpose of this section is to present a model of tariff setting which exhibits 
the property that distance between countries has an effect on the optimal level 
of protectionism. In particular, it will be shown that optimal tariffs are higher 
between close neighbors. As in Brander and Spencer (1984) tariffs shift profits from 
the foreign firm to the domestic consumer. With lower transport costs between 
A Model of Optimal Tariffs where Distance Matters 136 
close neighbors, more rents can be shifted through the use of tariffs. So unlike 
in conventional models, where each country sets a common tariff on all others, 
in the present model (in equilibrium) each country sets tariffs that vary, and are 
declining with distance. 
4.2.1 Country Location in Regions 
The set V=f1, ..., nI of countries is 
finite, with the number of countries being 
given by n. The regional structure R=f RI, R2 7... 7 
R, I partitions )v into regions, 
where a regZon is a set Rk 9 jV: R, n Rj =0 for i -=ý j and Uj'-j Ri = /V. Each 
region is assumed to have the same number of countries in it; I Ri I=r, for all 
R, E R, and r>1.3 To avoid trivialities, there is more than one region; IRI > 1. 
To make the differences between intra-regional. versus inter-regional trade con- 
crete, suppose that each Country iEX can be located by the coordinates (xi, yi). 4 
Therefore, the distance dij between any two countries i and j can then be measured 
by a (Euclidean) distance function. 
In order to make precise the distinction between countries by region, assume 
(xi, yi) = (xj, yj) for i, jE Rk ii :ýj; all countries in the same region 
have the 
same location. Also assume that (xi , yi) =7ý 
(xj, yj) for all iER, iE Rj, i :ýi- 
Assume that dij = dji >d>0 for all iER,, jE Rj, i j, and that dij is finite 
(dij = dji =0 for ij E Rk)- 
If the distance relationship between countries across regions has some regularity 
to it, being based on a regular shape for example, then it will help to be able 
to summarize the information on distances between countries. Let 6ki be the 
number of countries at a distance dk from i. Then, for Country iE 1ý-, let Di = 




ý, j) I be the set of pairs (dk 7 
6ki) 
, where there exists at 
least one 
3 If regions were of different size, then it might be possible for a country might prefer to form 
a block with a FTA in another region than with countries in its own region. More will be said 
about this later. 
4That is, each country can be located in Euclidean IZ2-space. 
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(other) Country jE Rj, i =ý j, for which dij = dk- 
Example: Three Regions on an Equilateral Triangle 
To keep the analysis relatively simple, the main results of the paper will be es- 
tablished using a three region model. Three regions are enough to capture the 
interactions we are interested in whilst avoiding extensive notation. A three re- 
gion model is obviously appealing because it captures the interactions between the 
three most important regions in economic terms, The Americas, Europe and Asia. 
To fix ideas, consider the three region example (IRI = 3), with r=3, where 
each region is located at a distinct vertex of an equilateral triangle. Using an 
equilateral triangle simplifies the analysis because (all else equal) the payoff to a 
country of forming an agreement with countries outside its own region is the same, 
as they must all be at the same distance, regardless of which other region(s) they 
are in. Label the regions R, Rb and R, Consider Country i located in region R". 
If the sides of the triangle are of length d, then countries in Rb and R, are all at 
distance d from Country i. Then the set Di has a single element, Di (d, 6) 
where (JR1 - 1) r=6 gives the number of countries not in R,,. 
4.2.2 Production and International Tý-ade with Distance 
The specification of demands and production is adapted from Grossman and Help- 
man (1994,1995a, 1995b). Each country has a population of size 1. Individuals 
across countries have identical preferences: 
x-- -1x2 ui (xio, xi) = xio +eZ ij 2Z 'j3 
jEAr je, ýV 
(4.1) 
where xio is consumption of the numeraire and xij denotes consumption in Country 
i of a good produced in Country j. Citizens across countries are endowed v6th 
sufficient quantities of the numeraire to ensure that international markets clear in 
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equilibrium. The preferences give rise to inverse demands in Country z, 
Pij = 
du 
=e- xij, (4.2) dxjj 
for goods jE jV, where pij is the price of Good j in Country Z. This form of 
preferences is clearly restrictive, as there is no substitutability between goods. 
When combined with the production technology introduced below, the resulting 
model has the advantage that trade block formation is always trade creating; it 
yields positive gains through production and trade. As we shall see, these gains 
can then be balanced against the (political) costs of forming an agreement. More 
general functional forms would also allow for the possibility of trade diversion. 
But such situations are not of direct interest here as countries would not consider 
formation of a trade agreement when trade diversion dominates. 5 
The representative citizen in each Country j is uniquely endowed with a spe- 
cific factor j that enables him to produce Good j. When referring to him in his 
productive role, we will refer to the citizen as 'producer'. The cost of producing a 
unit of 3* for sale in Country i is given by the function 
cij =c+ tij + dij, (4-3) 
where c is the basic per-unit production cost, which is the same for all firms, and tij 
is the tariff levied by Country i on imports from Country j. Producers take prices 
and all elements of costs as given and choose outputs competitively to maximize 
profits across markets. Also, domestic firms compete perfectly to transport goods 
to the home market, so that they deliver at CoSt. 6 
5 Moreover, as for the contexts examined by Grossman and Helpman, more general functional 
forms make for an unworkable analytical framework. In a companion paper, Zissimos (2003) 
1 allow Cournot competition in homogeneous products and find that welfare analysis of FTA 
formation is intractable. Elsewhere in the literature on FTAs, the utility function of Ottaviano, 
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) has been adopted. However, in the present context this utility function 
raises similar problems of tractability. 
61n a symmetric model, an equivalent assumption would be that the world market for trans- 
portation is competitive and that each firm from every country 
has an equal share of the market. 
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Since the domestic price of Good 0 is normalized to 1, j earns profit 
7rij = (Pij - cij) xij (4.4) 
on output xij for Country i. Using (4.2) in (4.4), and expanding, 
2_ 7rij = exij - xij Cijxij. 
The function 7r,, is thus differentiable and strictly concave because -xi, is concave, 
and so i's problem has a unique maximum. 
Producer j's first order condition in Country i is thus given by 
i 7. =e- 2x,, - cij = 0, 
(9xij- 
or equivalently, 
pij - cij - xij = 0. (4-5) 
We can rearrange (4.5) to get 
Xij ý Pij - Cij 
From this, note the following convenient property; in equilibrium, profits can be 
written as 
7ij = (Pij - cij) xij = xi, j- (4.6) 
The fact that profits can be represented in this way arises as a result of the linear 
structure of the model. 
Use (4.3) and (4.2) in (4.5), then rearrange to get the solution for xij: 
ij 
e-c- tij - dij 
, all i, jE JV 2 
(4.7) 
As citizen j is uniquely endowed with the specific factor required to produce Good 
the monopoly solution solves his Problem in each market i. The novel aspect 
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of this solution is the fact that it provides a way to take general account of the 
transportation cost from Country i to Country j. 7 
Note from (4.7) that xij is decreasing in tij and dij. To maintain the assumption 
that all j (=- Ar are active on all markets, e-c can be made large enough to ensure 
that xij > 0. For the domestic market, tij = dij = 0. Therefore, the weakest 
possible condition necessary and sufficient to ensure strictly positive output by 
the domestic firm for the domestic market is e-c>0. This condition will be 
assumed to hold throughout. 
4.2.3 Production- M-ade Payoffs 
The payoffs to the FTA formation game depend directly on the structure of trading 
arrangements, that is tariff setting across all countries, and the reciprocal impact 
on production. For this reason, gains to production and trade will be referred to 
as production-trade payoffs. They are given this name to distinguish them from 
(net) payoffs to FTA formation once the cost of sponsoring agreements is taken 
into account. 
The representative citizen in Country i receives his production-trade payoff 
through five economic components: domestic consumer surplus (CSj), the domes- 
tic firm's profit at home and abroad (7rij and7rji, j =h i respectively), tariff revenue 
(TRi), and net profits from transportation (DIý-): 
Wi = CSi + 7rii + I: 7rji + TRi + Dlý-- 
jEm/fil 
(4.8) 
The optimal tariff iij is derived by maximizing this expression with respect to tij. 
To do this, w must be expressed in terms of model variables; the subject of the 
next result. 
'Two country models where production takes account of iceberg transportation costs are 
commonplace in the literature. The novel aspect of this solution is that it allows for quantities 
produced for any number of trade partners at any number of distances to be calculated explicitly. 
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Lemma 1. Let CSi = Ej,; 1 (e - pij) xij, TR, = 1: jevýjil tijxij, and DR, DV 2 
Eje, vlli) dijxij. Then 
wi = CSi + 7rii +Z rji + T& + Dg.. 
Z X2 +Z Xj2i. = (e - c) xij --x. 713 ij 
icAr ieiv j(-zý/fi} jr=Y/{il 
With payoffs of the representative citizen in Country i as given by Lemma 1, it 
is straightforward to solve for the optimal taHff; the tariff that maximizes the 
representative citizen's payoff in a one-shot game with no communication. 
4.2.4 Optimal Tariffs with Distance 
The solution to the optimal tariff problem is given in the following result: 
Proposition 1. The unique optimal tariff set by Country i on imports from 
Country i takes the form 
e-c tij dij. 
3 
The key thing to notice is that the optimal tariff is decreasing in distance. The 
closer a country is, the higher the optimal tariff levied on its imports. The intuition 
is simple. Higher rents are made in nearby markets because a smaller share of 
revenue is lost in transportation costs to serve those markets. Consequently, there 
are more rents available to shift to domestic consumers using the tariff. ' 
As was the case in the solution for xij given by (4.7), it is always possible 
to set e-c high enough to ensure that tij > 0. If tij <0 then the optimal 
trade intervention is a subsidy. In that case, free trade is not necessarily welfare 
maximizing. In the present analysis we will be focusing on the standard case where 
free trade is best. For the optimal tariff to be positive, it is necessary and sufficient 
to make the following assumption: 
8Note that the term (e - c) /3 is parametric, and depends on the structure of linear- quadratic 
demands. 
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Al. 0< dk< (e - c) /3 for all dkE Di, all iE A(. 
Assumption Al holds throughout. 
4.2.5 Fý-ee Mrade Agreements (FTAs) 
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Having defined optimal tariffs, we are now ready to specify the formal assumptions 
that define an FTA. If countries i and j agree to adopt free trade - setting tij = 
tji =0- then they are said to have a Free Rade Agreement (FTA). In the absence 
of an FTA between countries i and j, let Country i set optimal tariffs on imports 
from Country 3 and vice versa - tij = iij = (e - c) /3 - dij; iji = iij. 9 
It is well known from the literature on trade agreements that the formation of 
an FTA may increase or reduce welfare depending on whether trade creation or 
trade diversion dominates. The following result shows that in the present model 
the production-trade gains to FTA formation are always welfare improving for any 
partner; trade creation dominates. 
Proposition 2. Assume Al. 
(i) The production- trade gain to two countries i and j from a bilateral FTA is 
gi ven by 
Awi =1 (7 (e - c) + 3dij) ((e - c) - 3dij) 72 
and is positive. 
(ii) production-trade gains from a bilateral FTA are decreasing in the distance 
between members i and j: d (A wi) Id (dij) =-1 (e -c+ dij). 4 
Because Country j is the world's only exporter of Good j, there can be no trade 
diversion associated with trade in Good j when Country j forms a trade agreement 
with any other country. " Proposition 2(i) tells us that there are production- trade 
9Note that t^ji = tij because dji = dij. 
"Recall that trade diversion arises when the formation of an FTA between Countries i and 
j reduces efficiency because the agreement causes i to import more of Good j from Country 1 
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gains to a trade agreement between two countries. Proposition 2(ii) says that 
production-trade gains are higher the closer the two countries are to one another. 
To see why Proposition 2(ii) holds recall that, in the absence of a trade agree- 
ment, Proposition I shows that tariffs between regional members are higher than 
between countries of different regions. Because the distance between two countries 
i and j in the same region is equal to zero, by Proposition 1, optimal tariffs on mu- 
tual trade are iij = iji = (e - c) /3. On the other hand, because there is a positive 
distance d>0 between two countries i and k in different regions, by Proposi- 
tion 1, optimal tariffs on mutual trade areiik = iki = (e - c) /3 - d. Proposition 
2(ii) shows that, due to, the removal of higher tariffs, FTA formation between re- 
gional members yields higher production-trade gains than FTA formation between 
countries of different regions. 
Proposition 2 focuses on production-trade gains to an FTA between two coun- 
tries. As we shall see in Lemma 4, the production-trade payoff to forming a 
multilateral FTA is a multiple of the production-trade payoff to a bilateral agree- 
ment. Due to the fact that there is no trade diversion, and that the firm in each 
country has a monopoly over the good that it exports, the production-trade gains 
to trade reaped by each citizen-producer can be calculated as a fixed multiple of 
the number of countries in the agreement. 
If production-trade gains were all that mattered, then Proposition 2 suggests 
the world would move straight to free trade. Anecdotal discussions often reflect 
surprise that the process of regionalism has not led more quickly towards free trade. 
One explanation is that the costs of coordinating such agreements hold the process 
back. Sponsorship costs, formalized in the next section, play exactly this role in 
the present model. But by themselves such costs do not explain why FTAs are 
formed within a region. Proposition 2 indicates that greater benefits to regional 
(than non-regional) FTA formation can be set against the costs of sponsoring an 
when Country k -ý4 j is a more efficient producer of Good j. In the present model, trade 
diversion 
is ruled out by the assumption that Country j is the sole producer of Good j. 
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agreement, and may make regional FTA formation worthwhile even though non- 
regional FTA formation is not. This is the central insight that will be developed 
in the following sections. 
4.3 Regions and M-ade Agreements in a Non- 
cooperative Network 
This section formalizes FTA formation in a world of regions. It shows how the 
formal language of noncooperative network formation due to Bala and Goyal (2000) 
can be adapted to model FTA formation when there is a regional dimension to the 
model. The distinction that countries make between FTA members in their own 
region and those from other regions is formalized by an adaptation of Slikker and 
van den Nouweland's (2000) partitioning of players in a network formation game. 
Gains from trade through the formation of an FTA provide a concrete source 
of benefits from network formation in the model. If countries are not members of 
the same FTA, they set tariffs non-cooperatively, producing and trading a smaller 
amount than if they engaged in free trade. If countries form an FTA (network) 
then they remove tariffs, giving rise to production trade gains. 
4.3.1 FTAs as Networks 
The overall FTA structure is described by the graph (. /V, g), a pair of disjoint sets, 
where g is a set of links called a (directed) network. The FTA structure of each 
region is described by the subgraph 
(Rk) gRk)) wheregRk is a set of links called a 
subnetwork between countries of region 
Rk- 
, 
A strategy of Country ZG jV is a row vector gi = (gi 11 ... 7 gin) where gij Ef0,11. 
If Country i sponsors an FTA with a set of other countries Aj = jil, ---, J, 
I then it 
sets 9ijk =I for all A E Aj. For all countries j with which Country i does not 
sPonsor an agreement, it sets gij = 0. If gij, =1 (or if gj, i = 1) then there is said 
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to be a link between i andik. The strategies of all countries forms g=f gl, ... ' g' 
1. 
Since Ar can be partitioned into regions, we can also have g= f9R17 ... 7 9R,, I where 
9Rk is the set of links between members of region Rk- 
The set of all strategies of Country i is denoted by gi. Attention is restricted 
to pure strategies. The set 9= 91 x ... x 9,, is the space of pure strategies of all 
the countries. This is needed for specification of the payoff function below. 
There is a path from i to ik in g if i and J are linked, or if there exist countries 
t, distinct from each other such that they are all linked. A path in g between 
i and j is denoted i +g--ý j. " 
A set Ak9 Ar is a component of g if for all i and j in Ak there is a path between 
them, and there does not exist a path between a country in Ak and one in Ar\Ak- 
A network g is called connected if it has a unique component A, with all 
iEA=M. A network that is not connected is referred to as disconnected. A 
network is called empty if gij = gji =0 for all i, j E. /V- 
The following definitions identify the network structures just introduced to the 
various types of FTA that will be of interest to us. 
Definition 1. (FTA Membership) A component Akg V Of 9 is an FTA: for all 
iE Ak7 ifj E Ak then tij =0. Ifj ý Ak thentij =iij = (e-c)/3-dij. 
Definition 2. (World FTA) If the network g is connected, then there is a world 
F TA. 
Definition 3. (Only-regional FTA, complete-regional FTA and extra-regional 
FTA) If there is a component for which all elements are in the same region, i, jE 
Ak g Rk then Ak is an only-regional FTA; if Ak = 
Rk and the network 9Rk 
is 
connected, then we say there is a complete-rTional FTA; if Ak (; Rk then Ak is 
1 'This notation emphasizes that for i and j to be linked there can either be a link from i to j, 
or from j to i or both. This is sometimes referred to as a non-directed link. As shall become clear, 
we need to make a distinction between directed and non-directed links. Whilst non-directed links 
determine which countries are members of an agreement, directed links determine the sponsor 
of the agreement. See Section 3.2 for further details. 
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an extra-regZonal FTA. 
Definition I gives FTA membership a definition in graph notation, and a con- 
venient graphical representation. Definition 2 then says that if all countries are in 
the same component then there is a world FTA. If, on the other hand, all mem- 
bers of a component are in the same region then the component is an only-regional 
FTA and if all countries in a region are in the same FTA then we say there is a 
complete- regional FTA. Finally, if FTA membership spans regions then the FTA 
is said to be extra-regional. A country that has no links with other countries is 
said to be in its own singleton component. 
4.3.2 The Sponsor of an FTA 
For a trade agreement to come about, we will say that it must have a sponsor. A 
sponsor must pay a sponsorship cost for coordinating an FTA. As mentioned in 
the introduction a sponsor is the country that meets the cost of bringing all other 
country representatives to the negotiating table in order to make the agreement 
for that period. 
When a country sponsors an agreement between a group of countries not al- 
ready in an agreement, it must pay the cost of bringing them all to the table. 
Formally, let the linear function rj (z), which is increasing in z, give the cost of 
sponsoring an agreement with z countries. Let the function ri (z) be the same for 
all i. So country i pays a cost rq (1) for each link that it forms. The sponsorship 
cost for an agreement with countries Aj =f ji, ... ' j, 
I is Ki (I Aj 1). " 
What happens if the set of countries Aj= ýjj, ..., 3'1} with whom 
Country Z 
proposes to sponsor an FTA are themselves already in an FTA? Then we will say 
that Country i only has to pay the cost of a single link ni (1); its own cost of 
12 Note that sponsorship costs do not depend on which country is being linked to. It is the 
same whether the country is in the same region or in a different region. It will become clear 
from the analysis below that if sponsorship of an agreement with more distant nations were more 
costly, this would reinforce the incentive to form regional only agreements. 
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reaching their table. If Country i is itself already in an FTA, entailing the set of 
countries Ak ill, then we will say that Country Z acts as a delegate 
for Ak if it sponsors an FTA with Aj; that is, Country i proposes an FTA between 
all members of Aj and Ak and that again the sponsorship cost is just Ki (1); the 
cost of Country i reaching the table of Aj. " 
The fact that Country i must act as a delegate for its partners in Ak is a 
strong simplifying assumption. In principle it makes world free trade more likely. 
If, from a given configuration of FTAs, a member of an existing FTA finds it 
worth sponsoring an agreement with another FTA then it will automatically bring 
all its existing FTA partners into the other FTA. Thus, the assumption effectively 
causes two FTAs to merge if any one member of one FTA joins another FTA. 
If regional FTA formation can be demonstrated under this assumption, then it 
seems even more likely to emerge in more realistic (but also more difficult to 
analyze) scenarios, in which members of a given FTA are allowed to 'go it alone' 
in approaching another FTA. Countries i and J* in a given FTA could each sponsor 
agreements with two other separate FTAs, potentially resulting in much more 
complex equilibrium paths. 
Nevertheless, it is conjectured that allowing Country i to 'go it alone' and join 
another FTA makes no difference to equilibrium of the present model. If there is no 
incentive for two blocks to merge then there would be no incentive for an individual 
country to deviate by joining an FTA in a different region; the sponsorship cost in 
both cases is the same and the production-trade gains to each member from the 
merger of two FTAs are greater. Admittedly, this suggests that the present model 
dramatically simplifies the actual incentives behind trade agreement formation. 
13The term 'coming to the table' is used as a metaphor for participating in negotiations to 
form an FTA. Clearly. it involves more than just the cost of physically getting to the meeting 
point where the agreement is discussed. It also includes, at a minimum, the briefing costs of 
knowing what would be entailed by the agreement and the opportunity costs of politicians and 
officials of attending the meeting. 
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When Bhagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998) represent the set of preferen- 
tial trade agreements that actually existed in the mid-1990s using a network of 
the kind formalized here, they aptly refer to the resulting diagram as a "spaghetti 
bowl". 
Because a country pays a sponsorship fee for each agreement that it proposes, 
we will want a way of keeping track of the total amount that each country pays 
in sponsorship fees. To this end, define 77'i7 (g) = If kE JV I gik =III as the number 
of countries with which i maintains direct links. Then the total sponsorship cost 
paid by a country is given by ri (TIO' (g)) or q? ' (g) rq 
As well as wishing to calculate the costs of FTA formation to each country, 
we will also want to calculate the benefits. Because in general these vary across 
regions, we will need to distinguish between the number of members in each. De- 
fine ý7j (g) =iG Rk7j E Rk 
li 
+9 *iIUf il 
Ii 
=A j as the number of countries 
in the same region as Country i and on the same path. RecaU that Di con- 
tains the set of distinct distances dk of other countries from Country i. Define 
d 
, qi , (g) iE RkJ E Rj 
I dij dk 
,i +gý j, as the number of other coun- 
tries ji at a distance dij dk >0 on the same path as Country i. Let 
d dk (g) rldý (g) Hi (g) be the complete set of membersh 77i (9) , 77i, 
(g) 
. ..... qi i 
vanables qdk (g). i 
In the three region model, where each region is assumed to be at the vertex of 
an equilateral triangle, we have a particularly simple representation. All countries 
not in the same region as Country i are at the same distance away. So if iE Rk 
then dij =d>0 for all jý Rk and a single scalar which we can call 77i (g) gives 
the total number of countries not in Rk with which Country i is linked. 
The process of agreement formation will be much easier to formalize if we know 
that any agreement which some Country i proposes to sponsor will be accepted 
by all the proposed partners. 14 
141f this were not known ex ante, then we would need to model an explicit procedure by which 
the agreement were formed. This would entail a sponsor announcing the countries with which 
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Proposition 3. Assume Al. If Country i proposes to sponsor an FTA with a set 
of other countries Aj = fjl, ..., ji 
1, then all countries in the set Aj would obtain 
positive production-trade payoffs from the proposed FTA and would therefore ac- 
cept. This holds whether or not the set of countries Aj = fil, ..., J, 
I are themselves 
already in an FTA and whether or not Country i is itself already in an FTA. 
This result is intuitively obvious. By Proposition 2, the production-trade gains 
to an FTA are always positive. So if some country proposes to sponsor an FTA 
then all of the proposed members will always accept. Therefore the proposal of an 
agreement is synonymous with its formation. 
The following result shows that the network structure gives rise to an ordinary 
coalition structure of the form C=f Al 7 
A2) 
... ) Amj- 
Lemma 2. An FTA structure is a partition of the set of countries., V: Ain Aj =07 
UiGA =: JV. 
Thus, an FTA structure is like the cooperation structure modelled by Myerson 
(1977). This follows from the simplifying assumption made above that any country 
acts as a delegate for its partners, if it is already in an FTA, when it proposes 
to join another FTA. We have a conventional coalition structure rather than a 
network. But as we shall see, the network terminology of link formation is helpful 
because it enables us to model equilibrium very conveniently in the manner of a 
non-cooperative network. 
4.3.3 Payoffs to FTA Formation 
The production-trade payoffs wi, given by the function (4.8), will now be adapted 
for use as a payoff function in an FTA formation game. 
Lemma 3. Let iE A-. Let xij be given by (4.7) and let the set of model 
it would like to sponsor an agreement, and then each proposed member accepting or rejecting 
the agreement in turn. Such a procedure has been formalized for coalition formation by Bloch 
(1996). 
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parameters be represented by -y. Then the production- trade payoff function (4.8) 
can be expressed in the form 
" (g) 
dk d; r (g) Wi =w 
(77i (g), Tli i (g) Tli 
or equivalently 
wi =w (Hi (g); -y) 
To gain greater insight into this result, look at the expanded form of the payoff 
function w (Hi (g) ; -y): 
d, (g) 7ilz (g) 7-0 (77i (9) , ý7i 
77i (g) 
3 (e _ C)2 
(8 





(3 (e - c) + di) (e -c- di) 
) 
+z (g) (3 (e - c) + d, ) (e Tli 
(8 
di (g) 'ýdý (g) The expression is parametric except for the membership variables'qj (g),, qi i 
because tariffs have been substituted for, using either the optimal tariff formula 
(Proposition 1) where no agreement exists, or zero tariffs where an agreement 
exists. 15 
The first line shows the payoff to production and trade with FTA members 
that are in the same region, the number of which is given by qi (g). No distance 
parameter appears on this line because countries in the same region are assumed to 
15Look at the proof of Lemma 3 to see how the terms in w 
d, dý (g) (77i(g), 77i (9),..., 77i 
are derived. 
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have the same location. The second line gives the payoff to production and trade 
with all countries not in Country i's FTA. Notice that when optimal tariffs are 
in place, the volume of trade is exactly the same between all non-members of the 
FTA, regardless of their distance. The remaining lines measure the production- 
trade gains from FTA members at all distances dk E Dj. 16 
Having derived a convenient short-hand to write wi in terms of regional FTA 
membership, it is now possible to evaluate the gains to Country i from FTA 
formation with other regional members and countries from outside the region. The 
following result shows that as long as optimal tariffs are positive, then an increase 
in membership of Country i's FTA carries production-trade gains to Country i. 
The result also shows that more production-trade gains are derived the closer are 
the new members. 
t dk (g) Let Aqi (g) denote a unit increase in qj (g) from any level and le A77i 
dk 
'AW/, 
A, ýdj, (g) denote a unit increase in qi (g) from any level. Let Aw/, Aqi (g) and i 
measure the impact on w (Hi (g) -y) of a unit increase in 71i (g) and 77dk (g) respec- i 
tively. 
Lemma 4. Assume Al. 
(1) The terms Aw/Aqi (g) and AW/, At7dk (g) are positive and constant, (where i 




(ii) Let dj be the smallest element of Di, let di E Di be the largest element, 
and let dkc- Di be any other element such that dj < dk< di. Then 
di (g) > AW/A77dk (g) >, AW/, Aqd (g) > AW/A77i (g) > AW/A77i 
16T6 see why no distance parameters appear in the second line showing product ion-trade gains 
with non-members of the FTA, use the expression for the optimal tariff (Proposition 1) in the 
expression for output (4.7) and notice that the distance parameter cancels. 
If optimal tariffs are removed and tariffs are set to zero then the distance parameters appear. 
This explains why the distance parameters do appear on the remaining lines. 
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Lemma 4 extends Proposition 2 from bilateral to multilateral agreements. As 
mentioned earlier, due to the fact that there is no trade diversion, and that the 
firm in each country has a monopoly over the good that it exports, the production- 
trade gains to trade reaped by each citizen-producer can be calculated as a fixed 
multiple of the number of countries in the agreement. 17 
Assumption Al ensures that optimal tariffs are positive. Part (i) of Lemma 
dk 
4 establishes that Aw/, A? 7i (g) and Aw/A77j (g) are constant and do not depend 
on the initial levels of 77i (g) and qd' (g). This is convenient because it means 
that the production-trade benefit of changes in FTA membership can be evaluated 
depending only on the distance between members. Consequently, the production- 
trade gains of any change in FTA membership, regional or non-regional, can be 
captured using the notation Aw/Aqi (g) and Aw/, Aq d' (g). For example, the effect 
of an increase in 71i (g) from y' to y' is given by (y2 yl), AW/, Aqi (g). 
Part (ii) of Lemma 4 shows that production-trade gains of trade block expan- 
sion are greater for closer countries. To understand why, look at the payoff function 
" (g) ni - (g) , notice that the production-trade payoff 
from re- W (, qi (g) ''qi 
gional members, (e - c) 
2, is greater than the production-trade payoff from coun- 8 
tries where there is no agreement, -L (e _ C)2 . The proof then shows that 
for any 18 
two countries joining an FTA, the production-trade payoff lies between these two 
levels. The intuition is straight-forward. Because tariffs between closer countries 
are higher, their removal brings about a relatively large increase in production- 
trade gains. Formally, this follows from Proposition 1, which shows optimal tariffs 
to be declining in distance, and Proposition 2(ii), which shows in turn that the 
production-trade gains to a bilateral agreement axe declining in distance. As long 
as signing an FTA entails. removal of positive tariffs, it must yield a positive gain. 
But this is ensured by Assumption Al, which guarantees that optimal tariffs are 
positive. 
171n a more complex model, the degree of trade diversion would vary according to the specific 
FTA structure being considered. 
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Three Regions on an Equilateral Triangle Again 
As mentioned above, when using the three region model only two parameters are 
needed to describe FTA membership from the point of view of Country i. These 
parameters are qj (g) andqi (g), which give regional and non-regional membership 
respectively. Nothing more complicated than the 3-region model, based on an equi- 
lateral triangle, is needed to motivate the tendency to form regional agreements, 
and the results will be based on this simplified special case. '8 
4.3.4 FTA Formation with Sponsorship Costs 
Now that the production-trade payoffs of FTA formation have been determined, 
these can be used in the payoffs of a noncooperative network formation game. An 
overall payoff function will be specified in which the increased likelihood of being 
voted for as a result of the production-trade payoffs from FTA formation can be 
balanced against the sponsorship costs. 
The parameters in the vector -y are held constant throughout, so from now on 
the function w (Hi (g) ; -y) will be written w (Hi (g)). Using this form for production 
trade payoffs, define each country's overall payoff function Tj :9 --+ R as follows: 
Ti (g) = ýb (Hi (g),, qi (g)) 
= (Hi (g)) - ri (, qi (g)) 
(4.9) 
The function (4.9) has been transformed so that the term w (Hi (g)) enters with no 
coefficient. More generally, we would expect this term to carry a coefficient which 
translates the increase in welfare from FTA formation into the increased likelihood 
of being voted for. Through the transformation, this effect is incorporated into 
the function ri (). 
When optimal tariffs are positive (Al), w () is increasing in qj (g), and weakly 
dk 
increasing in 77i (g) E Hi (g) (Lemma 4). So for the purposes of the analysis 
18 Results will be generalized further in a subsequent version. 
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(Hi (9) 
, 77' 
(g)) is increasing in qj (g) and weakly increasing in 77dk (g). " The func- ii 
tion rj () is a linear function of q? ' (g), the scalar measuring the number of FTAs 
sponsored by Country i. As already pointed out above, sponsorship costs are 
invariant to the distance between members. 
4.3.5 FTAs in Equilibrium as Nash Networks 
With payoffs to the network formation game now specified, we can define equilib- 
rium as a Nash network (Bala and Goyal 2000). Given a network gE!;, let g-j 
denote the network obtained when all of Country i's links are removed. Then the 
network g can be written as g= gi ED g-j., where (D denotes that g is formed as the 
union of the links in gi and g-j. The strategy gi is a best response of Country Z to 
g-j if there does not exist a strategy g' for which 
Tj (gi ED g-j) ý: Tj (gi ED g-j) for all gi' E 9j. 
The set of all Country i's best responses to 9-i is denoted BIý- (g-j). A network 
(gl,..., g,, ) is a Nash network if gi c- BR, (g-j) for each i. 
This definition of equilibrium is a straightforward application of the standard 
notion of Nash equilibrium to a noncooperative network setting. A network is in 
a state of equilibrium if none of the agents, countries in the setting of this present 
paper, has an incentive to deviate. In the present setting, deviation would entail 
a country breaking a link by withdrawing its sponsorship of an FTA. 
4.3.6 The Dynamics of Regionalism 
This process is based on naive best response dynamics. The FTA formation game 
is assumed to last for three periods t=0,1,2. The process is initialized with the 
empty network at t=0. The FTA formation game is assumed to be repeated in 
"Asymmetries in the value of links across players have also been considered in network for- 
mation models by N'Iyerson (1980) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) among others. 
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periods t= 1) 2. Within each period, the sequence of events is as follows. Each 
country observes the FTAs (described by the network g) of the previous period. 
Then, using (4.9) each country simultaneously chooses a set of proposed partners; 
Country i chooses Pi, Country j chooses Pj and so on; each Pi contains the set of 
countries with which Country i would like to sponsor an agreement in the current 
period. Then each of the intersections nicArPi forms a proposed FTA. A sponsor 
for each proposed FTA is then picked at random from its members. Payoffs that 
would result if the FTA were formed are calculated, where sponsorship costs are 
conditional upon the FTA structure of the previous period. If the payoff given by 
(4.9) is negative for the sponsor, then that country is allowed to refuse sponsorship, 
in which case another sponsor is picked at random, and so on. " If the payoff to 
all sponsors is negative then no FTA is formed. Then (conditional on the FTA 
structure of the previous period) sponsorship costs are paid by all sponsors, FTAs 
are formed and tariffs are set. Finally, production and trade take place for given 
tariffs and output is consumed. There is a subgame perfect equffibrium of the FTA 
formation game if there is a Nash network in period t=1,2. 
4.4 The 3-Region FTA in Equilibrium 
This section uses the simple 3-region model to present the main results of the 
paper. Nothing more complex than the 3-region model is needed to show why 
trade blocks may be regional. So let ICI = 3. Countries are located at the vertices 
of an equilateral triangle. Then for all countries not sharing the same region, 
20This is a shortcut taken to ensure immediate convergence to a Nash network. It circumvents 
the collective action problem of forming such an agreement described by Olsen (1965). Other 
papers in the international trade literature simply assume that the group is small enough to 
overcome the collective action problem; see for example Grossman and Helpman (1994). On 
the other hand, to get around this problem a full dynarm c process of convergence on a noii- 
cooperative basis to a Nash network is modelled by Bala and Goyal (2000) and could be included 
here as well. 
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iE 1ý-, iE Rj ýi =ý j, the distance between them is given by the same parameter, 
dij =d>0, which measures the length of the sides of the triangle. Then the 
variable 77q (g) measures the total number of non-regional members in Country Z"s 2 
FTA. (The variable 77i (g) gives the number of regional members as before. ) 
4.4.1 Product ion-Trade Payoffs, Sponsorship Costs and Over- 
all Payoffs in a Network Game 
One of the main advantages of using a 3-region model is that it keeps the overall 
payoff function as simple as possible. The overall payoff function takes the form 
V) (Hi (g),, qi (g)) =0(, qi (g),, qi (g),, qi (g)). 
Equilibrium analysis will centre on showing network configurations from which 
there is no incentive to deviate. So we will want a method of examining the change 
in payoffs to all possible strategic alternatives that are available to a country. 
To develop such a method, let A? 7,? (g) denote a unit increase of qi" (g). This 
provides convenient notation to help evaluate the change in the overall payoff to 
the sponsorship of any given agreement. For example, suppose that Country i has 
already sponsored z agreements with countries; formally Country i has sponsored 
z links with other countries. And through these agreements Country i is in an 
FTA with yi other regional countries and y' countries outside the region. Then d 
the payoff to the sponsorship of an additional agreement, which will enlarge the 
22> y' from outside the FTA to include y> y' countries from the region and Yd d 
region is given by 
(9» - ýb 
(Y', Yd', (Y', Yd, Z+ A'gio 
1) ý IW/, ýý77d (g) _r (Y2 _ Yl) 
(g) + (Y2 _ Yý d 
The left hand side takes the difference between overall payoffs under the two net- 
work structures. The first term on the right hand side shows the production-trade 
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gains to an increase in regional members of the FTA. The second term shows the 
production-trade gains to an increase in non-regional members. The third term 
shows the sponsorship costs of setting up the additional agreement. Taken to- 
gether, these terms show how the production-trade gains balance and the reciprocal 
expected gains in votes balance against the sponsorship costs of an agreement. 21 
Recall from Lemma 4 that the production-trade payoffs to a regional FTA are 
higher than to a non-regional FTA. Rom what we have just seen, it is easy to 
envisage sponsorship costs at a level where regional agreements of a given size are 
worthwhile but non-regional agreements are not. The following result formalizes 
this idea by looking at sponsorship costs across a range of levels and their implica- 
tions for the incentive to sponsor regional and non-regional FTAs. It is important 
to keep in mind when looking at this result, however, that it evaluates the in- 
centive to form an FTA where none are pre-existing. As we shall see later, the 
production-trade payoffs to form new FTAs from existing ones are greater than 
the incentive to get FTAs off the ground in the first place. 
Lemma 5. Assume Al. Assume that in period t=0 the network g is empty. 
(1) Let the production-trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country 
in the same region be lower than the sponsorship cost. If there are no exist- 
ing FTAs then no FTA is worth sponsoring. Formally, Aw/Aqi (g) <K (1) 
0(yl, yd, (y, +yd_l)) <0(1,0,0) for 1 <r<yl, O<y' <n-r. 11--d- 
(ii) Let the production- trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country in 
a different region be higher than the sponsorship cost. Even if there are no FTAs, 
then the payoff to sponsorship of a world FTA is higher than the payoff to spon- 
d (g) > r, (r, n-r, (n - 1)) > sorship of any other FTA. Formally, Aw/A71i 
(yI, yd, (y, + yd for r> yl > 1, n-r> yl > 0, holding with strict 11---d 
inequality if and only if yl <r and/or yl <n-r. d 
(Iii) Let the production- trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country in 
21 in the following, we will just refer to "production- trade gains" and drop the reference to -the 
reciprocal expected gains in votes" - 
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the same region be higher than the sponsorship cost. But let the production- trade 
payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country in a different region be lower than 
(or equal to) the sponsorship cost. If there are no e. 3dsting FTAs then sponsorship 
of a complete-regional FTA yields a higher payoff than sponsorship of any other 
agreement. Formally, Aw/A? 7, q (g) < r, (1) < Aw/A77i (g) =ý- V) (r, 0, r- 1) > 
, O(r, n-r, n- 1) and O(r, O, r- 1) > O(y, 7ydl 
(y, +yd- 1)), for r> y' > 
n-r> y' > d- 
In a situation where there are no FTAs already existing, Lemma 5 shows 
the FTA structure that will yield the highest payoff from sponsorship. If the 
production-trade payoffs of a bilateral agreement are lower than the sponsorship 
cost even for an agreement with regional neighbors, then no country has an incen- 
tive to sponsor an FTA (Lemma 5(i)). If the production-trade payoffs are higher 
than the sponsorship cost of an FTA with a country in another region then an a 
world FTA will be worth sponsoring (Lemma 5(ii)). 
It is when costs are at an intermediate level that the incentives show scope for 
regionalism. In part (iii) of Lemma 5 it is assumed that the costs of production- 
trade payoffs of sponsoring an FTA with a country in the saxne region are above 
the sponsorship costs. Therefore, it is immediately clear that it will be worth 
sponsoring an FTA with regional neighbors. But sponsorship costs are above the 
production-trade payoffs of an FTA with countries outside the region. So from 
a situation where a country did sponsor an extra-regional FTA, it would gain 
more from withdrawing its sponsorship of an agreement with those more distant 
nations than from the production-trade gains of maintaining it. In this situation, 
the sponsorship costs lie between the relatively large gains from removing higher 
mutual tariffs with close neighbors and the smaller gains from removing lower 
mutual tariffs with countries that are further away. An only-regional FTA is the 
only type of agreement that is worth sponsoring. 
Lemma 5 focuses exclusively on the payoffs to a country when it is the sole 
s onsor of an FTA- It will be shown that in equilibrium any given 
FTA can only p 
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have one sponsor. But first, to make analysis of the equilibrium path easier, it 
will be helpful to look at how the incentives to sponsor a world FTA change when 
starting not from a situation where there are no FTAs but from one where there are 
complete-regional FTAs already in existence. The incentives to sponsor an extra- 
regional FTA, given that a complete-regional FTA already exists, are analyzed in 
the next result. 
Lemma 6. Assume Al. 
Let the production-trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a single country 
in a different region be lower than the sponsorship cost. Assume that a complete- 
regional agreement exists in every region Rk EE P. An extra-regional FTA (formed 
with a single link) is worth sponsoring if the production-trade payoffs to an FTA 
with more than one country in a different region are higher than the sponsorship 
cost of a bilateral agreement. (If no FTA already eýdsts in another region R. then 
an extra-regional agreement is not worth sponsoring. ) 
Formally, ydAW/A77q (g) > r, > Aw/A77q (g) (yi, ayd, y, +a- 12 71 1 
*(yj, O, yj - 1), for r> y' > 1, r> y' > 1, a> I 
If there are enough other countries from another region already in an FTA then 
the production-trade benefits may overcome the sponsorship costs, even though 
these costs are too high to make an agreement with a single other country in that 
region worthwhile. This can happen because it is assumed that negotiating with 
an existing FTA incurs only the sponsorship cost of a bilateral agreement r, (1) - 
Recall that if Country i wants to negotiate membership with an existing FTA 
then it only has to pay the cost of bringing itself to their table. And there exists a 
range of r, (1) for which the production-trade gains to a bilateral agreement with 
a country outside the region is less than r, (1), but the production-trade gains to 
joining an existing FTA with more than one country are greater than r, (1). The 
last part of the Lenuna, shown in brackets, is a re-statement of Lemma 5(ii), to 
emphasize the contrasting outcomes depending on whether or not an FTA exists 
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in the other region. 
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4.4.2 Equilibrium Paths; Are FTAs Stepping Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks? 
This subsection takes its title from the famous question posed by Bhagwati (1992). 
In the way that it will be answered below, the question should in fact be posed 
as follows: 'When are FTAs stepping stones and when are they stumbling blocks 
in the path to free trade? ' As argued in the introduction of this present paper, 
trade blocks in the real world are regional. In this light, the question is whether 
the regional blocks Presently existing will ultimately promote world free trade. 
The term regionalism usually describes a situation where countries in a region 
form a club or agreement, but where membership does not extend beyond regional 
boundaries. For a corresponding analytical definition that will be useful in the 
present context, let regionalism be a situation where all regions have a complete 
FTA but where there are no extra-regional FTAs; in the network g there is a 
connected subnetwork9k for each RkE C, but gij = gji =0 for all zE Ri, jE Rjj 
i =ý 1. The next proposition presents the main result of the paper. 
Proposition 4. Assume Al. 
(i) If the production- trade payoff to a bilateral agreement iidth a country in 
the same region is lower than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium path 
no FTA will exist at any point in time t=1,2 
(ii) If the production- trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country in a 
different region is higher than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium path 
there is world free trade at every point in time t=1,2 
On the equilibrium path there is regionalism in the first period if the 
following conditions hold: 
(a) production-trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a country in the same 
region is higher than the sponsorship cost 
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(b) production-trade payoff to a bilateral ap-eement with a country in a differ- 
ent region is lower than the sponsorship cost. 
(1v) (Regional trade blocks are stepping blocks to free trade) On the equilibrium 
path there is regionalism. in period t=I followed by world free trade in period 
t=2 if the following conditions hold: 
(a) the production- trade payoff to an extra-regional FTA with all countries in 
a different region is higher than the sponsorship cost (of a bilateral agreement), 
(b) the production-trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a single countiy 
in a different region is lower than the sponsorship cost. 
(c) the production- trade payoff to a bilateral agreement with a single country 
in the same region is higher than the sponsorship cost. 
If the prod uction-trade payoff to an extra-regional FTA with all countries in 
a different region is lower than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium Path 
there is regionalism at every point in time. 
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibrium path to free trade may indeed exhibit 
a period of regionalism followed by free trade (Proposition 4(iv)), presenting an 
encouraging answer to Bhagwati's question. Indeed, this is the most interesting 
possibility and the only one that is not immediately obvious. Let us briefly review 
the other outcomes before looking in more detail at Proposition 4(iv). 
Obviously, if the sponsorship costs are prohibitive of even an FTA between 
close regional neighbors then none will be sponsored at all ( Proposition 4(i)). On 
the other hand, with sponsorship costs sufficiently low there will be a move straight 
to free trade, bypassing regionalism altogether ( Proposition 4(ii)). With costs at 
an intermediate level it is worth sponsoring an FTA between regional partners but 
not with countries that are further away, because gains to an FTA with regional 
partners are higher than with more distant nations. 
If regionalism prevails in the first period, the question of whether the process 
stalls at regionalism thereafter or whether the process proceeds to free trade de- 
pends once again on the level of sponsorship costs. If the sponsorship cost 
(of 
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a bilateral agreement) is greater than the production-trade benefit of a bilateral 
agreement with a single country outside the region, but less than the production- 
trade benefit of joining a complete regional agreement outside the region then 
countries will wait until they see regional agreements formed elsewhere before 
proposing to join them. Of course, if the sponsorship cost (of a bilateral agree- 
ment) is higher than the production-trade benefit of joining a complete- regional 
agreement in another region then the process stalls at regionalism. 
Finally, note that if one country sponsors an agreement with another region 
then free trade results immediately because of the assumption that any given 
country acts as a delegate for all of its regional partners when it negotiates to join 
an FTA with another region. 
Recall that the cost structure assumed here has two bases, one in practice and 
one in theory. In practice, 'trade negotiators often report that it is much easier 
(and therefore cheaper) to negotiate an agreement with a block of countries than 
with countries as individuals (CREDIT 1998). In theory, Bala and Goyal assume 
that there is a single link cost of linking to an existing network; it is not necessary 
to pay a link cost of linking to each country individually. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to show that regionalism can arise 
in equilibrium. That is, countries may choose to form regional trade agreements 
rather than move all the way to free trade. Politicians balance the increased likeli- 
hood that they will be voted for if they coordinate an FTA against the coordination 
cost itself. The increased likelihood of being voted for results from conventional 
welfare gains to trade due to formation of the FTA. By working out optimal tar- 
iffs with transport costs, it is shown that trade based gains to an agreement with 
countries of the same region are higher than gains to an agreement involving (dis- 
tant) countries from different regions. On the other hand, the costs of bringing 
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politicians together from different nations in order to coordinate an agreement are 
assumed to be proportional to the number of countries involved, and not depen- 
dent upon which countries they come from. Therefore, a regional FTA may be 
worth coordinating whilst one involving countries from outside the region may not. 
In addition, Chapter 3 also makes a contribution to the debate on whether trade 
blocks are building blocks or stumbling blocks in the freeing of trade multilaterally. 
It shows that a period of regionalism may be necessary in order for free trade to take 
place. This result was based on the idea that it is cheaper to sponsor an agreement 
with an existing FTA than with all its individual members; an idea expressed in 
practice by trade negotiators and formalized in the literature on noncooperative 
network formation. 
There are a number of extensions to this work that suggest themselves imme- 
diately. One straightforward extension to appear in the next version of this paper 
is to present the results of this paper for any number of regions. A more substan- 
tive extension would be to give greater attention to the negotiation process in the 
model. In the chapter as it stands, the model of agreement formation is crude. 
Explicit models of agreement formation, have been constructed by Busch and Wen 
(1995) and Furusawa and Wen (2002) and it would be interesting to extend these 
to a regional setting of the kind described in Chapter 4. 
Also, it would be nice to improve upon the 'naive' best response dynamics 
assumed in Chapter 4; the basis for the evolution of regional agreements, possibly 
towards free trade. It would be far more satisfactory to undertake such analysis, 
and establish whether or not trade blocks are building blocks, in a network where 
agents are far sighted as in Page and Wooders (2002) for example. 
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4.6 Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. First rearrange the expression for CSj as follows: 
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where the second line follows by (4.5), and the fourth line follows by (4.3). 
Using this, the expressions for TR, DR, and (4.6) in (4.8) yield 
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Now rearranging terms, 
W (e - C) xij - (e -c- tij - dij) xij -x2. 22 
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where the third line uses (4.3). 0 
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Proof of Proposition 1. Using the expression for w obtained in Lenima 1, the 
government of Country i solves the following problem to set the optimal tariff on 
imports from Country j; 
322 
nax w= (e - c) 
E xij -2 i tij 
xzj +E X3 . 
jGA( jev jem 
Because, by (4.7), xji is not a function of tij (the tariff set by Country i does not 
affect production in other countries), the derivatives with respect to tij of all the 
terms under the last summation are equal to zero. Given that - (xij )2 is concave, 
and by (4.7) xij is a linear function of tij, the objective function w is concave in 
ti3i, all jE JV- So there must exist a unique solution for tij. Write the first order 
condition as 
dw dxij dx-. (e-c)- -37 0. dtij dtij 
(xij) 
dtij 
Then, using the fact that dxijldtij = -1/2, simplifying and rearranging obtains 
tij = (e - c) /3 - dij. It is immediate that if d< (e - c) /3 then 
iij > 0. El 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Country Z's production-trade payoff is given by 
1x2_Z 
X2 +Z X2 Wi (e-C)EX'j-2E 'j ij ji 
jeg iciv jeg/{i} jEliV/{i} 
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By (4.7), if dij = dji and tij tji then xij = xji and the last two terms cancel, 
leaving 
Wi = (e -C) xij -x E21: 'j* 
jcA( jGA( 
Using (4-7), 
wi = 1: -1 (3 (e - c) + tij + dij) (e -c- tij - dij) 
jEA( 8 
Now let countries i and j form an FTA. Using tij == iij for the pre-agreement tariff, 
and tij == 0 for the post agreement tariff in wi, take discrete differences to work 
out the welfare gain: 
AWj =1 (7 (e - c) + 3dij) ((e - c) - 3dij) 72 
Under the assumptions that e-c>0, and tij iij = (e - c) /3 - dij > 0, so 
AWj > 0. 
(ii) Immediate by differentiation. 0 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Definition 1, if ji E Aj and i2 E Aj then mutual 
tariffs are set at 
tilh = thil = 0. By Proposition 2, each country in Aj gains 
Awi >0 for each other country in the agreement. Moreover, each country in Aj 
pays no sponsorship cost. Therefore, it is in the interest of each country in the set 
Aj to accept membership of the FTA proposed by Country i. 0 
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not. UiEcAi =X is trivial (recall that countries 
not in an FTA are singleton components. ) To see that An Aj = 0, suppose 
not. Suppose that zEA and iE Aj. This may be the case for one of the 
following reasons. Either i proposed to sponsor A. and Aj. But in that case there 
must be a path between i and all members of Ai \fiI and i and all members of 
Aj \fi1. But by Definition 1 all members of A and Aj must be in the same FTA; a 
contradiction. Or i was already in one FTA, without loss assume Ai, and proposed 
to sponsor an agreement with the members of Aj. But then, by assumption, if i's 
proposal were accepted, all members of Ai must have joined Aj at the same time; 
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a contradiction. Finally, suppose that i was already in one agreement, assume A,, 
but came into Aj as a result of an agreement proposed by another country. But 
then if i entered Aj in this way, then so must all A, \ Iij; a contradiction. 0 
Proof of Lemma 3. For convenience, define the following piece of notation. Let 
ýjj = max Igij, gji 1. Note that, by (4.7), tij = tji and dij = dji 7 it is the case that 
xij = xji for all i73E jV (independent of whether gij =0 or gij = 1) - 
Consequently, 
the function w can be written in the form 
Wi = (e - C) 
E 







(gij) represent (4.7) where the superscript dk denotes that Country 
is at distance dk >0 from Country i; iE 1ý-, jE Rj, i =, A j. We substitute for 
(4.7) explicitly in the step after this. But to see how the structure of the new 
function arises, it is helpful to note the following intermediate step. Recall that 
gij E 10,11, where tij is set optimally according to Proposition I if gij =0 and 
free trade is adopted if and only if gij = 1. As xýý (ý7jj) depends only on 9ij and 23 
dk the function wi can be partitioned accordingly: 
d dk (g) 
wi =W 




(e - C) xij (1) - xij 
(1)2 
2 
+ (r - 77i (g)) (e - c) xij 
(0) -1 Xij 
(0)2 
2 
d d, (1)2 +77i, (g) 
( 
(e - C) X4ý x .72 'i 
+ rldl (g)) 
I di (0)2 (e 
_ C) Xid, 
(0) x ij2 ii 
+,,, dz (g) (e _ C) Xýý 
d-, (1)2 
23 2x '3 . 
+ (jzi _ , 
dz (g)) 
I d-ý (0) 2 
i (e - C) X4ý 
(0) - -x 23 2 'i 
where the absence of a superscript in the terms xij (1) and xij 
(0) denotes that 
iIJE Rk- 
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Now substitute explicitly for (4.7). First note that if i, jE Rk then dij = 
0. Also, if gij =I then tij =0 and, by (4.7), xij (1) = (e - c) /2. If gij =0 
then tij = (e - c) /3 and so xij (0) = (e - c) /3. Analogously, by (4.7), Xdk 
(1) 
ij 
(e -c-dk) /2. And, by Proposition 1, use tij -e3c- 
dk and (4.7) to obtain 
dk 
- c) /3. Making these substitutions, we can rewrite the function xij (0) = (e 
W (, ýi (g)', ýdj (g) 7 .... 7dz 
(g), 
...; -y) as ii 
,z (g) w (1 (9) , 77i" 
(9) 
. ..... qi 
ý7j (g) (e - c) 
(8 
+ (r - 77i (g)) 
5 





(3 (e - c) + di) (e -c- di) 
) 
d5_ 
C)2 (6kl - 77i' (9)) 
(18 
(e 
+77, z (g) (3 (e - c) + dz) (e -c- 
(8 
d-ý (g)) 5 C)2 (6kz -77i - (e 
(18 
Now, using the facts that r+Ed Jki = I. /Vj andqi 
(9) + Edd dk (g) 
k EDj kGDj 77i 
we can simplify further by writing 
W (, qi (g),, qid, (g), 
d; ý 
.... 77i 
77i M3 (e _ C)2 8 
+ (jjVj - lAil) 




(3 (e - c) + di) (e -c- di)) iM 
(8 
(3 (e - c) + d,, ) (e 
F-1. 
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Proof of Lenuna 4: (i) To show that Aw/Aqi (g) is constant, begin by noting 
d, (g) d, (g) that althoughqj (g) is a discrete variable, the function w (77, (g) 77i ... 77i , ^Y) 
is continuous in 77i (g). Treating 77i (g) as a continuous variable in a compact set, it 
is possible to calculate the derivative of w (ý7i (g) , qid, (g) 37i z (9) ; -Y) with respect 
to 77i (9); 
Ow 72 
=- e-c O, qj (g) 72 
As the expression for (9wlOqi (g) is parametric, the effect on w of a discrete change 




2 Aqi (g) 
(72 
This holds at any 77i (g), as required. As (e - c) ->0 by assumption, Aw/Aqi (g) 
0. 
dk 
To show that Aw/Aqi (g) is constant, foHow the same procedure. Calculate 
the derivative Of W (77i (g) 177d, 
(g) 
, ... 77 
d.,, (g) Y) with respect to ýdk (g): 
19W 
-1 (7 (e - c) + 
3dk) (e -c- 
3dk) 
a, q 
dk (g) 72 
As the expression for awla? 7 d' (g) is parametric, the effect on w of a discrete change i 
in q 
dk 
is given by i 
I 
A77dk (g) Aw = 72 
(7 (e - c) + 
3dk) (e -c- 
3dk) i 
Again, this holds at any qi (g) as required. By Al, (e - c) > 3dk and therefore 
d AW/ATIi, (g) > 0. 
dj (g) > AW/A, ýdk (g) > AW/, A77d, (g) Show that Aw/A77j (g) > Aw/Aqi ii 
d 
0. First establish that Aw/A77i (g) > Aw/A77ij (g). Rom (i) we know that in 
general 
Aw 
-1 (7 (e - c) + 
3dk) (e -c- 
3dk) 
dk (g) 72 AT/i 
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where dk is any element of Di. Expanding the brackets, 




dk k (g) 72 
dk 
= 0. Notice that Aw/Aqi (g) is declining in dk, attaining its maximum for dk 
dk 
So Aw/Aqi (g) > Aw/Aqi (g) for all dk E Di and, in particular, Aw/A77j (g) 
AW/A, q 
dj (q). 
ýj (g) AW/A? 7dk (g) ý> AW/Arld, Next, establish that Aw/A77, >ii (g). But this 
follows immediately by the fact that Aw/Aq d' (g) is declining in dk, and that by i 
assumption dj < dk < dl. 
Finally, it must be established that Aw/Aq 
d, (g) ý! 0. The root for 'AW/A77dj, (g) zi 
0 is dk == (e 
dk 
- c) /3. To see this, use dk= (e, - c) /3 in Aw/Aqi (g) to obtain 
Aw 1 
)2 
18 e- C) 
2) 
c 
A77 dk (g) 72 
7 (e 
3(30. 
But by Al, 0< dk< (e - c) /3. The result follows. 0 
Proof of Lemma 5. By Al, Aw/Aqi (g) > Aw/A? 7i (g) >0 (Lemma 4). 
(i) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary 
that there does exist an FTA that is worth sponsoring. For this to be the case 
the overall payoff to sponsoring such an agreement must be higher than autarchy. 
d Yd' ý: 0, for which Then there exist values of y' and y', where r> y' > 1, n-r> 
(yl, yd, (y, + yd _ 1)) >0 (1,0,0). This implies 11 
0 (yl, Yi , (Y, + Yi - i» - o(i, o, o) 
(YJ+yd_1) >O. (yl _ 1) AW/, A, ýi 
(g) + YdAW/A77d (g) _K 1i1 
But 
, (g) (y, + Y, 'Aw/A, qi 1 '), Aw/Aqi (g) + yl 
(yj AW/A, ýi (g) + YdAW/AIld (g) (YI + yd K 
(yj AW/, A, ýi (g) + YdAW/A, ýi (g) (y, + yd K 
(YI + yd 1 (g) 
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I, (1)) < 0; and 
by assumption Aw/A77i (g) <K (1) So (y, + yd _ 1) (AW/Aý7i (g) _K 
contradiction. 
(ii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary 
that sponsorship of some FTA other than the world FTA yields a higher payoff. 
Then V) (r, n-r, (n -< (yi, y1d, (y, + y1d - 1)) for all values of y' and yd' 1d 
where r> y' > 1, n-r> yd' 0. This implies 
(r, n-r, (n 
(yl, yd) (yj + yd 11 
= (r - yi) Aw/Aqi (g) + (n -r_ Yd) AW/Arld (g) -n (n - yj _ yd) 1i1 
But 
(r yi) Aw/Aqi (g) + (n -r Yld) AW/Aqd 
(g) r, (n - yj _ yd) i 
(r Yd) AW/Aqd (g) yd) yl), Aw/A77i (g) + (n -r1i 
(n 
- yj 




- yj yd 1) 
d) (AW/A77d (g) 
_K 
(n 
- yj - yl i 't, (I )) 
_ yd) 
(AW/A, ýq (g) _6 and by assumption Aw/Aq' (g) >n (1) so 
(n 
- yj > 
d) (AW/, A? 7d (_q) 0; contradiction. Clearly, if yr and Yd = n-r then (n - yj - yj i 
0 and 0 (r, n-r, (n - V) (yl, yd, (y, + yd - 1)). But if y' <r and/or y' < 11d 
d) (AW/Aqý (g) 
_K n-r then (n-yj -yj I, 
(1)) > 0. The result follows. 
(ii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary 
that sponsorship of some FTA other than the complete-regional FTA yields a 
higher payoff. Then 0 (r, 0, (r - 1)) <0 
(yl, yd, (y, + yd _ 1)) 11 for some values of 
yl and Yl where r> yl > 1, and n-r> y' > 0. This imphes d, d- 
0 (r 
11 7 
0, (Y17 Y" (yi + Y, - 
= (r - y, ) Aw/A77i (g) + 
(n 
-r- yl) AW/A77, (g) - r, 
(n 





yl) Aw/A77i (g) + (n -r_ Yd) AW/A77d (g) - r, 
(n 
- yj _ yd) 
yi) Aw/A? 7i (g) + (n -r_ Yd) AW/Arld (g) _ 
(n 
- yj _ yd) X 1i1 
(r - yl) Aw/Aq 
d (g) + (n -r_ Yd) AW/A, ýd (g) _ 
(n 
- yj _ yd i1 
d) (AW/, Aqd (g) (n - yj - yl i 
AW/A, qd (g) >r- yd) (AW/A, ýd (g) _X and by assumption So (n - yj > 
d) (AW/, Aqd (g) _r 0; contradiction. Clearly, if y' =r and y' = n-r then (n - yj - yj d 
(yl+yd_ 0 and 0 (r, n-r, (n - (yl, yd, 1)). But if y' <r and/or y' < d 
n-r then (n-yj -y d) (Aw/A77ý (g) - r, (1)) > 0. The result follows. II 
(iii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary 
that sponsorship of some FTA other than the complete-regional FTA yields a 
higher payoff. Then either 0 (r, 0, (r - 1)) < V) (r, n-r, (n - 1)) or 0 (r, 0, (r - 1)) 
0 (yi, y1d, (y, + y1d - 1)) for all values of y' and yd, where r> y' > 1, and 
n-r> yd' ý! 0. But the first inequality implies 
ýb (r, 0, (r - 1» - ýb (r, n-r, (n - 1» 
- (n - r) Aw/A77i (g) + r, «n - r» 
-(n-r) 
(AW/A77d (g) (1)) < 0. i 
d (g) and by assumption Aw/Aqi <n (1) and so - (n - r) (Aw/A? 7ý (g) -n 2 
0; contradiction. 
The second inequality implies 
d (yl, ydl, (yl + y, - 
YdAW/A, ýd (g) _X 
(r 
-1 -yj -yd Yj) AW/A77i (9) 1i +I) <0. 
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But 
(r - yi) Aw/A77i (g) _ YdAW/Aqd (g) - r, (r- I -yj _ yd + 1iI 
_ YdAW/A? 7d (g) __ yd) r 
(r - yl) Aw/A? 7i (g) i 
(r 
- yj 
(r _ yl) AW/Arld (g) _ YdAW/, Arld (g) _ (r - yj _ yd i1i1 
d) 
I, rld (g) (r-yi-yl i 
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and by assumption Aw/A77il (g) <K (1) So (r yl yd) (AW/, A, ýd 1i>0 
d d) (1)) forr < yl+yl. Now (r-yj -yj <0 for r> yl + yd 1. But 
in addition 
)Y AW/Arli YdAW/, A, ýd (g) Yd) /, C (r -11i (r - yj 1, (1) 
(r - yl) Aw/A77i (g) - yj Aw/Aý7j (g) - 
(r 
- yj - yl) 
(r 
- yj - yl) (Aw/A77i (g) -n (1)) 1 
and by assumption r, (1) < AW/A, ýi (g)7 So (r _ y, _ yd) (, AW/A, ýi (g) -K (1)) >0 1 
for r>y, + yd. I 
Proof of Lenuna 6. Let there be a regional agreement of size r> yd >I in region -1 
Rj (i E Ri, i j). The proof is in two parts. (i) Show that if ydAW/, Arld (g) > 1 
(1) > AW/Arld (g) i then Country i does find it worth sponsoring an extra-regional 
agreement with the FTA in Rj. (ii) Show that this does not hold if r, (1) > 
dAW/, A77d (g). Y1 i 
(i) Assume yl'Aw/A77i' (g) > r, (1) > Aw/Aqd (g). Suppose to the contrary 
that an extra-regional agreement with the FTA in Rj is not worth sponsoring. 
This implies 
0 (yl, Yi , yi) - ýb (yl , 03 Yi - 1) 
= yj Aw/Aqi (g) - r, (1) <0 
But by assumption y, Aw/A71i (g) > r, (1); contradiction. 
(ii) Now assume r, (1) > yj AW/A77d (g) in order to see that Country Z does i 
not find it worth sponsoring an extra-regional agreement with the FTA in Rj. 
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Suppose to the contrary that such an agreement is worth sponsoring. This implies 
ýb (Y1, Yi', YI) -0 (Y1,0, Y1 - 1) = YlAW/Aqid (9) -K (1) > 0; contradiction. 0 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
First observe that under the 3-region structure, eyistence of a nonempty Nash 
network depends upon finding a member of each FTA that will be its sponsor. By 
the symmetry of the 3-region structure, if jE Pi then iE Pj and so Pi = Pj, 
Therefore, for an FTA to exist it must be shown that any given member would 
obtain a positive payoff from sponsoring it. This will be shown for each case below. 
(i) Suppose to the contrary that there exists a period in which at least one FTA 
is sponsored. Let t=s be the first period in which at least one FTA is sponsored. 
Then by the assumption that the network is empty at t=0, the network must be 
empty at t=s-1. Taking as given the empty network g at t=s-1, the payoff 
to sponsoring an agreement with yj countries in the same region and yd countries 1 
outside the region is 0 (y, I yd 7 
(y, + yd _ 1)). By assumption, production-trade 11 
payoffs and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 5(i). But by 
Lemma 5(i), 0 (1,0,0) >0 (yl, yd7 (y, + yd _ 1)) and therefore any country spon- 11 
soring an agreement could gain by deleting all its links; withdrawing sponsorship. 
So the network must be empty at t=s as well. As t=s is any period t>1, the 
network g must be empty at every period t>1. 
(ii) Suppose to the contrary that there exists a period t>I in which there is 
not a world FTA. Let t=s be a period in which the Nash network g is either empty 
or not connected. By definition of equilibrium, there must exist a world FTA at 
t=1. By assumption, production-trade payoffs and sponsorship costs are in the 
same relation as in Lemma 5(ii). Then by Lemma 5(ii), Vý (r, n-r, (n - 1)) ý! 
V) (yi, yj', (y, + yj' - 1)), for r> y' > 1, n-r> yd' ý! 0 
holding with strict 
inequality if and only if y' <r and/or y' <n-r. So the empty network cannot d 
be Nash; Country i would receive a payoff Tj (1,0,0) < V) (r, n-r, (n - 
and has an incentive to deviate by forming links with all other countries. 
Similarly, 
if Country i sponsors an FTA that is not a world FTA, then it can increase its 
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payoff by forming links, again contradicting Nash. 
11-5 
Given that the Nash network g is connected at t=I, then it must be connected 
at t=2. If not, then the sponsor of the agreement, Country i, must have deleted 
some or all of its links. But deviating in this way would yield a lower payoff than 
maintaining all links; 0 (y, ý yd I 
(y, + yd _ 1)) 11< V) (r, n-r, (n - 1)), r>y 
n-r> Yd' ý: 0, contradicting equilibrium. By induction, taking as given a 
world FTA in period t=s- 11 it is a best response for any country to maintain 
sponsorship of the world FTA at t=s. As t=s is any period t>1, and as the 
network g is connected at t= 1) it must be connected at every period t -> 
1. 
(iii) By definition, there is regionalism in the network g if there is a connected 
subnetwork9k for each Rk E C, but gij = gji =0 for all iER, jE Rj, i -ý J- 
Suppose to the contrary that the Nash network g does not exhibit regionalism. 
There are two (mutually inclusive) possibilities. One is that the Nash network g 
contains links gij =I or gji =I for some iE Iý-, iE Rj, i =h j. The other is that 
the subnetwork A is not connected for some Rk E C- Contradictions for these two 
possibilities are found in turn. 
Suppose to the contrary that at t=I the Nash network g contains links gij =I 
or gji =1 for some iE 1ý-, jE Rj, i =h j. By assumption, production-trade payoffs 
and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 5(iii). Then by Lemma 
5(iii), O(r, O, r-1) > *(r'yd'(r+yd_j))' for r> y' > 1, n-r > y' > 11--d- 
Therefore, if Country iE 1ý- sponsors any links of the form gij =I with jG Rj, 
i ý4 j, then it can gain by deleting them, so the network g cannot be Nash. By the 
same argument, Country i has an incentive to break links if it sponsors a world 
FTA. 
Now suppose that in the Nash network g of period t=1, Country i sponsors 
an FTA that is not a complete-regional FTA; that is where y' < r. But then 
again by Lemma 5(iii) 0 (r, 0, r- 1) >0 (yl, yd' (r + yd for r> y' > 11- 
n-r> yd' ý: 0. Therefore, Country i could gain by linking to the other countries 
i for which i, jER,, so the network g cannot be Nash. It follows that for each 
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Rk EC the subnetworkgkmust be connected. By definition of equilibrium, only 
one country sponsors the complete-regional FTA. If not then a second sponsor 
could withdraw from sponsorship, gaining the sponsorship cost and not losing any 
production-trade payoffs, contradicting Nash. 
(iv) Conditions (b) and (c) are exactly as in (iii) so from (iii) we know that 
there must be regionalism at t=1. Take the network from period t=I as 
given, where the subnetworks A are connected for the elements of all Rk E C. 
Suppose to the contrary that at t=2 the Nash network g is not connected. 
By assumption, production-trade payoffs and sponsorship costs are in the same 
relation as in Lemma 5(iii). If at t=2 any subnetwork A is not connected then 
by Lemma 5(iii) there is an incentive to deviate by forming links to other countries 
within Rk so g cannot be Nash. Moreover, condition (a) implies that production- 
trade payoffs and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 6. So by 
Lemma 6, if there does not exist a link between Country i C- R, and jE Rj, i :ýJ, 
then Country i could gain by forming a fink with a country in another region, 
d Yd < V) (r, ay, ,r+a- 1) > ýb 
(r, 0, r- 1), 0<a1- (n - r), a>1, contradicting 
Nash. 
Finally, suppose that condition (a) does not hold, so that the payoff from linking 
to an FTA in another region is not greater than the sponsorship cost. Then the 
Nash network g cannot be complete, because if Country iE Ri sponsors any links 
to countries jE Rj, then it could gain by breaking those links. However, given 
that conditions (b) and (c) continue to hold, and given regionalism at t=1, there 
is no incentive for any country to deviate at t=2. By (iii), any sponsor of a 
regional agreement could not gain by deleting links. So there is regionalism in at 
t=1. Under these same conditions, given regionalism at t=s-1, there must be 
regionalism at t=s. So when (a) fails to hold there must be regionalism at all 
points on the equilibrium path. 0 
Chapter 5 
ConclUsions 
This dissertation has examined situations where there are confficts of interest be- 
tween governments in policy setting, focusing in particular on tax and trade policy. 
There is a large literature in each of these areas. Yet there appear to be reasons 
to believe that existing theory does not give us a complete understanding of the 
tax and trade policy interactions we have been observing. 
The first chapter of the dissertation adapts Hotelling's model of competition 
between firms to think about tax competition between governments. Hotelling's 
Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition 
and shown to be invalid. There may be excessive differentiation in which one 
government overprovides the amenity and sets taxes too high whilst the other 
government underprovides the amenity and sets taxes too low. Not only may there 
be excessive differentiation but, in addition, equilibrium may fail to exist. --\'on- 
existence of equilibrium is interpreted as a metaphor for intense tax competition. 
Chapter I represents the first occasion on which, to our knowledge, Hotelling's 
model and the possible nonexistence of equilibrium have been adapted to think 
about amenities and taxation competition. The model seems to provide a way 
of understanding the patterns of taxation that have been observed in Europe, for 
example, where the core has not been forced to reduce taxes significantly towards 
the lower rates set in the periphery, despite ever more integrated capital markets. 
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Conclusions 178 
Also in Chapter 1, perfect tax discrimination was analyzed to examine the ex- 
tent to which it provided a solution to the equilibrium existence issue raised b,, - 
Hotelling (uniform) tax competition. We find that allowing governments to dis- 
criminate perfectly in setting taxes only partially resolves the equilibrium existence 
problem. There is a larger range of values for which the cost of amenity mismatch 
supports an equilibrium. But even under perfect tax discrimination, if the cost of 
amenity mismatch is relatively high then tax competition is so intense that the 
system does not settle down to an equilibrium. Moreover, when equilibrium does 
exist, the efficiency problem is exacerbated. A race to the bottom occurs in which 
neither government offers amenities at a positive level in equilibrium. 
Chapters 2 and 3 switch focus from problems of international tax competitioii 
to problems with forming trade agreements. Chapter 2 examined the multilat- 
eral trade liberalization process. In Chapter2, the fact that trade liberalization 
has proceeded in a number of rounds over the post-war period was explained in 
terms of the institutional structure imposed on trade liberalization by the GATT 
rules themselves. Attention focused particularly on a 'withdrawal of equivalent 
concessions, ' (WEC) and tariff bindings. 
The first main result of Chapter 2 was that was that the WEC rule does facili- 
tate trade liberalization but that free trade certainly cannot be reached, no matter 
how little countries discount the future. A standard repeated game allows trade 
partners to implement the worst (credible) punishment against a deviant. In gen- 
eral, the WEC rule makes such severe punishments illegal. By outlawing a class of 
severe punishments, the VVEC rule compromises efficiency. The second main result 
was that if punishments are constrained by the WEC rule and initial deviations 
are bound, then on the equilibrium path, trade liberalization must take place over 
a number of periods or 'rounds'. Intuitively, these rules effectively limit countries' 
ability to withdraw cooperation. As withdrawals of cooperation are limited, only 
the promise of future cooperation is available to make an agreement today self- 
enforcing. As a restflt cooperation, in this instance over tariff liberalization, cannot 
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be given away all at once. It must be given up gradually. 
Chapter 3 proposed an answer to the question of why trade agreements tend to 
be regional. It argued that politicians balance the increased likelihood that they 
will be voted for if they coordinate an FTA against the coordination cost itself Tile 
increased likelihood of being voted for results from conventional welfare gains to 
trade due to formation of the FTA. By working out optimal tariffs with transport 
costs, it is shown that trade based gains to an agreement with countries of the same 
region are higher than gains to an agreement involving (distant) countries from 
different regions. On the other hand, the costs of bringing politicians together 
from different nations in order to coordinate an agreement are assumed to be 
proportional to the number of countries involved, and not dependent upon which 
countries they come from. Therefore, a regional FTA may be worth coordinating 
whilst one involving countries from outside the region may not. 
In addition, Chapter 3 also made a contribution to the debate on whether trade 
blocks are building blocks or stumbling blocks in the freeing of trade multilaterally. 
It showed that a period of regionalism may be necessary in order for free trade 
to take place. This result was based on the idea that it is cheaper to sponsor 
an agreement with an existing FTA than with all its individual members; an 
idea expressed in practice by trade negotiators and formalized in the literature on 
noncooperative network formation. 
5.1 Four Broad Themes 
Four broad themes emerge from the research. The first is that the forces of com- 
petition over taxation between governments may not simply push all governments 
in the same direction; towards efficiency or underprovision of amenities. There are 
good reasons to suppose that governments may be pushed in opposing directions 
in order to soften the degree of competition that they face. By making their ju- 
risdictions different from others, by offering a particular level or tyl)e of amenity, 
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jurisdictions may effectively be able to reduce the extent to which they have to 
compete over conventional measures such as taxation. This thinking appears to 
provide stylized outcomes that are in some ways closer to what we actually ob- 
serve. It also seems this thinking may extend to a range of other areas, including 
environmental policy, where it was previously believed that competition forced 
jurisdictions in a single direction. 
The second broad theme is that in fact harmonization measures may be moti- 
vated not by inefficiency but by intense competition. It is impossible to comment 
on the efficiency of a situation where no equilibrium exists. But it seems fair to 
conclude that it is not a pleasant environment for government officials to work in. 
It may be the intensity of competition, more than the inefficiency that results, 
that may be motivating calls for tax harmonization. 
The third broad theme is that cooperation may be gradual in any situation 
where there are restrictions on reversing levels of cooperation once they have been 
adopted. These restrictions need not be complete; partial irreversibility say in 
cooperation over investment or military matters will make cooperation necessarily 
gradual. 
The fourth broad theme is that politicians may weight costs of forming agree- 
ments against different gains across different types of agent in deciding which 
agreements to form. Moreover, if the costs of linking to a network once it has been 
formed are the same as the costs of linking to a single player, then the results sug- 
gest that a set of small networks may expand into a bigger network subsequently. 
5.2 Directions for Future Research 
First, more work is needed to characterize situations where no equilibrium exists in 
the Hotelling tax competition model of Chapter 1. It appears to be an interesting ýD 
idea that non-existence of equilibriwn might represent a situation of intense coni- 
petition. That is, from any given policy situation, there is always an incentive to 
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undercut another government. This appears to capture the difficulties that many 
governments complain of in a world where policy making is increasingly subject to 
external influences. Yet describing a situation of interest through non-existence of 
equilibrium is unsatisfactory in that it is not subject to further analysis; in partic- 
ular, its efficiency properties cannot be analyzed. Therefore, more work is needed 
to capture situations of perpetual policy change through competition of this kind. 
More work is also warranted on tax harmonization, given that it represents a 
way of escaping intense tax competition highlighted above. In the framework of 
Chapter I were governments are Leviathans, tax harmonization is likely to be bad 
for citizens in that governments could cooperate on tax setting to extract maximal 
rent from producers. A number of distributional issues are raised as well as issues 
for efficiency. But it is not possible even to begin to make comparisons in an 
environment where equilibrium does not exist under Hotelling tax competition. 
So further research that preserves the basic features of intense competition whilst 
enabling equilibrium and efficiency issues to be analyzed could be very useful. 
Extending the ideas in Chapter 2, there are a number of useful ideas that could 
usefully be pursued in future work on gradualism in a policy environment. One is to 
extend the framework of partial irreversibility to other areas where cooperation is 
required, such as environmental policy or investment. Some work has already been 
undertaken in this area, by Chisik and Davies (2003) for example, under complete 
irreversibility. But the motivating forces are different from those of Lockwood and 
Thomas (2002) and further insights may be possible from extending the framework 
of partial irreversibility developed in Chapter 2 to other areas. 
Perhaps more interesting still is the idea of using other modelling frameworks 
to probe in other ways the question of why negotiation of international treaties 
takes so long. One element that is missing from the model of Chapter 2 and may 
be an important factor in bringing about gradualism is that valuations over a 
trade agreement are private information. Bulow and Klemperer (1999) suggest a 
framework in which private valuations can be taken into account to understand 
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gradualism under the GATT. 
There are a number of future directions suggested by Chapter 4 as well. One 
is to give greater attention to the negotiation process. In the chapter as it stands 
the model of agreement formation is crude. Explicit models of agreement forma- 
tion, have been constructed by Busch and Wen (1995) and Furusawa and Wen 
(2002) and it would be interesting to extend these to a regional setting of the kind 
described in Chapter 4. 
Also, it would be nice to improve upon the 'naive' best response dynamics 
assumed in Chapter 4; the basis for the evolution of regional agreements, possibly 
towards free trade. It would be far more satisfactory to undertake such analysis, 
and establish whether or not trade blocks are building blocks, in a network where 
agents are far sighted as in Page and Wooders (2002) for example. 
Bibliography 
[1] Anderson, J. E. and H. van den Berg (1998); "Fiscal Decentralization and 
Government Size: An International Test for Leviathan Accounting for Un- 
measured Economic Activity, " International Tax and Public Finance 5: 171- 
86. 
[2] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger (1990); "A Theory of Managed Trade. " Amencan 
Economic Rev%ew, 80,779-795. 
[3] Bagwell, K. and R. Staiger (1999); "An Economic Theory of the GATT. " 
AmeTican EconomZc Review, 89(l) (March): 215-48. 
[4] Bala, V. and S. Goya: 1 (2000); "A Noncooperative Model of Network Forma- 
tion. " Econometnca, 68(5): 1181-1229. 
[5] Baldwin, R. and P. Krugman (2000); "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax 
Harmonization, " CEPR Discussion Paper no. 2630 (November). 
[6] Bergsten, F. (1975); Toward A New International EconoMZc Order, Lexing- 
ton Books, Lexington, MA. 
[7] Berliant, M. and F. Page (2001); "Income Taxes and the Provision of Public 
Goods: Existence of an Optimum, " Econometnca, 69(3): 771-84. 
[8] Besley, T. and M. Smart (2001); "Does Tax Competition Raise Voter ýýel- 
fare? " LSE Typescript. 
183 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 184 
[9] Bhagwati, J. (1988); Protectionism. MIT Press, Cambridge, NIA. 
[101 Bhagwati, J. (1991); The World Rading System at Risk, Princeton Univei-- 
sity Press, Princeton. 
[11] Bhagwati, J. (1992); "Regionalism versus Multilateralism. " The W6, rId Econ- 
omy, 15: 535-555. 
[12] Bhagwati, J. (1993); "Regionalism and Mudtilateralism; an Overview, " in 
de Melo and Panagariya (eds. ) New Dimensions in Regional Integration, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
[13] Bhagwati, J. D. Greenaway and A. Panagariya (1998); "Trading Preferen- 
tially: Theory and Policy, " Economtc Journal, (July) 108: 1128-1148. 
[14] Bhaskar, V. and T. To (2002); "Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Effi- 
cient? An Analysis of Ree Entry, " Rand Journal of Economics forthcoming. 
[15] Black, D. A. and W. Hoyt (1989) "Bidding for Firms, " AmeTican Economic 
Review, 79(5): 1249-1256. 
[16] Bloch, F. (1996); "Sequential Formation of Coalitions with Fixed Payoff 
Division and Externalities, " Games and Economic Behawor, 14: 90-123. 
[17] Boadway, R. P. Pestieau and D. E. Wildasin (1989); "Non-cooperative Be- 
havior and Efficient Provision of Public Goods, " Public Finance, 44(l): 1-7 
[18] Boadway, R., K. Cuff and N. Marceau (2002); "Inter-jurisdictional Compe- 
tition for Firnis, " International EconomZe Retýew, 43(5): 761-782. 
Bond, E. (1999) "Multilateralism, Regionalism, and the Sustainability of 
'Natural' Trading Blocs. " Penn State University mimeograph. 
[20] Bond, E. B. and J. H. Park (2000); "Gradualism in Trade Agreements '"ith 
Asymmetric Countries. " To appear in Remew of Economic Studies. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 185 
[21] Bond, E. and L. Samuelson (1986); "Tax Holidays as Signals, " AmeHcan 
Economic Rev%ew, 76(4): 820-826. 
[22] Bond, E. B. and C. Syropoulos (1996); "Trading Blocs and the Sustainability 
of Inter-regional Cooperation. " Chapter in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier and 
V. Grilli (eds), The New Transatlantic Economy, pp. 118-141. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
[23] Bond, E. B., C. Syropoulos and A. Winters (2001); "Deepening of regional 
integration and multilateral trade agreements. " Journal of Internahonal Eco- 
nomtcs, 53: 335-361. 
[24] Brainard, S. L. and T. Verdier (1994); "Lobbying and adjustment in declining 
industries, " European Economic Retýiew, 38: 586-595. 
[25] Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1984); "Tariff Protection and Imperfect compe- 
tition, " chapter in H. Kierkowski (ed. ) Monopolistic Competition and Inter- 
national Rade, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
[26] Brennan, G. and J. M. Buchanan, (1980); The Power To Tax: Analyhcal 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge University Press, Cam- 
bridge. 
[27] Busch, L. -A., and Q. Wen (1995); "Perfect Equilibria in a 
Negotiation 
Model, " Econometnca, 63(3): 545-565. 
[28] Bucovetsky, S. (1991); "Asymmetric Tax Competition, " Journal of Urban 
Economics, 30: 167-81. 
[29] Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer, (1999); "The Generalized War of Attrition, " 
Amencan Economic Remew, 89(l): 175-89. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 186 
[30] Burbidge, J. B., J. DePater, G. M. Myers and A. Sengupta (1994). "A Coali- 
tion Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs, " 
American Economic Review 87,940-956. 
[31] Cassing, J. H. and A. L. Hillman, (1986); "Shifting comparative advantage 
and senescent industry coRapse. " Amencan Economic Rem*ew, 76(3): 516- 
523. 
[321 Chisik, R. and R. B. Davies (2003); "Gradualism in Tax Treaties with Irre- 
versible Foreign Direct Investment. " International Economic Remew, forth- 
coming. 
[33] Coase, R. H. (1960); "The Problem of Social Costs", Journal of Law and 
Economics. 
[34] Conconi, P. (2002); Rade and the Enwronment, PhD Thesis, University of 
Warwick. 
[35] Conley, I and A Wooders (1997); "Equivalence of the Core and Competitive 
Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types. " Journal of Urban 
Economics, 41,421-440. 
[36] Conley, J. and M. Wooders (2001); "Tiebout Economies with Differential Ge- 
netic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics. " Journal 
of Economtc Theory, 98(2): 261-94 (June). 
[37] CREDIT, University of Nottingham (1998) "Study on the economic impact 
of introducing reciprocity in the trade relations between the EU and EAC 
countries", June. 
[38] Dam, K. W. (1970); The GATT. Law and Internattonal Economtc Organiza- 
hon. Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 187 
[39] Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin. (1986); "The E)cistence of Equilibrium in Dis- 
continuous Economic Games I. Theory. " Review of Econornic Studies 53, 
1-26. 
[40] d'Aspremont, C., I Cabszewicz, and J. Thisse (1979); "On Hotelling's Sta- 
bility in Competition, " Economehica, 17: 1145-1151. 
[41] DePater, J. A. and G. M. Myers, (1994); "Strategic Capital Tax Cornpeti- 
tion: A Pecuniary Externality and a Corrective Device, " Journal of Urban 
EconoMZcs 36: 66-78. 
[42] Devereux, M. (1997) "Growth, specialization and trade liberalization. " In- 
ternatzonal EconoMtc Retýew, 38(3): 565-585. 
[43] Devereux, M. P., R. Griffith and A. Klenun (2001); "Have Taxes on Mobile 
Capital Declined? " Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Warwick, 
May 2001 unpublished manuscript. 
[44] Devereux, M., B. Lockwood and M. Redoano (2002); "Do Countries Compete 
over Corporate Tax Rates? " Warwick Econornic Research Paper no. 642. 
[45] Dixit, A. (1987); "Strategic Aspects of 'Rade Policy. " Chapter 9 in Bew- 
ley, T. F. Advances in Economic Theory; Fifth World Congress, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
[46] Edwards, I and M. Keen (1996); "Tax Competition and Leviathan. " Euro- 
pean Economtc Remew 40(l): 113-134. 
[47] Frankel, J., E. Stein and S. Wei (1995); "Rading Blocs and the Americas: 




[48] F&usawa, T. and H. Konishi (2002) "Free 'Rade Networks. " Yokohoma --',, a- 
tional. University and Boston College mimeograph. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 188 
[49] Furusawa, T. and L. -C. Lai (1999); "Adjustment costs and gradual trade 
liberalization. " Joumal of International Economics, 49: 333-361. 
[50] Furusawa, T. and Q. Wen (2002); "Disagreement Points in Trade Negotia- 
tions, " Journal of International Economics, 57: 133-50. 
[51] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994); "Uruguay Round: 
Final Act" Marrakesh, 15 April. Photocopy. 
[52] Gordon, R. and J. D. Wilson (1986); "An Examination of Mulitjurisdictional 
Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment, " Econometn*ca, 
54(6): 1357-1373. 
[53] Gordon, R. and J. D. Wilson (1999); "Tax Structure and Government Be- 
havior: Implications for Tax Policy, " NBER Working Paper 7244. 
[54] Gordon, R. and J. D. Wilson (2002); "Expenditure Competition, " Journal of 
Public Economic Theory forthcoming. 
[55] Goyal and Joshi (2000); "Bilateralism and Free Trade. " Erasmus University 
and George Washington University mimeograph. 
[56] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994) "Protection for Sale. " Amencan 
EconomZc Review, September, 84(4): 833-50. 
[57] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1995a) "Trade Wars and Trade Talks. " 
Journal of Political Economy, August, 103(4): 675-708. 
[M] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1995b) "The Politics of Free Trade Agree- 
ments. " AmeTican EconomZc Review, September, 85(4): 667-690. 
[59] Haaparanta, P. (1996); "Competition for Foreign Direct Investment, " Jour- 
nal of Publtc Economics, 63(l): 141-53. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 
[60] I-Eggott, R. (1999); "Economics, Politics and (International) Political Econ- 
omy: The Need for a Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalization. " New Political 
Economy, 4(l): 23-36. 
[61] Hobbes, T. (1651); Leviathan reprinted subsequently in the Everyman 
brary series by J-M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1914,1962. 
[62] Hohaus, B., K. Konrad and M. Thum (1994); "Too much conformity? A 
Hotelling model of local public goods supply, " Economics Letters, 44(3): 
295-299. 
[63] Horwell, D. J. (1966); "Optimum Tariffs and Tariff Policy. " Review of Eco- 
nomtc Studies, 33,147-158. 
[64] Hotelling, H. (1929); "Stability in Competition, " Economic Journal, 39: 41- 
57. 
[65] Jackson, J. (1989); The World Rading System. MIT Press, Cambridge Mas- 
sachusetts, 417 pages. 
[66] Jackson, M. O. and A. Wohnski, (1996) "A Strategic Model of Social and 
Economic Networks, " Journal of Economic Theory, 71: 44-74. 
[67] Johnson, H. G. (1953-54); "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation. " Retýew of 
EconomZc Studies, 21,142-153. 
[68] Justman, M., J-F. Thisse and T. Van Ypersele (2001); "Fiscal competition 
and regional differentiation, " CORE Discussion Paper No. 01/24. 
[69] Kemp, M. C., and H. J. Wan (1976); "An Elementary Proposition Concerii- 
ing the Formation of Customs Unions", Journal of International Economics 
6,95-97. 
[70] Kennan, J., and R. Riezman (1990); "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs 
Unions", Canadian Journal of Economics 90,70-83. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 190 
[71] Keohane, R. (1982); "The Demand for International Regimes. " International 
Organization 36(2) (Spring) 325-355. 
[72] Keohane, R. (1984); After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 14, 'Orld 
Polffical Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
[731 King, I., R. P. McAfee and L. Welling (1993); "Industrial Blackmail: Dy- 
namic Tax Competition and Public Investment, " Canadian Journal of Eco- 
nomics, 26: 590-608. 
[74] Kose, M. A., and R. Riezman (1999). "Understanding the Welfare Impli- 
cations of Preferential Trade Agreements", CSGR Working Paper 45/99, 
University of Warwick. 
[75] Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, D. Roberts and R. Wilson (1982); "Rational Coop- 
eration in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. " Joumal of Economic 
Theory, 27,253-279. 
[761 Kreps, D. and J. A. Scheinkman (1983); "Quantity Precommitment and 
Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, " The Bell Jow-nal of Eco- 
nomZcs, 14(2): 326-337. 
[771 Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982); "Reputation and Imperfect Information. " 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27,253-279. 
[78] Krugman, P. (1991); "Is Bilateralism Bad? " in E. Helpman and J. Razin 
(eds. ) International Rade and Rade Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
[79] Krugman, P. (1998); "What's New About the New Economic Geographyl- 
Oxford Retýiew of Economtc Policy, 14(2): 7-17. 
[801 Learner, E. (1980) "Welfare computations and the optimal staging of tar- 





[81] Levy, P. (1997); "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free Trade Agreements. " 
Amencan Economic Review, 87(4): 506-19. 
[82] Lockwood, B. and J. Thomas (2002); "Gradualism and Irreversibility. " Re- 
view of Economic Studies 69(2) no. 239: 339-356. 
[83] Lockwood, B. and K. Y. Wong (2000); "Specific and Ad Valorem Tariffs Are 
Not Equivalent in Trade Wars. " Journal of International Economics, 52, 
183-195. 
[84] Mayer, W. (1981); "Theoretical Considerations of Negotiated Tariff Adjust- 
ments. " Oxford Economic Papers, 33,135-153. 
[85] McLaren, J. (1997); "Size, Sunk Costs and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free 
Trade. " American Economic Remew, 87,400-420. 
[86] Milgrom., P. and I Roberts (1982); "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incom- 
plete Information, " EconometTica 50: 443-460. 
[87] Mill, 1 (1844); Essays on Some Unsettled Queshons of Political Economy, 
Parker, London. 
[881 Mintz, J. and H. Tulkens, (1996); "Optimality Properties of Alternative Sys- 
tems of Taxation of Foreign Capital Income. " Journal of Public Economics, 
(June) 60(3): 373-99. 
[89] Mintz, J. and M. Smart (2001) "Income Shifting, Investment and Tax Com- 
petition: Theory and Evidence from Provincial Taxation in Canada, " CESifo 
Working paper 554, August 2001,17 pages. 
[90] Mussa, M. (1986) "The adjustment process and the timing of trade liberal- 
ization. " ChaPter 4 in A. M. Choski and D. Papageorgiou (eds. ) Economic 
Liberalization in Developing Countnes, Blackwell, Oxford. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 192 
[91] Myerson, R. (1977); "Graphs and Cooperation in Games. " Mathemahcs of 
Operahons Research 2: 225-229. 
[92] Oates, W. E. (1972); Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, NeNv 
York. 
[93] Oates, W. E. (1985); "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study, " Amer- 
ican Economic Remew, 75: 748-757. 
[94] Oates, W. E. (1989); "Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some Further 
Reflections, " Amencan Economic Review, 79: 578-83. 
[95] Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab (1988); "Economic Competition Among Ju- 
risdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing? " Joumal of Public 
Economics, 35: 333-354- 
[96] Olson, M. (1965). The Lopc of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
[97] Ottaviano, G. I. P. T. Tabuchi and J. -F. Thisse (2002); "Agglomeration and 
Trade: Revisited, " International Economic Review, 43: 409-436. 
[98] Page, F. and M. Wooders (2002); "Networks and Farsighted Stability, " War- 
wick Economic Research Papers no. 660, December 2002. Available on-line 
at http: //www. warwick. ac. uk/econornics/research/twerps. htrnl. 
[99] Panagariya, A. (1998) "Do 'Ransport Costs Justify Regional Preferential 
Trading Arrangements? No. " Weltunrtschaftliches Archiv/Review of World 
Economtcs 134(2): 280-301. 
[100] Mchardson, M. (1993); "Endogenous Protection andRade Diversion. " Jour- 
nal of International Economics, 34(3-4): 309-24. 
[101] Richardson, M. (1995); "On the Interpretation of the Kemp/NVan Theorem", 
Oxford Economic Papers 47,696-703. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193 
[102] Richter, W. F. and D. Wellisch (1996); "The Provision of Local Public Goods 
and Factors in the Presence of Firm and Household Mobility, " Journal of 
Pubhc EconomZc8 60: 73-93. 
[103] Riezman, R. (1985); "Customs Union and the Core, " Journal Of Interna- 
tZonal Economics 19,355-365. 
[104] Salop, S. (1979); "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, " Bell 
Journal of Economics, 10: 141-156. 
[105] Sampson, G. P. (1996); "Compatibility of Regional and Midtilateral Trade 
Arrangements: Reforming the VVTO Process", Amencan Economic Review 
86,82-88. 
[106] Slikker, M. and A. van den Nouweland (2000); "Communication Situations 
with Asymmetric Players. " Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 
52: 39-56. 
[107] Spence, M. (1976); "Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Com- 
petition, " Ret4ew of Economic Studies 43: 217-235. 
[108] Spence, M. (1977); "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, " 
Bell Journal of Economics, 8: 534-544. 
[1091 Staiger, R. (1995); "A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization. " In Levin- 
sohn, J., AN. Deardorff and R. M. Stern (eds. ) New Directions in Rade 
TheoT-y, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. 
[110] Syropoulos, C. (2001); "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How 
Country Size Matters. " To appear in Review of EconomZc Studies. 
[111] Tiebout, C. M. (1956); "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. " Journal of 
Polffical Economy, 64: 416-24. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 
[112] Whalley, J. and C. Hamilton (1996); The Rading System After The Uruguay 
Round, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. 
[113] Wildasin, D. E. (1988); "Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition. " 
Journal of Public Economics, March 1988,35(2): 229-240. 
[114] Wildasin, D. E. (1989); "Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Exter- 
nality and a Corrective Subsidy. " Journal of Urban Economics, 25: 193-212. 
[115] Wilson, J. D. (1986); "A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition. " Jowmal 
of Urban Economics, 19, pp. 296-315. 
[1161 Wilson, J. D. (1987); "Týacle, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition. " Jour- 
nal of Polffical Economy, (August) 95(4): 835-856. 
[117] Wilson, J. D. (1991); "Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Fac- 
tor Endowments. " Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1991,423-451. 
[118] Wilson, J. D. (1986); "Theories of Tax Competition. " National Tax Joumal, 
(June) 52(2) pp. 269-305. 
[119] Wooders, M. H. (1980); "The Tiebout Hypothesis; Near Optimality in Local 
Public Good Economies. " Econometnca 48: 1467-85. 
[120] Wooders, M. H. (1985); "A Tiebout Theorem, " University of Minnesota IMA 
, 
Preprint 128, published in Mathematical Social ScZences, 1989,18: 33-55. 
[121] Wooders, M. (1999) "Multijurisdictional Economies, The Tiebout Hypothe- 
sis and Sorting, " Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 96: 
10585-10587 (September). 
[122] Wooders, M., B. Zissimos and A. Dhillon (2001); "Tax 
Competition Reconsidered. " Warwick Economic Research Pa- 
pers no. 622, December 2001,52 pages. Available on-line at 
httP: //www. warwick. ac. uk/econornics/research/twerps. html. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195 
[123] WTO (2000); "Mapping of Regional Trade Agreements" World Trade Orga- 
nization, Geneva. Available online at http: //www. wto. org. 
[124] Yi, S. -S. (1996) "Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imper- 
fect Competition: Open Regionalism is Good" Journal of Internahonal Eco- 
nomics, 41: 151-175. 
[125] Zodrow, G. R. and P. Mieszkowski (1986); "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Tax- 
ation and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods. " Journal Of Urban 
EconoM%cs, 19: 356-370. 
